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The quality of higher education and research is strongly connected to the quality of the people 
working in the academic sector. For excellent science, excellent scientists are needed. The pool 
of competent scholars with academic career ambitions has been growing for the past decades. 
As public funding of universities has not matched this rise of (potential) staff, academics have 
become more dependent on competitive external project funding and individual funding. 
Publishing and grant proposal writing are two activities of major importance for especially early 
career researcher who aim to advance in academia. Funding organizations therefore play a crucial 
role in the development of academic careers, next to universities that increasingly focus on 
attracting and retaining academic top talent. The research questions of this study, ‘What is 
academic talent and how is it selected?’ aim to create a better understanding of the process of 
talent selection within academia, especially in the context of grant allocation. 
Key results of this study address the criteria used in talent assessment and more speciﬁ cally the 
weight assigned to publications; the social and competitive nature of grant allocation processes; 
the role of gender in talent selection and gender differences in academic performance; and 
factors supporting or impeding academic careers.
This study feeds current debates on scientiﬁ c quality and the growing competition for funding 
and academic positions with empirical arguments. It reﬂ ects on the existing mechanisms of talent 
selection and ends with a discussion on the implications for higher education and science policy 
to uphold and stimulate academic talent.
The Rathenau Institute promotes the formation of political and public opinion on science and 
technology. To this end, the Institute studies the organization and development of science 
systems, publishes about social impact of new technologies, and organizes debates on issues 
and dilemmas in science and technology.
Who was Rathenau?
The Rathenau Instituut is named after Professor G.W. Rathenau (1911-1989), who was 
successively professor of experimental physics at the University of Amsterdam, director of the 
Philips Physics Laboratory in Eindhoven, and a member of the Scientiﬁ c Advisory Council on 
Government Policy. He achieved national fame as chairman of the commission formed in 1978 
to investigate the societal implications of micro-electronics. One of the commission’s 
recommendations was that there should be ongoing and systematic monitoring of the societal 
signiﬁ cance of all technological advances. Rathenau’s activities led to the foundation of the 
Netherlands Organization for Technology Assessment (NOTA) in 1986. On 2 June 1994, this 
organization was renamed ‘the Rathenau Instituut’.
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Little Dandelion
Brave little Dandelion
Fast falls the snow,
Bending the daffodil’s
Haughty head low.
Under that fleecy tent
Careless of cold,
Blithe little Dandelion
Counteth her gold.
Helen Barron Bostwick
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1  Introduction
For decades there has been an ongoing discussion about quality in science. Questions related to 
quality have been the subject of a long research tradition, i.e. what is scientific quality and how to 
evaluate and improve it (e.g. Butler, 2007; Gibbons and Georghiou, 1987; Hemlin and Montgomery, 
1990; Wolff, 1970)? The same questions have been asked with regard to the societal quality of 
research (e.g. De Jong, Van Arensbergen, Daemen et al., 2011; Donovan, 2007; Spaapen, 
Dijstelbloem and Wamelink, 2007), and to human capital and academic talent (e.g. Van den 
Brink, Fruytier and Thunnissen, 2012). Due to both the complexity and relevance of these 
concepts the discussion is still ongoing.
1.1 Current debates in academia
Recently there has been rising turmoil within the academic community. While not everyone agrees, 
many academics worldwide are expressing more and more criticism and concerns about the 
functioning of contemporary academic systems. The current academic incentive system is criticized 
as overemphasizing the need to publish in high-profile journals. This is said to encourage rapid 
submissions (Collins and Tabak, 2014), and to prevent data sharing and replication of previous 
studies (The Economist, October 19th 2013a). The principle of self-correction by means of verifica-
tion is generally considered to be an important cornerstone of science, but is considered under 
threat by the current academic climate. As research aiming to verify earlier studies is generally 
considered not to be highly pioneering or interesting, it is often difficult to get funded and pub-
lished. Replication studies are claimed to do little to advance a researcher’s career (The Economist 
October 19th 2013b).
Universities are criticized as supposedly transforming themselves into ‘publication factories’, where 
publishing is strongly overrated and teaching underrated (Dijstelbloem, Huisman, Miedema et al., 
2013). In the current debates, mentoring and teaching are emphasized to be very important, as 
they involve educating new generations of researchers, but to be lacking in the assessment of 
researchers for hiring, funding or job promotion purposes (Fang and Casadevall, 2011). Whereas 
mentoring and teaching achievements are perceived as hardly contributing to career advance-
ment, publishing in prestigious journals is claimed to do so, even to such an extent that publish-
ing is criticized as having become the ultimate goal of academic labour these days. 
Furthermore, it is claimed there is too much focus on scientific excellence and star scientists, and 
too few career opportunities for young researchers. Growing numbers of PhD students and post- 
doctoral researchers are trained at universities. They are alleged to do significant work without 
much perspective on an academic career (Halffman and Radder, 2013). Early career grants are 
available, but only for what is seen as the small group of excellent young researchers. This relates 
to the severe competition characterizing modern science. Academia is even described as a ‘hyper- 
competitive’ environment: “While some competition is inarguably good for science, excessive 
competition is demoralizing, destructive, and counterproductive” (Fang and Casadevall, 2011, p. 897). 
Lately, several alignments have been established which revolt against the current situation and 
plead for change. For example, the San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA) 
Talent Proof: Selection Processes in Research Funding and Careers14
was initiated in 2012 by the American Society for Cell Biology together with a group of editors 
and publishers from scholarly journals. This group predominantly aims at reducing the dominant 
role of journal impact factors in research assessments. These factors are said to have become a 
powerful proxy for scientific value and to be widely misused in the assessment of individual 
academics. According to DORA, the focus of assessments should be on the content of primary 
research papers instead of where they are published (am.ascb.org/dora). In the Netherlands 
similar alignments include the Concerned VU group (Verontruste VU’ers, 2012) and Science in 
Transition (Dijstelbloem, et al., 2013). The Concerned VU group, consisting of academic and 
administrative staff of the VU University Amsterdam, claims that the university is too strongly 
steered by economical motives and too strongly managed by managers who lack affinity with 
scientific work or ethics. The movement called Science in Transition pleads for more appreciation 
of the added value of science for society: decisions regarding knowledge production should not 
only be in the hands of scientists, but should involve societal stakeholders as well. 
1.2 General scope of this dissertation 
Not everyone agrees on the claims described above and although some of them are broadly 
supported worldwide, in general they lack a sound empirical basis for thorough analyses. This 
dissertation is about academic careers, and more specifically, talent selection regarding early 
career researchers in the competitive context of grant allocation within the Netherlands. It 
provides empirical material which may offer the opportunity to test several of the claims related 
to the overpowering role of publications, the negative consequences of competition and the lack 
of career opportunities for early career academics. Through analyses of current evaluation and 
selection processes, we will create a better understanding of which criteria are used and the 
weight assigned to publications as criteria for talent assessment within the young generation of 
academics. Furthermore, we look at the potential consequences of competition and at career 
opportunities for early career researchers. 
We based our research on data from the Netherlands as this is an interesting case for several 
reasons. First, the Netherlands is one of the better performing Higher Education systems. It has a 
high position in various international university ranking tables and it has high average publication 
and citation scores. Second, the personal funding program de Vernieuwingsimpuls of the Dutch 
Research Council (NWO) is considered to be highly successful. Internationally it is often seen as a 
model example, proven by several similar funding programs being set up in the recent past. And 
third, in the Netherlands the role of talent management is growing in Dutch academia. In the past 
decade, many talent programs and initiatives were implemented to stimulate, attract and 
develop academic talent. For a better understanding of the current academic career and selec-
tion system in the Netherlands, including the focus on talent and excellence, the most important 
changes within higher education in the past few decades leading to the current system, are 
briefly described below.
1.3 Changing relations within academia
Since the 1980s, overall R&D expenditures in most OECD countries more than doubled, and 
within the higher education sector, even tripled. Growing investments in higher education have 
resulted in substantial growth in student numbers, causing a transition from elite to mass educa-
tion (Vincent- Lancrin, 2006). There was also a strong increase at the PhD level: OECD countries 
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showed a 40% increase in doctoral graduates between 1998 and 2006 (Auriol, 2010). The 
‘massification’ of higher education has subsequently affected the academic profession, leading to 
a rise in the number of academic staff on all levels. There has been a strong worldwide increase in 
the category of postdoctoral researcher in particular. For example, in the United States, the 
number of postdocs in 2010 increased by about 30% compared to 2005 and by 250% when 
compared to 1979 (Einaudi, Heuer, and Green, 2013). In the Netherlands within this similar more 
recent period (2005-2011), the number of postdocs increased by around 40% percent (De Goede, 
Belder and De Jonge, 2013), compared to rises of 11% for assistant professors, 7 % for  associate 
professors and 17% for full professors (VSNU/WOPI). 
At the same time due to increasing pressure towards more efficient use of public resources, ‘New 
Public Management’ was introduced. The government’s role in higher education diminished, 
empowering European universities as institutional actors (Goedegebuure and Meek, 1997; 
Leisyte, 2007; Vincent-Lancrin, 2006). This responsibility incited universities to develop more 
management and evaluation tools. Assessment has become an ongoing activity. The object of 
assessment procedures varies from individual researchers to whole institutes, from teaching to 
research performance, and from ex-post to ex-ante. Academics currently face many more 
moments of evaluation than in the past, in line with the emerging audit culture as also exists in 
broader society (Strathern, 2000). Nowadays academics are continuously monitored in terms of 
their performance not just in situations related to recruitment or promotion. Besides increased 
emphasis on output control and performance measures, decisions with regard to budgets, staff 
and strategies, previously mainly managed by public authorities, have to a large extent been 
transferred to universities. Nowadays most European universities, although there are differences 
between countries, have the authority to manage their budgets, implement their scientific and 
organizational strategies and policies, and over recruitment and staff management. They deter-
mine the size of their staff, the type of positions (e.g. academic, administrative, junior, senior, 
temporary, tenure) and the timing and procedure of recruitment. This has led to the situation in 
which universities have more control over academic careers (Musselin, 2013a). However, these 
transitions have not only changed the balance of power in university management, but also for 
academic elites (Musselin, 2013b). Full professors and academic staff play a crucial role in internal 
university policies. They are key actors in the execution and management of academic organiza-
tions (Thunnissen and Fruytier, 2014).
At the same time, as rising numbers of students and academic staff has not been matched by an 
increase of public funding, universities have become more dependent on external funding and 
more market oriented. Although in most European countries the amount of government funding 
is generally still increasing and it is a major funding source for academic research, funding has 
become more project- orientated (Lepori, Van den Besselaar, Dinges et al., 2007) and other sources 
like private funding gained importance (Vincent-Lancrin, 2006). The shift from block funding 
towards project funding has contributed to increased competition and a changing role for inter- 
mediary organizations. Instead of government funding being allocated to the entire university or 
research institute, it is to an increasing extent allocated via intermediaries directly to individual 
researchers or research groups (Lepori, et al., 2007). Universities are encouraged to compete for 
external funding from industry, national and European research councils, or charity foundations, 
also as part of a deliberate strategy to strengthen ties with society and stakeholders (Mouwen, 2000).
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The increases in academic staff supply and the changes in the funding landscape have required 
universities to adjust their career system and recruitment policies. They have reduced the share of 
tenured staff in order to increase their flexibility and adaptive power towards varying external 
demands and circumstances. This has led to a rise in temporary staff, but also to a wider variety 
of academic positions, e.g. research project staff and teaching-only staff (Huisman, De Weert and 
Bartelse, 2002; Santiago and Carvalho, 2008). Until recently, academic careers could be de-
scribed in terms of two stages: a training and temporary position stage and a permanent position 
stage. At the start of a career, people were predominantly engaged in training and developing 
academic skills, followed by a selection. Those who passed were appointed to fixed-term 
contracts. The second period was characterized by access to permanent positions. Nowadays, 
this clear structure is no longer generally valid, as people more often work in several temporary 
positions successively, without getting a permanent contract (Enders and Musselin, 2008). 
1.4 Academic career structures in the Netherlands
As this study is conducted within the context of the Dutch career system, we will now zoom in on 
the Netherlands. Figure 1 illustrates the academic ranking structure in the Netherlands, according 
to position, age and gender. Professors, associate professors and about two thirds of the assistant 
professors have permanent contracts; postdocs and PhD students generally have temporary 
positions (De Goede et al., 2013). About 60% of all academic staff is employed on a temporary 
basis. This percentage includes PhD students, whose number is rising and who all have tempo-
rary contracts.1 Excluding PhD students, the share of temporary academic staff is 40%, still more 
than twice as high as in the national labour force, where 19% of the employees has a temporary 
contract (www.vawo.nl).
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the figure: strong selection takes place in early career 
phases and there are gender differences in career structures. The first observation related to 
figure 1 is the significance of selection in the early career phases, where the number of positions 
strongly reduces with each next step upwards.2 The supply of young academic staff exceeds the 
academic career opportunities by far. Even though this selection is not unique to the academic 
sector, it does point out that doctoral education cannot be considered as a mechanism to create 
new generations exclusively of scholars. Due to the status of PhD candidates’ contracts in the 
Netherlands (formal work contract), PhD positions are generally considered a first step in an 
academic career. And in line with this general perception, most postdocs aspire to an academic 
career (Thunnissen and Fruytier, 2014). However, as a growing number of graduates will be 
employed outside academia, doctoral education to a large extent trains people for the non-
academic labour market (Huisman et al., 2002). For example, in the U.S. approximately half of 
doctoral graduates pursue an academic career (Hoffer, Dugoni, Sanderson et al., 2002), in the 
1  In the Netherlands, PhD students are generally employed by the universities, and are included in staff numbers. 
Besides this type of PhD student, there are external PhD students (e.g. working part time on their PhD while working 
elsewhere) and scholarship recipients (provided with a stipend or scholarship for their PhD research). The exact size 
of these two groups is unclear, as they are not registered as such by universities, but is estimated together to be at 
least as large as the first group.
2  Note that only PhD students employed by universities are included. Although external PhD candidates might differ 
in their ambitions for an academic career, as they are not included in figure 1, the actual selection is stronger than 
depicted here.
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Netherlands this is about 30% (Van Balen and Van den Besselaar, 2007). The large majority will 
seek a job outside academia.
Figure 1 Academic ranking structure in the Netherlands according to age, function and sex
Related to the second observation, the figure shows men are still overrepresented in higher 
positions. The shape of the career figure for women academics looks much more like a pyramid 
than that of men, where the ranking goes up more evenly. All over the world the share of women 
is growing for all academic positions, however the general rule still is ‘the higher the rank in 
academia, the lower the number of women’ (Brouns, 2000; De Weert, 2001; Timmers, Willemsen 
and Tijdens, 2010). In the Netherlands the current share of women students and PhD students are 
50% and 45% respectively, whereas the share of women professors only slowly moved up to 15%, 
one of the lowest percentages in Europe (Gerritsen, Verdonk and Visser, 2012). Currently, the 
largest bottleneck seems to be at the transition from assistant to associate professor (De Goede 
et al., 2013). The claim that this would be the result of women being less ambitious than men, 
does not hold as previous studies do not confirm gender differences in ambition (e.g. Dikkers, 
Van Engen and Vinkenburg, 2010). The stagnation of women in the academic system is con-
sidered to be the result of persistent gender disparities in science (Lariviere, Ni, Gingras et al., 
2013). More generally, gender disparity can be ascribed to a ‘male model’ of science, including 
masculinity of organizational, social and cultural norms within academic organizations 
(Bleijenbergh, Blonk, Schulte et al., 2008). For example, university standards implicitly prescribe 
working fulltime and overtime, full availability and flexibility of staff. Furthermore, there is a strong 
Source: VSNU/Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs Personeelsinformatie (WOPI)
Rathenau Instituut
Talent Proof: Selection Processes in Research Funding and Careers18
emphasis on early achievements and mobility, mainly disadvantaging female academics who 
often have greater responsibilities towards starting and maintaining a family, particularly early on 
in their career (Bleijenbergh, Benschop and Vennix, 2013; Etzkowitz and Ranga, 2011; Ranga, 
Gupta and Etzkowitz, 2012). 
In order to prevent excellent scholars from leaving academia and due to a growing awareness of 
the importance of human capital, more and more attention is being paid to talent selection and 
talent management. More than ever before, universities explicitly aim for attracting and retaining 
talent. A growing number of European organizations is currently using the Human Resources 
Strategy for Researchers (HRS4R) to align their policies and practices to the principles of the 
European Commission’s Charter and Code. In acknowledgement of their efforts they can display 
the HR Excellence in Research logo awarded by the European Commission. With this logo 
organizations can present themselves as providers of a stimulating and favourable work environ-
ment, committed to fair and transparent recruitment and appraisal procedures. Various talent 
selection and development programs have been implemented so far. For example, following the 
American example, many European countries currently recruit academics via tenure tracks, 
offering high potentials a promotion trajectory based on individual performance. The employee 
is hired on a temporary contract, with the prospect of a permanent contract if (s)he meets certain 
performance criteria within the first few years. Furthermore there are scholarships for excellent 
PhD students, mentoring programs for early career researchers, programs promoting equal 
opportunities for women, and coaching programs stimulating and supporting high potentials in 
applying for external funding (De Boer and Jongbloed, 2010; Huisman, De Weert and Bartelse, 
2002; Neufeld, Huber and Wegner, 2013; Van den Brink, Fruytier and Thunnissen, 2012). 
Also with regard to funding worldwide there is an increased focus on talent and excellence. Not 
only because grants are to a large extent distributed via competition, but also as various coun-
tries set up personal funding programs especially directed at talented early career researchers 
(e.g. the ‘Future Research Leaders’ grants of the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC), the Saupere Aude Postdoc grants of the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF) 
or the Veni grants of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO)). Although the 
size of these programs varies, they do take up a significant part of the research councils’ budgets 
(Van Arensbergen, Hessels and Van der Meulen, 2013). The growing importance of these 
programs, reflected in their budget sizes and application pressures, places these intermediary 
organizations - peopled with members of the academic community - in a more central position 
within the academic playing field (Musselin, 2013b). 
1.5 Focus and outline of this dissertation
In short, in the past decades, the balance in temporary and tenure positions has shifted much 
more towards temporary positions. Academics have become more dependent on competitive 
external project funding and individual funding. The relations have altered between the various 
actors within the academic playing field: the academic staff and their peers, the academic 
organization including human resource management (HRM) and administration, and the inter-
mediary research councils. All these developments have led to an increase of evaluation practices 
and occurrences, to intensified competition for funding and academic positions, and finally to 
more emphasis on talent and excellence, especially in early careers. In this study the main focus is 
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on the concept of talent and we will examine the process of talent selection within the academic 
community. The overall aim of this study is to create a better understanding of the process of 
talent selection. By using different methods and combining various levels of aggregation, we will 
answer overarching research questions as what is academic talent and how is it selected? 
Chapter 2 analyses the notion of talent in more detail. Based on interviews with established 
academics involved in the allocation of personal research grants, we will compare concrete and 
general views on talent. How do they recognize talent among grant applicants and among 
academics in their own daily work environment? Furthermore, by analyzing the process of grant 
allocation we create a better understanding of which criteria are used during the selection 
process and how final allocation decisions are established within panels. 
Since talent selection is increasingly performed by panels, chapter 3 shows what is known from 
the literature on this type of panel reviewing and group decision making. This literature review 
combines peer review studies from the sociology of science and science policy studies with 
group dynamics studies from social psychology to better understand the dynamics of these 
selection decisions within panels. 
Chapter 4 is a quantitative study of the talent selection procedure. Through statistical analyses of 
the reviews of about 900 grant applications, we will show how the followed procedure affects the 
selection decisions. Furthermore, it shows the importance of the various phases and criteria within 
the procedure. For example, what is the influence of the external peer reviews and what is the 
influence of the interview with the candidate? This chapter also answers the question how evident 
talent is and whether real top talents can be identified. Subsequently it studies the relation between 
talent selection and gender. Is talent selection gender-neutral and does panel composition matter?
In chapter 5 we take a closer look into the issue of gender bias. One of the potential factors 
explaining the underrepresentation of women in higher academic positions is the difference in 
scientific performance between men and women. Are men outperforming women? By analyzing 
the publication and citation records of 843 social scientists, we study whether these often 
demonstrated gender differences still exist in younger generations of researchers, and whether 
men still outperform women in terms of productivity.
After several chapters on the process of talent selection, chapter 6 is about the talents them-
selves. Interviews are conducted with academics who were previously identified as talent, but of 
whom several have left academia in the meantime. A comparison is made between the careers of 
talents who stayed in academia and of those who left academia. It is an exploratory study on the 
importance of various factors deciding for talents to stay within science or to switch to a career 
outside science.
This dissertation concludes with a general discussion on the current mechanisms of talent selection. 
After summarizing all chapters and more specifically the main findings regarding the notion and 
recognition of talent, we discuss the potential impact of the current selection mechanisms on 
academic talent. What are the potential consequences for the talented academics and for the 
academic organizations? Finally, the implications for practice and future research are given.
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2  Different views on scholarly talent: What 
are the talents we are looking for in science?1
Abstract
In this paper we study the evaluation of talented early career researchers, as done in grant 
allocation processes. To better understand funding decisions, we studied the grant allocation 
process in more detail, and compare the notion of talent in grant allocation with more general 
notions of talent existing in the academic work environment. The comparison is based on interviews 
with 29 scholars who have experience with identifying talent both in their daily academic work 
and in the process of grant allocation. Overall there is large agreement on the notion of talent. 
However, the characteristics ascribed to top talent vary depending on the evaluation context. In 
grant allocation a narrower talent definition prevails compared to more general evaluation. 
Furthermore, difficulties arise in the process of panel decision-making, when selection criteria 
need to be concrete and explicit to enable comparison. Having to choose between many appli-
cants of similar quality makes the selection process liable to subjectivity, arbitrariness and random-
ness. Despite these uncertainties, grants are ascribed a very high symbolic value. Small quality 
differences are enlarged into considerable differences in recognition, consequently affecting 
career opportunities, as they provide academics with both financial and symbolic resources.
2.1 Introduction
The quality of higher education and research is strongly connected to the quality of the people 
working in the academic sector. For excellent science, excellent scientists are needed. Therefore 
government and universities specifically aim at selecting the best people when investing public 
resources in education and research. This has led to an increased focus on talent and talent 
policy, especially within the group of early career researchers. This is a general phenomenon, also 
clearly visible within the Netherlands, the specific context of this study. In the hiring policies of 
Dutch universities the notion of talent nowadays has taken a central position. It is becoming a key 
issue in Higher Education for Human Resource Management (HRM); a management tool that 
focuses on individual performance (Waring, 2013). Several programs and policy initiatives are 
currently implemented to attract and stimulate academic talent, e.g. the Tenure Track program, 
scholarships for excellent PhD students, and mentoring programs for promising female academ-
ics (De Boer & Jongbloed, 2010; Van den Brink, Fruytier & Thunnissen, 2012). Furthermore, many 
programs are directed towards motivating researchers to apply for external grants and to 
increase the chances of young researchers to acquire external funding. They involve pre-selection 
processes, encouragement by dedicated mentors, training and supervision of writing grant 
applications, and improvement of presentation skills (Neufeld, Huber and Wegner, 2013). 
The increased focus on acquiring external funding is both a deliberate consequence of changes 
in funding policy (from institutional towards project funding), as it is a result of the growing pool 
1   This chapter has been accepted for publication by Research Evaluation as Van Arensbergen, P., Van der Weijden, I. 
& Van den Besselaar, P. (forthcoming). Different views on scholarly talent: What are the talents we are looking for in 
science?
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of competent scholars with academic career ambitions. Government funding used to be pre-
dominantly allocated as block funding to the entire university or research institute. Nowadays, in 
many countries intermediaries like research councils have taken an important position in the 
distribution of resources, as they allocate an increasing share of government funding directly to 
individual researchers or research groups (Lepori et al., 2007). Securing external research grants 
has become a prominent criteria in academic recruitment, evaluation and promotion processes in 
science (Bloch, Graversen & Pedersen, 2014; De Jonge Akademie, 2010; Laudel & Gläser, 2012; 
Van Arensbergen, Hessels & Van der Meulen, 2013). Therefore, career opportunities as well as 
university appointment decisions of individual scientists depend on granting decisions made by 
external funders, like the European Research Council (ERC) or the Dutch Research Council 
(NWO). Personal career grants are to an increasing extent considered as a necessary resource in 
order to further develop an academic career. The real effect of these grants on someone’s career 
is subject of many studies. A recent study (Laudel & Gläser, 2012) on the impact of ERC grants on 
careers of grantees, showed that several organizations responded to the reputation of ERC grants 
by promoting (mainly ERC starting) grantees or by offering them tenure. At the same time the 
grants were found to only play a minor role in promoting inter-organizational mobility. Most of 
the grantees already worked in the best possible environments, and/or were settled with their 
families which constrained them to move. A Danish study showed that grant recipients from the 
Danish council for Independent Research have a higher probability of becoming a full professor 
(16%) compared to rejected applicants (9%). Also grant recipients stressed the central role of 
grants in facilitating subsequent collaboration with leading researchers in their field and in 
establishing their own positions in research communities (Bloch et al., 2014). 
A successful personal funding instrument of the Dutch Research Council is the Innovational 
Research Incentives Scheme (Vernieuwingsimpuls). Gerritsen, Plug and Van der Wiel (2013) 
recently studied the effect of these grants and found that they indeed increase one’s chance of a 
successful academic career. Comparing applicants with about the same priority scores, they 
found that grantees are more likely than rejected applicants to stay in academia, receive follow-
up grants and become a full professor. These results show that the allocation of personal career 
grants is an important context of talent selection. To study the notion of talent within science, the 
process of grant allocation is therefore included and investigated in more detail. 
2.2 Research questions
In this study we investigate the process of talent selection in more detail with a twofold aim. On 
the one hand we want to create a better understanding of the notion of academic talent. What 
are the talents the academic community is looking for, both within academia in general as within 
grant allocation procedures? On the other hand we want to open up the black box of grant 
allocation by scientific panels. For improving the transparency, quality and legitimacy of grant 
allocation practices, it would therefore be important to uncover the details of the de facto (implicit 
and explicit) applied criteria. Which characteristics of applicants do panel reviewers value the 
most and how do they reach agreement within panels?
2.3 Theoretical background
The word ‘talent’ clearly has a positive connotation, but there is no general consensus on the 
exact meaning of it. A highly debated issue, for example, is the origin of talent: is talent innate or 
Rathenau Instituut 21
acquired (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1998; versus Howe, Davidson & Sloboda, 1998)? A recent quantita-
tive study on career grant allocation showed that except for a few positive outliers (top talents), 
no evident pool of talents could be identified based on review scores (Van den Besselaar & Van 
Arensbergen, 2013). Thomas and Nedeva (2013) recently developed a multidimensional frame-
work of 23 elements to characterize talented researchers, based on an extensive literature review. 
Examples of these elements are geographic and workplace mobility, demographic variables and 
the amount of academic service tasks undertaken.
2.3.1 Symbolic capital
In this paper we relate the notion of talent to ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1986). Bourdieu discerned 
several forms of capital, most importantly economic (financial resources), cultural (education and 
upbringing) and social (relations and networks) capital. In every field, like politics, arts, economy 
and science, there is competition for accumulating as much capital as possible. The general 
distribution of these types of capital and the way they can be accumulated is field specific. The 
various forms of capital can be converted into other forms, most importantly into symbolic capital. 
Symbolic capital concerns the reputation and prestige accredited to someone, based on the 
recognition of his accumulated capital. In science this is mainly determined by the judgment of 
peers. Evaluation processes - whether it concerns reviewing scientific manuscripts for publication 
or assessing academics for recruitment or promotion practices - can be charac-terized as self- 
governing as they are mainly executed by academics themselves. Academic reputation and quality 
therefore lives by peer recognition. We relate symbolic capital to talent selection, since assigning 
the prestigious label of talent can be seen as recognition of a person’s accumulated capital. 
What is considered to be valuable capital and how it can be accumulated, is determined by the 
academic habitus. According to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, academics generally have 
internalized certain dispositions and norms in response to objective conditions they encountered 
through their academic work. The habitus is shaped by past experiences and guides current 
behavior and thinking within a specific field. It refers to the embodiment of certain dispositions, 
so not only at the explicit conscious level (Bourdieu, 1988). From the perspective of talent 
selection, habitus determines what is considered to be valuable capital, as it relates to disposi-
tions academics should have or should develop in time. People are not only assessed on their 
current dispositions, but also on their potential, what are they expected to become, reflecting the 
habitus of the more established academics. Looking into how academics decide who is talented 
and who is not, will provide more insight in which qualities of academics the scientific community 
value the most and are part of the academic habitus. 
In this study we modify Bourdieu’s forms of capital and differentiate between professional, 
individual and social capital, following the example of Van den Brink (2009), who applied the 
concept of symbolic capital to appointment practices within academia. Professional capital 
involves skills, experience and achievements related to research, teaching and management. This 
is mainly assessed from track records, e.g. in terms of years of experience, former employers, 
number of publications and acquired funding. Formal assessment criteria predominantly reflect 
professional capital. Individual capital has more of a subjective character and is about personal 
traits and motivation. For example creativity, perseverance, commitment and likeability relate to 
individual capital. Finally, social capital is defined as consisting “of an aggregation of networks 
and these networks provide access to certain resources and positions of power” (Van den Brink, 
2009: p. 145). Social capital is not only valuable as it itself can be converted into symbolic capital, 
it also serves as an accelerator for turning accumulated professional and individual capital into 
symbolic capital: academic prestige. As science is turning more into a social activity, and as 
collaboration is of growing importance, we chose to extend the concept of social capital with 
those skills and traits needed for interaction and collaboration - the skills needed for creating and 
maintaining social networks. Thus, some of the skills that generally are considered as professional 
or individual capital, (e.g. communication skills, ability to collaborate, and social attitudes), are 
treated in this study as (conditions for) social capital. 
To summarize, in this paper we study symbolic capital in the context of talent selection, as the 
recognition of professional, individual and social capital. We will identify the skills and traits 
characterizing talent and categorize them as one of the three types of capital (see table 3).
2.3.2 Academic talent selection
An inventory of definitions of talent in policy documents of several Dutch universities (Thunnissen, 
Fruytier & Van den Brink, 2010), shows that the general descriptions of talent leave considerable 
room for interpretation: talents are people who perform better than expected based on their age 
and/or experience (p. 20), or talents are they of whom is expected to be able to shortly acquire a 
position as an associate professor (p. 19). The main criteria for assessing young talents are 
publications, study and promotion results, honors degrees, awards, grants, and international 
experience. These criteria primarily relate to professional capital. To a lesser extent individual 
capital is mentioned within policy documents, such as motivation and drive.
Evaluation of scientific quality is often carried out in panels. To understand how talent is evaluated 
and selected in these panels, it is not enough to only study characteristics of the talents and the 
reviewers. Panel decisions are influenced by, and the result of, group interaction, making group 
and context characteristics important variables to include. Luukkonen (2012) studied review processes 
of ERC panels and showed how panel decisions are steered by customary interpretative and 
deliberation rules. From literature reviews on this type of panel reviewing, we learn that, for example 
group composition, group dynamics (e.g. discussion, sharing of information, power relations), 
characteristics of the procedure and contextual factors (e.g. budget, time pressure, accountability) 
can strongly affect the decision outcomes (Olbrecht & Bornmann, 2010; Van Arensbergen, Van 
der Weijden & Van den Besselaar, forthcoming). These factors impede the transparency and 
predictability of decision-making processes. However, as this type of panel evaluation involves 
interactions between human beings, it needs to be considered as a social and emotional process. 
Therefore, it is impossible to completely rule out any form of subjectivity (Lamont, 2009). 
In this paper, we approach the process of talent selection as a strongly subjective process. We 
study it as fully as possible by investigating the decision-making process on both the individual 
and group level. We look at how reviewers use formal procedures and interpret formal criteria in 
their own way when evaluating grant applications. Furthermore, we analyze panel discussions 
and the way panels reach their final allocation decisions. By studying the process of personal 
grant allocation, we aim to get a better understanding of how symbolic capital is ascribed within 
academic talent selection.
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2.4 Data and methods
Data for this article consists out of 29 semi-structured interviews with members of grant panels. 
All the respondents were involved in reviewing and allocating personal career grants in 2009 for 
two funding programs within the Talent Program called Innovational Research Incentives Scheme 
(Vernieuwingsimpuls) of the Dutch Research Council (NWO). Table 1 gives an overview of these 
funding programs, the Early Career Grant (ECG) and Intermediate Career Grant (ICG) scheme. 
This grant scheme is not limited to a certain scientific domain, but has eight domain panels and 
one interdisciplinary panel. In this paper we grouped the eight domains into two main domains: 
Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH), and Natural and Technical Sciences (NTS).
Table 1 Innovational Research Incentives Scheme
Early career grant (Veni) Intermediate career grant (Vidi)
Career conditions 0-3 years after PhD 0-8 years after PhD
Funding Max. €250.000 per grant Max. €800.000 per grant
Duration 3 years 5 years
Number of grants 150 per year 85 per year
Acceptance rates (%) 2002 25 17
2005 22 26
2008 18 21
2012 16 14
2013 15 20
From the list of about 220 panellists active in 2009, we invited 40 of them across the various 
domains for an interview. Efforts were made to attain comparable numbers of women and men. 
The large majority was willing to participate: five people did not reply and seven were willing but 
unable to participate due to time constraints or illness. The respondents are predominantly 
associate or full professor and come from various scientific domains, from social sciences to life 
sciences (see table 2 for more details). Most of the respondents have been involved in this type 
of grant allocation for several years, have experience in internal selection processes at the 
university, and have been active as (national and international) peer reviewers. 
Table 2 Overview of the respondents per program, domain and gender
ECG ICG
Male Female Male Female Total
Social Sciences & Humanities 4 5 2 3 14
Natural & Technical sciences 7 3 2 2 14
Total 11 8 5* 5 29*
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* including one panellist for cross disciplinary applications which is not categorized as SSH or NTS.
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The research fieldwork was conducted in the beginning of 2012. Most of the interviews were 
conducted at the respondent’s workplace (27), two were done by telephone, with an average 
duration of one hour. Respondents were asked about identification of talent in their daily aca-
demic work (e.g. describe young academics that clearly stood out in their group or who they 
really would have liked to retain). As this type of identification concerns the respondent’s general 
view on talent apart from any specific selection or appraisal procedures, we refer to this as 
general talent identification. We feel this provides a useful frame of reference to better under-
stand specific types of talent selection. Then we asked about talent selection within the grant 
panel (e.g. how do they review the grant applications; what criteria do they use in the different 
phases of the selection process; how do they recognize the top talents; how are the applicants 
discussed within the panel; how does the panel reach the final allocation decisions?). This we will 
call concrete grant talent selection, because of the presence of concrete selection procedures 
and because actual selection takes place. 
All interviews were audiotape recorded, transcribed verbatim, send back to interviewees for 
authorization and coded using the software program Atlas.ti (see table 3 for summary of this 
code scheme). 
Table 3 Most important codes describing the three types of capital
Professional Individual Social
Awards Ability to work hard Ability to motivate others
Broad expertise Ability to work independently Being proactive
Clear presentation (interview) Ambition Being social
Comprehensible proposal Authenticity Communication skills
Cum laudes Enthusiasm Fit in a group
Elaborate proposal Goal directed Having a large network
Grants Leadership skills Persuasiveness
International experience Originality Social skills
Previous employers/institutes Perseverance Team spirit
Publication record Self-consciousness
Writing skills Willingness to learn
2.5 Results
First we focus on how talent is generally identified in daily work at the university, before shifting 
to talent selection in the concrete context of grant allocation. At the end of this paper we will 
look into the process of group decision making and which difficulties panellists face in the final 
phase of the selection process. As our main focus is not on gender, career stage or disciplinary 
differences, we will not structurally compare men and women, nor the ECG and ICG schemes, 
nor the NTS and SSH domains when describing our results, but only where we found important 
differences. 
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2.5.1 The general concept of scholarly talent
Real talents were said to be easily and widely recognized. They are those who do not excel on 
one single dimension, but on various dimensions, combining all forms of capital. Talent is multi-
dimensional. Related to professional capital talented academics distinguish themselves from 
others by having broad expertise, excellent writing skills and above all a high productivity. 
Productivity is positively assessed when one has a high number of publications, also first authored, 
preferably in prestigious journals with a high impact factor. This is in line with the formal criteria 
formulated in many career policy documents. 
Although young academics need to have accumulated considerable professional capital to be 
identified as talent, respondents emphasized talents above all stand out from the majority 
because of their individual capital. Especially female respondents strongly value this type of 
capital as more than half of all traits mentioned by women had to do with personality and 
motivation. The personality trait that is central to the academic habitus and mentioned most 
frequently - by both men and women - is the ability to work very hard. People who lack this ability 
will never make it in science, especially in top science. This also means young researchers need 
to be very ambitious and eager, possess a strong drive to become a top researcher, and work 
with great enthusiasm and passion. Since the academic world is a competitive world and set-
backs are unavoidable, perseverance is considered to be an exigency, a crucial part of the 
academic habitus. Top talents do not let themselves be demotivated by rejections and negative 
reviews, but they learn from them and use these experiences to grow. Furthermore, talents are 
willing to learn, and are strongly self-conscious and goal directed. A last personal trait, which 
seems to be more important within NTS compared to SSH, is the ability to work independently 
and ‘think for yourself’. 
Being a social person is found to be a primary requirement in order to be considered a talent. As 
science is not purely an individual activity, but becomes to an increasing extent a social activity, it 
is found of great importance to fit well in a group and to have good social skills. Social skills seem 
to become a more important part of the academic habitus over time. In line with Bourdieu’s 
meaning of social capital, young talents are described as people who already created their own 
significant network and are not just embedded in their professor’s network.2 Having a strong 
network is seen as meaningful in two ways. It shows they are good academics, as they are 
acknowledged by other people who they are connected with. But it is also considered a strategy 
in order to increase your career opportunities and academic success. If you really want to be 
successful in science you need to have the right connections and the ability to make and maintain 
these connections. Interestingly, having your own network as characteristic of talent was only 
mentioned by women, not by men. This could be explained by earlier research (Bleijenbergh, 
Benschop & Vennix, 2013; Van den Brink, 2009) suggesting that networks play an important role 
in distribution of information, resources and career opportunities. As men are overrepresented in 
academia and have more homogenous networks than women (Brass, Joseph, Greve et al., 2004), 
women may be disadvantaged and therefore more aware of the importance of having a good 
network.
2  For an indicator based on similar ideas: Van den Besselaar et al. (2012). 
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Other social characteristics valued in talents are having a strong team spirit, being interested in 
others, willing to help others and being able to motivate them. Finally, talents have good 
communication skills, take a lot of initiative and they are proactive.
“On the one hand you want to hire the best people, but they should also fit in the group. 
Some people are very good, but completely antisocial. […] we are all just human beings 
and we want someone in our group who is a nice person. There are plenty of people with 
whom in theory I could collaborate with perfectly content wise. But the chemistry is not 
right or there are little things of which you think, am I going to invest my time in this?” 
(male, interdisciplinary) 
      
To sum up, the majority of characteristics of talent valued in general daily academic work can be 
described as features of individual capital: personal traits, motivation and ambition. For women 
this holds even stronger than for men. 
However, one type of professional capital was found to be of special importance: acquired 
grants. A large majority of the respondents do not consider these simply as part of track records, 
but as a significant indicator in itself of previous recognition of talent. In times of severe competi-
tion and generally low allocation rates, grants have an important value. They provide the receiver 
with both financial resources and prestige. Especially personal career grants as the ERC grants 
and the Dutch Veni- and Vidi-grants are considered very meaningful for young researchers.
 
“Currently it is extremely important to enter the Veni- and Vidi- trajectory or something 
similar at a very early stage. From the beginning of your career you should have received 
some sort of mark indicating you are on the right track. Those will get a plus for sure, they 
successfully passed the procedure. And the selections are very heavy, everyone knows. 
There you don’t have a 80% chance, but more likely the opposite of 10 to 20%. So if you 
have survived, it gives you the mark ‘top’, meaning you are obviously very good.” (male, NTS)
As the selection is tough, those who managed to receive a grant are assumed to be excellent 
researchers. In the sociology of science this phenomenon is also known as the Matthew effect. 
Scientific credits like awards and grants are more often allocated to researchers who received 
them before, than to those who haven’t, even when the quality of their work is similar (Merton, 
1968). In terms of conversion of professional capital (grants) into symbolic capital (prestige), 
grants have a very high exchange rate. As these personal career grants are seen as important 
indicators of talent - also within career policy - we will in the next section take a closer look at this 
process of grant allocation.
2.5.2 The concrete concept of talent within  grant allocation 
The process of grant allocation within the Innovational Research Incentives Scheme 
(Vernieuwingsimpuls) consists of several evaluation phases.3 The criteria used to evaluate the 
applications are found to vary across the several evaluation phases. For this reason we succes-
sively describe the various phases and which criteria are primarily used by individual reviewers in 
3  See Van Arensbergen & Van den Besselaar (2012) for more details on the allocation procedure.
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each phase. After subsequently comparing this concrete case to the just described general 
identification of talent on the individual level, we will describe how talent is deliberated within 
panels and how panels reach agreement with regard to talent selection. 
Pre-selection: many applications, limited information
In case of a much higher number of applications compared to number of grants, the allocation 
procedure involves pre-selection, as often occurs. For the pre-selection panellists receive the 
research proposals and the curriculum vitae of the applicants. Applications are not yet sent to 
external reviewers, who can be considered to be the experts in the specific research area. Panels 
are composed in such a way that their members cover a broad expertise. This implies that the 
panel as a whole is assumed to have the expertise to review all proposals as good as possible. At 
the same time this implies that a single panellist lacks knowledge to accurately review all pro-
posals. Respondents indicate to be aware of this and many of them consider the broadness of 
the set of applications as problematic and impeding the selection process. Especially taking into 
account that the rejection rate in this phase is often about forty percent.
Figure 1  Schematic overview selection procedure Innovational Research Incentives Scheme 
(Veni/Vidi)
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“You need to review and judge research and performance of people from a completely 
different research field. And within the social sciences these differences are really huge. 
Certainly last time, we had people from psychology to law and so on. And yes, the 
tradition of publishing and way of working, everything is so different that you really are 
comparing apples and oranges. […] At the same time it is an enrichment as you are 
confronted with things you consider to be normal while others don’t, and the other way 
around. But it is quite difficult.” (female, SSH)
Because of the heavy workload and the wide range of topics, panellists tend to primarily focus on 
the curriculum vitae of the applicant. The curriculum vitae, proof of mainly professional capital, is 
found to be generally easy to review for all applicants, regardless of disciplinary proximity. 
“The applicant can be evaluated rather objectively. You can put a list next to it and count 
like, how many publications, how many awards, grants, honor degrees, that kind of things.” 
(female, SSH)
List of publications is mentioned as the most important indicator of talent in this first selection 
phase. Secondly, especially according to female respondents, there should be a notification of 
international experience. More generally, respondents use the institute, lab or organization itself 
an applicant previously worked at as a quality criteria. However, this only holds for the NTS domain, 
as in the SSH domain it was only mentioned once. Similar to what we found with regard to general 
talent selection, honor degrees, awards and grants are highly valued as professional capital.   
In this first evaluation phase the emphasis is on professional capital, as three quarters of all 
criteria mentioned are related to this type of capital. To a much smaller extent panellists review 
individual and social capital. These types of capital are found harder to assess based on résumé’s 
and written proposals. Nonetheless panellists do look for indications of authenticity, independ-
ence, and leadership skills (individual capital) and for quality of the applicant’s network (social 
capital). They mainly ground their assessment on (co-)authorship patterns. People are positively 
evaluated when they published without their promoter, with various researchers from other 
(international) institutes, and on topics different from their PhD research. They are seen as having 
clear goals and ideas about what they personally want to accomplish, as being able to create 
their own niche and network (authenticity), and to work independently.
Although the applicant’s résumé is found to be most decisive, abstracts of research proposals are 
important too. All panellists, regardless of specific expertise, should be able to generally under-
stand the abstract. If it is too specific or too much jargon is used, it will not be evaluated posi-
tively. Applicants are expected to be able to inform a broad audience about their research ideas. 
“When I started, I remember in the first round I returned five or so of the thirty applications I 
had to review. I said I was not able to assess them. They were far out of my working range. 
In the second year, you don’t do that anymore, as for the third year. Then you may think, 
oh no, not another one you don’t understand. But after all, it is up to the applicants to 
make clear to everyone who reads the abstract what they aim to do. If they succeed it is 
fine, it is a good application. If they fail, it is not a good application.” (female, NTS)
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In short, in the pre-selection phase the emphasis clearly is on professional capital as assessed 
from résumés. Besides having an impressive publication list, including first author publications, 
independent from the promoter and on a different topic, talents are able to communicate their 
research ideas in a clear and generally comprehensive way. 
Involving external peer review: bringing in more expertise
Next, panels have to select applicants for the interview round. Proposals are reviewed more 
thoroughly beyond résumé and abstract. At first proposals are more globally assessed, and 
panellists determine their level of expertise regarding the specific topic. When one concludes to 
have enough expertise, (s)he will critically review the proposal in more detail. Otherwise, (s)he will 
leave the thorough evaluation of the actual content of the proposal up to external reviewers, who 
are the experts in the specific research area. 
In this phase of the process applications are sent to (generally two or three) external reviewers 
based on their specific expertise. In an earlier quantitative study on grant allocation within the 
same Dutch research council and funding program, the external reviews were found to play a 
modest role in the selection process, which are eventually decisive (Van Arensbergen & Van den 
Besselaar, 2012). This can be explained because panellists indicated to not automatically take 
over these expert reviews, but evaluate and weigh them. They primarily want to understand how 
the external reviewers determined their score. When external reviews lack a clear motivation or 
when panellists disagree, they can decide not to take it into account when formulating their own 
score.
“Some external reviews are very good, some are very bad. It is also possible to put the 
external reviewer offside, I agree. We had several situations in which we thought that the 
review did not come up completely objectively. This person is only trying to slice down the 
applicant instead of giving serious feedback. You also check if your opinion on the 
applications matches the opinion of the external reviewers.” (female, SSH) 
When panellists evaluate the quality of the research proposal the focus is predominantly on 
elaboration. It should contain a complete description of the research idea, context, methodology, 
relevance etc. No gaps or any missing information. As in the pre-selection, generally understand-
able phrasing is strongly valued. Other important criteria are originality and innovativeness of 
research topics, and feasibility of proposals. However, some proposals describe very innovative 
research questions, but lack any clear evidence that the applicant will be able to answer them (in 
time). These proposals score lower. Furthermore panellists want to be convinced that the 
proposal is really the applicant’s work. It should be part (or the beginning) of their own line of 
research, not of their PhD supervisor. Just as in the pre-selection phase, authenticity is highly 
valued, showing their personal contribution to the proposal, and giving it their own clear signature. 
To summarize, in this phase the emphasis is still on professional capital, as the most important 
criteria used by panellists are track record and a clearly elaborated and feasible grant proposal. 
Elements of individual capital are also assessed to some extent. Talents are those applicants who 
are creative, innovative, and most of all authentic.
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Selection after the interview: having been face to face with applicants
In the next stage a selection of applicants is reviewed in a face-to-face interview of about thirty 
minutes. Applicants present their proposal and answer questions of panellists. In line with earlier 
research, panellists indicate this is a very decisive phase in the selection process (see also 
Van Arensbergen & Van den Besselaar, 2012). For some applicants it is a clear turning point, 
meaning a considerable shift in their ranking. 
“I noticed that even if you received excellent external reviews, it can still go wrong 
completely. That is the most important role of the panel, you assume that if one has real 
talent, it will show in an interview of twenty minutes. You ask a few questions and then one 
has to think flexibly enough to respond with ‘yes indeed, when this won’t work out I still 
have this or that theory’. So it has to be someone who thinks about research in a realistic 
and flexible way and does not only have excellent papers. You notice rather quickly in 
interviews who you really consider to be a talent, not only on paper but as a real person.” 
(female, NTS) 
First of all talents are able to give a clear presentation, with a right balance of showing academic 
expertise and using a generally understandable language at the same time. Comments from the 
external reviewers given to them in the previous selection round, need to be taken up or con-
tested with a clear explanation. Furthermore, the way in which applicants answer the questions is 
strongly assessed. For panels, this serves as an opportunity to test several of the criteria applied 
previously to the written application, predominantly authenticity. Where they can have received 
strong support from e.g. their promoter while writing the proposal, reflecting on the proposal 
they fully have to do themselves during the interview. This gives panels more room to assess 
individual capital and their academic habitus, as applicants’ answers better reflect personal skills 
and ideas. 
“Persuasiveness and enthusiasm, but also if you don’t have that, enthusiasm needs to be 
there [during the interview], otherwise you’re out. An extra check whether the person 
clearly comprehends [the topic] and whether it is really his own thing and the proposal is 
not written by someone else. You try to figure out if the person really is into it. As for 
content not much happens anymore, that happened beforehand. […] I believe it are these 
things. They are often hard to prove, they are intuitive.” (male, NTS)
As this male respondent indicates, during the interview intuition comes into play. Writing and 
presenting a proposal can be improved by training, and panels can evaluate them with a certain 
extent of objectivity. However, especially in this phase of the evaluation process, more subjective 
criteria related to individual capital play an important role, mainly enthusiasm, perseverance and 
ambition. Because it is all about allocating personal career grants, panellists want to be con-
vinced that applicants really want to and are able to conduct the research project. Enthusiasm 
needs to be accompanied by strong persuasiveness. As this has to do with communication skills, 
this is linked to social capital. Finally panellists look at personality of applicants. Since there are 
only a few grants to allocate, they prefer allocating grants to someone they like instead of 
someone who appears arrogant or unfriendly.  
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To summarize, also in this evaluation phase, the emphasis is on professional capital. Academic 
skills evaluated earlier in the procedure, are tested during the interview. Does the applicant really 
have the knowledge and skills to conduct the proposed research project? Furthermore, during 
the interview much more attention is paid to individual, and to a smaller extent also to social 
capital. Face to face contact enables panels to evaluate the real person behind the proposal. 
Talents are those who succeed in convincing the panel of their authenticity, enthusiasm, ambition, 
perseverance, and excellent communication skills. We found that for male panellists the shift in 
focus during the interview from professional towards individual capital is larger than for females. 
The same holds true for the NTS domain compared to the SSH domain. 
2.5.3 Tension between general and concrete talent identification
After asking the respondents how they assess applicants and applications in each phase of the 
review process, we also asked them to describe the top talents they came across during their 
grant panel work. In table 4 we listed the ten characteristics that were mentioned most often by 
the respondents both in general (first part of study) and concrete assessments (in grant panels), 
with the most frequently named traits at the top.
Table 4 Top ten characteristics of talent in general and concrete talent evaluationa
General evaluation Concrete grant evaluation
Being social (sc)b Publication record (pc)
Acquired grants as previous recognition (pc)c Elaboration research proposal (pc)
General comprehensiveness (pc)Ability to work hard (ic)
Ambition (ic)
Publication record (pc)
International experience (pc)
Authenticity (ic)
Enthusiasm (ic)
Originality (ic)
Self-consciousness (ic)
Ability to work independently (ic)
Enthusiasm (ic)
Perseverance (ic)
Writing skills (pc) Ambition (ic)
Hot topic in research proposalBeing proactive (sc)
The main difference between the lists of traits is the variation in types of capital that are valued in 
talents. Within the top ten of general evaluation all three types of capital are represented, with 
number of acquired grants being a very important indicator for talent. In concrete grant evalua-
tion the emphasis is on professional capital, complemented with several types of individual 
capital but no social capital.
a  Characteristics within the same cell were mentioned just as often by the respondents and are therefore ordered 
alphabetically.
b sc = social capital, pc = professional capital, ic = individual capital. 
c  Although grants can be considered professional capital, respondents referred to them more directly as symbolic capital: 
previous acknowledgement of prestige.
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2.5.4 Deliberating talent within panels
Next, we will examine the decision-making process at the group level. How is talent discussed 
within panels and what eventually decides who receives formal recognition as being a talent? 
Both before and after the interview panellists meet to discuss their evaluations and come to a 
final priority ranking. During these meetings each proposal is generally introduced and commented 
upon by one or two panellists who were instructed to prepare a more extensive review. After this 
other panellists have the opportunity to respond, give their opinion or ask questions. 
Panel discussions offer panellists the opportunity to explain criteria specific to their discipline, 
e.g. publication practices or research methods. As mentioned before, many panellists conceive 
the broad scope of the total set of applications in terms of topics and research fields as proble-
matic. By exchanging information with the panellists who are experts on the specific proposal, 
panel meetings enable them to adjust their evaluation accordingly. The same holds true for 
evaluating the innovativeness, feasibility and relevance of proposals. In order to accurately assess 
these elements, one needs to be informed of the current state of the art of the related research field. 
“You know the journals from the field you publish in yourself. You know the status and 
reputation of those journals and maybe of a few from outside your field, but of many 
journals you don’t know this. We had interesting discussions about this, in which an 
applicant was about to be put aside because he lacked top publications, when a panellist 
said: ‘But this is THE journal in this field, so it won’t get any better than this.’” (male, SSH)   
In general the panel agrees with and follows the opinion of the field expert(s) within the panel. 
Lamont (2009) described this as adhering to the rule of ‘deferring to expertise’. Experts generally 
have affinity with the topic, which can make them put extra effort in convincing the other panel-
lists of the strengths of that application. But their knowledge can make them more critical too, 
identifying more easily the weaknesses of applications. Panellists are also found to be quicker 
enthused by topics they do not know much about. Some fields of research seem to be more 
attractive for non-experts, because topics are more appealing. In these situations the experts 
sometimes consider it their task to temper this enthusiasm, by e.g. explaining flaws in the 
research design.
“Compared to earth sciences people are generally easily enthused [about life sciences]. 
So often I say ‘well, this is not that interesting’ instead of ‘why don’t you understand that 
this is very interesting?’ But yeah, this certainly does not hold for earth sciences. They 
often had to convince us that it was very interesting. Those times I didn’t see this.” (male, 
NTS) 
With regard to top talents, the majority of the respondents indicated the entire panel easily 
recognized them and not much discussion is needed to determine the top three.4 Also the least 
4   This could not be confirmed in an earlier study on talent selection in grant panels (Van den Besselaar & Van 
Arensbergen, 2013). In most panels no clear top could be discerned based on panel review scores, especially not in 
the beginning of the selection process. 
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impressive applicants are said to be easily identified. Most deliberation time is spent on the large 
middle area in between. Quality differences within this group are very small, leading to a rather 
arbitrary boundary between just selected and just rejected applicants (see Van Arensbergen & 
Van den Besselaar, 2012). 
“Actually only the top 2 is evident. Of numbers 3, 4, 5 and so on, I have the feeling of, yeah, 
it could have been otherwise. It is all being exactly calculated. You have to assign scores 
including decimals. This gives a kind of impression of quasi exactness, but it isn’t.” 
(female, SSH)
The average scores within this group are almost the same, but applicants generally vary on 
different criteria. One may have a better track record, but less international experience, or one 
gave a more convincing presentation but has a less innovative research proposal. Therefore it is 
very important which criteria the panellists emphasize during the discussion. This is found to be 
dependent on various factors, like panel composition and the comments made by the first 
speaker (see also Lamont, 2009; Langfeldt, 2002; Luukkonen, 2012). The composition determines 
the available expertise, but also more subjectively the affinity with the research topic or methods 
within the panel. What the first speaker starts the discussion with, is also found to be decisive 
according to the respondents. The strong or weak points of the applicant mentioned first, are 
strongly supported by other panellists. 
“So when someone is assessed, what the first reviewer states will set the tone. When he 
completely tears down the proposal, the rest is only damage control. When he praises it 
with arguments, they others will say, yes this is also a way to look at it, and they will 
immediately consider it as something positive.” (male, interdisciplinary)
Furthermore, personal preferences and the atmosphere within the panel are found to influence 
final selection decisions too. Although panellists are convinced that in the end the top talents are 
granted, they indicate to have doubts about part of the allocation decisions. Since the quality 
differences are small, and random (social) factors influence decisions related to the middle group, 
many rejected applicants could have received grants as well. Most respondents indicate they are 
aware that this is inherent to the review process, and they would not know how to change this. As 
the process of grant allocation is conducted by human beings and involves social interaction, 
these subjective factors can never be fully excluded (Lamont, 2009).  
2.5.5 Talent and gender
In the interviews we deliberately did not ask explicitly for gender differences, both with regard to 
panellists as to applicants. As gender in general is quite a sensitive and highly debated topic, we 
wanted to see if respondents would bring up the gender issue by themselves. The large majority 
did not. Only a few times, (mostly female) respondents mentioned gender differences explicitly 
as in female candidates being more introvert and emotional, males being more rational and 
self-confident. All other references to gender were made to emphasize that gender was not an 
issue within the panel. Interestingly, these all came from female respondents. Women seem to be 
more conscious of the gender issue than men, as the following quote also shows:
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I: “Okay, I asked all my questions. Is there anything you would like to add?”
R: Yes, there is one thing I was really wondering whether you would ask me about. Namely 
to what extent gender plays a role in this whole process. Just briefly, in my mind it is a 
point of attention. I mean, it is something I’m very attentive to. Myself. So I mean, if things 
would happen of which I think, well this is not acceptable, then that would be problematic 
for me. But I have to say, I’m pleasantly surprised.” (female, SSH)
The only difference we found between male and female respondents is that in describing top 
talents, both as grant applicants and as general university employees, women ascribe an higher 
value to individual capital. 
2.6 Conclusions and implications
Analyzing talent in terms of symbolic capital, this study contributes to previous research on talent 
assessment or evaluation practices in several ways. Firstly, it showed the dynamics of evaluation 
criteria in various phases of the grant allocation process, not only with regard to the final out-
comes. We described how criteria relating to various types of capital and the weight assigned to 
them, change during the review process. Secondly, we showed the differences between what 
characteristics count as talent when (early career) researchers are selected by grant panels, and 
the more general notion of talent used by (senior) scholars. 
To start with the second issue, the general description of academic talent reflects the various 
activities scholars are involved in, and it entails a broad variety of skills and traits, combining 
professional, social and predominantly individual capital. Within the concrete context of grant 
allocation, a much narrower definition of talent is used and selection is mainly based on profes-
sional capital. Counts of publications, awards, grants and international experience are key criteria 
used in the selection process, especially in the first phase. Only later in the procedure individual 
capital is added. Being highly productive is obviously an important part of the academic habitus. 
And, more specifically, in case of early career grants as discussed in this paper, being highly 
productive can be considered an importance entrance criterion. 
As grants are distributed with specific aims - e.g. to do innovative research - it is not surprising 
that the notion of talent differs between this concrete and the more general forms of talent 
identification. However, it is important to create a better understanding of talent selection in 
grant panels, because of the considerable significance assigned to grants. Grants, more specifi-
cally the personal career grants, provide academics not only with financial resources to conduct 
research, but also with academic prestige and further career opportunities. The acquirement of 
career grants like those of the Dutch Innovational Research Incentives Scheme, is considered an 
important indicator of talent. Competition for these grants is strong, and having succeeded in 
obtaining one is seen as proof that the grantee belongs to the top talents. Actually, being in the 
top 10% talents in one’s field is one of the formal evaluation criteria. Many respondents indicated 
the only possibility they saw for their talents to stay in academia was by obtaining external grants. 
Within recruitment, evaluation and promotion procedures, acquirement of external funding - and 
especially prestigious career grants - form an important criterion. Skills and dispositions needed 
to acquire grants have been included in the academic habitus. 
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When obtaining prestigious career grants becomes leading in recruitment, the tension with the 
more general notion of talent becomes important. There is the risk of de facto undervaluation of 
other aspects of individual and social capital, needed for core tasks of university staff as teaching, 
management and valorization. The growing importance of research grants could also have 
negative consequences for risky and creative research, as review procedures adopted by funding 
agencies for allocating grants tend to contain a conservative bias. As evaluations are constrained 
by the boundaries of current knowledge and reviewers generally highly value criteria like validity, 
plausibility and a strong publication record, researchers who move to a new field or who have 
‘wild’ ideas, have less chance being funded (Heinze, Shapira, Rogers et al., 2009; Luukkonen, 
2012). The question remains whether these ‘other’ skills are increasingly neglected, or whether 
these come up in the later part of e.g., grant selection processes. This brings us to the issue of 
changing characteristics of what counts as talent in grant selection procedures.
In the second part of our study, we studied the various stages of panel reviewing and delibera-
tion, following up on research by Lamont (2009), Langfeldt (2002) and Luukkonen (2012). Talent 
proved to be assessed differently across the various phases of the selection process, and panels 
change the way they discuss applications and reach agreement. Within every phase there is an 
overall agreement on which skills and traits applicants need to have. However, panellists face two 
main difficulties: first, the broadness of the set of applications they have to review and second, 
the minimal quality differences within the main group of applicants. Because of the broadness of 
the applications under review, panels have to cover a wide area of research. Therefore, panellists 
can only be experts to some of the applications, making the panel usually a ‘panel of generalists’ 
(Luukkonen, 2012). Discussions about individual applications are dominated by the few ‘real’ 
experts, but all panellists are involved in evaluating the applications and in decision making. In 
cases where the expert panellists evaluate applications highly positively, these scores will be 
averaged with the other scores of panellists maybe less familiar with the specific research area, 
methods or subject. Consequently, high potentials which are not recognized as such by the 
majority within the panel will end up in the so-called grey area, in which average quality scores 
hardly vary - even if the experts did recognize them as high potentials.   
The second difficulty panellists face is that within the large set of applicants, no clear differentia-
tion can be made using the most common criteria (e.g. publications, grants, international 
experience). This is often clear in the final scores, which hardly differ between many of the 
applicants. This implies that other criteria are involved - explicitly or implicitly. These criteria 
cannot always be fully articulated, as they are often more subjective and related to the tacit 
dimension of evaluation (Bourdieu, 2004; Van den Brink, 2009). As grant decision making is a 
social process involving human interactions, subjectivity and random factors can never completely 
be excluded, they are inherent to the evaluation process. “Judging academic excellence is a 
process shaped by real-world constraints” (Lamont, 2009: p.155). We showed how panel out-
comes are influenced by individuals’ behavior (e.g. personal preferences), context specific 
characteristics (e.g. time restrictions) and group dynamics (e.g. influence opening statement). 
Panel decisions convert minor differences in quality into enlarged differences in recognition. 
Due to these difficulties, many panellists indicate to question the final allocation decisions. Even 
though they are convinced the top talents are amongst the grantees, a large share of the 
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grantees are considered not to be any better than many of the rejected applicants. Many 
panellists indicate that decisions with regard to this share are liable to arbitrary factors and are 
partly a matter of luck. Consequently, one would expect a devaluation of the symbolic value of 
these grants. Paradoxically, despite acknowledging this level of subjectivity and arbitrariness, 
experienced researchers still ascribe high symbolic value to these grants.
Further research is needed to determine the actual value of these grants for early career researchers. 
Following up on studies by Bloch et al. (2014), Gerritsen et al. (2013) and Laudel and Gläser 
(2012), it is necessary to better understand if and how these grants enhance academic careers 
and moreover, if these researchers are more successful than those without such grants. 
Observational studies adding to the interesting work of Lamont (2009) and Langfeldt (2002) 
would create opportunities to further identify the exact review criteria, including the more tacit 
criteria, used within panels and the effects of group dynamics on the outcomes of panel review 
processes. By making these implicit criteria explicit, one may be able to avoid that applicants are 
assessed on different criteria, and may reduce the influence of subjectivity and random factors 
when selecting among applicants with almost equally good publication records. And, to what 
extent do these implicit criteria cover the dimensions of the more general concept of talent that 
resulted from this study?
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3  The selection of talent as a group process
A literature review on the social dynamics of 
decision-making in grant panels1
Talent selection within science is increasingly performed by panels, e.g. by reviewing grant or 
fellowship applications. Many studies from fields of sociology of science and science policy 
studies have been conducted to identify biases and predict outcomes of these processes, mainly 
focussing on characteristics of applicants, applications and reviewers. However, as panel review-
ing entails social interaction, group dynamics influence these processes. By adding insights from 
social psychology to current knowledge on panel reviews, we are better able to identify factors 
affecting talent selection and funding decisions in grant panels. By opening up this so-called 
black box we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of panel decision-
making. This knowledge is also relevant for various stakeholders involved in grant allocation, for 
applicants, reviewers and policymakers, as it can be used to improve transparency, fairness and 
legitimation of talent selection processes.
3.1 Introduction
The academic market in both the United States and most European countries is a buyer’s market, 
and has been so for quite some years, given the strong preferences of many new PhDs and postdocs 
for a job at the university. Researchers who are lower in the academic hierarchy hold to an increasing 
extent temporary positions without prospect of permanent employment (Stephan, 2012). This 
shift towards more temporary contracts is mainly due to an increase of the proportion of research 
within universities that is based on short term external funding, like project funding or individual 
career grants. Consequently, opportunities for especially young academics to conduct research 
and develop an academic career are more and more characterized by competition for funding.2 
A rationale behind project funding is that it strengthens competition between researchers, and 
therefore promotes the quality of science: only the best succeed. The ability to acquire research 
grants is turning into a prominent criterion in processes of academic recruitment and perfor-
mance evaluation (De Jonge Akademie, 2010; Van Arensbergen, Hessels & van der Meulen, 
2013). Career grants are not only a way to directly distribute financial resources amongst young 
researchers to conduct research, it also provides them indirectly with improved career opportuni-
ties as grants are considered significant indicators of excellence or talent (Van Arensbergen, Van 
der Weijden & Van den Besselaar, forthcoming). This line of reasoning is based on the assump-
1   This chapter has been accepted for publication after minor revisions by Research Evaluation as Van Arensbergen, P.,  
Van der Weijden, I. & Van den Besselaar, P. (forthcoming). The selection of talent as a group process: A literature 
review on the social dynamics of decision-making in grant panels.
2   To give an impression of how strong the competition for individual career grants is: for the starting grants of the 
European Research Council the success rate in 2013 was 9% (http://erc.europa.eu/statistics). For similar type of 
career grants in the Netherlands - Veni and Vidi grants - success rates in 2012 were 16 and 14% respectively (NWO, 
2012).
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tion that grants are awarded to the best applicants. Although this obviously is what funding 
agencies claim, several recent studies suggest otherwise (Bornmann et al., 2010; Hornborstel et 
al., 2009; Melin & Danell, 2006; Van den Besselaar & Leydesdorff, 2007, 2009; Van den Besselaar, 
2013). As these funding decisions have great impact on individuals’ careers, but also shape the 
direction of academic research (Hodgson, 1997), we consider it of great importance to create a 
better understanding of underlying decision-making processes. Of course, uncertainty in grant 
decisions is unavoidable, which prevents high predictive validity. But a better understanding of 
the social dynamics may help research councils to improve their selection practices and to reduce 
the systematic bias that may emerge from social dynamics in decision-making bodies.
The main method used to make these allocation decisions is a combination of individual peer 
review and panel review (peers reviewing as a group). Although peer review has been studied a 
lot, attempts to predict the outcomes of funding allocation processes show it still largely is a 
black box (Cole, Cole & Simon, 1981; Hartmann & Neihardt, 1990; Van den Besselaar & 
Leydesdorff, 2007). 
Contributing to the unpredictability of these review outcomes is the nature of this type of decision-
making: it often involves group decision-making. Often panels of peer experts are installed to 
assess the quality of applications and to decide on funding allocation. Reasons for installing 
panels mainly have to do with the size and width of the set of applications and with the weight of 
funding decisions. A panel of reviewers has more resources to draw on than one or two individual 
reviewers (information integration). And secondly, decisions made by a panel of experts (through 
consensus building) are considered more acceptable than individual decisions (Olbrecht & 
Bornmann, 2010). 
3.2 Focus of this review
The present literature study focuses on decision-making as performed by panels, including 
individual peer review. Originally peer review is considered the legitimate method to evaluate 
scientific quality of scholarly contributions and therefore is deeply embedded in research culture. 
Peers are considered to be best suitable to assess scholarly quality and to distinguish inferior 
from meritorious research by means of critical appraisal (Hartmann & Neihardt, 1990; Langfeldt 
2002). At the same time it is highly criticized as being unreliable, costly and biased (e.g. Marsh, 
Jayasinghe & Bond, 2008; Porter & Rossini, 1985). Most of the studies on peer review stem from 
sociology of science (SoS) and science policy studies (SPS).3 They mainly deal with how review 
outcomes are affected by performance and characteristics of individual applicants, and by charac-
teristics of reviewers. These studies are predominantly based on analyses of written documenta-
tion (e.g. submitted proposals, review reports and reports of meetings), interviews (e.g. with 
reviewers and applicants), and bibliometric data. 
However, many allocation (and appointment) decisions are made in panels, which is not covered 
very well by peer review literature. Panel review is not the same as peer review, as panelists are 
often not peers. Since panels have to assess heterogeneous objects (e.g. grant applications 
3  See Bornmann (2011) for a recent literature review on peer review.
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covering a range of fields, research programs, job candidates), they are composed in such a way 
that they cover a broad range of expertise. Consequently, panelists are not all experts or peers to 
every object they review. Panels may also include non-scientific members, e.g. societal stake-
holders, representatives from funding agencies or university board members. Furthermore, peer 
review generally is just part of panel review procedures. Finally, panel review is embedded within 
group interaction and can therefore be characterized as a social activity. For this reason we 
combine SoS and SPS literature on peer review with literature on group decision-making from 
social psychology (SP). Where the first mainly focus on how peer review affects review outcomes, 
the latter focusses on actual review processes. SP research predominantly deals with central 
mechanisms involved in decision-making processes and the context in which these are carried 
out. To a large extent this literature is based on experimental research. Langfeldt (2001, 2002), 
Lamont (2009), and Olbrecht and Bornmann (2010) also looked at social psychological research 
with regard to panel review. Although they describe several important mechanisms that could 
affect panel review (e.g. motivation losses and group polarization), based on exploratory observa-
tions of panels we know there are more factors related to panel interaction that influence 
allocation decisions. 
Figure 1 Basic model of grant allocation process
3.3 Methodology
The literature exploited in this study mainly comes from Web of Knowledge searches, added with 
Google Scholar hits. Figure 1 depicts the straightforward model we used for our literature search 
and to structure our review. We searched for literature using as main key words ‘peer review’, 
‘grant allocation’, ‘group decision-making’, ‘group interaction’, and ‘intragroup behaviour’. 
Searches resulted in a broad scope of literature in terms of type of research (e.g. interview 
studies, bibliometric analyses, historical case study analyses, (lab) experiments) and in terms of 
Grant application
Social process
within panel
Review scores Process organization
Funding decision
Applicant
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potential factors influencing panel reviews. Results were refined based on six exploratory obser-
vations of panel meetings in 2010 and 2012, in which grant applications were reviewed and 
ranked in pre-selection and selection phases. We observed several issues related to group 
dynamics, which seemed to influence panel processes. For example, panelists varied in their 
motivation and contribution to panel deliberation, and similar types of information (e.g. anecdotal 
or shared) were not always considered evenly important. Factors identified in our observations 
and included in our SP literature review are social status and identity, group norms and cohesive-
ness, information distribution, motivation and interests, and procedural factors.
Next, we describe how characteristics of people or proposals under review affect review out-
comes. For this we primarily draw upon SoS and SPS literature. Second, review processes as a 
social interaction between various panelists are explored in more detail. Characteristics of panels 
and dynamics inherent to group decision-making are further explained predominantly using SP 
literature. Finally, also based on SP literature we look at influences of external factors related to 
the organizational context in which the review process is carried out.
3.4 Panel review of grant applications
 
3.4.1 Explicit quality related criteria
Since funding organizations claim to fund only excellent research and the best researchers, one 
expects in accordance with Merton’s (1973 [1942]) norms of universalism the scholarly quality of 
grant proposals and of applicants to be central criteria for a proposal’s acceptance or rejection. 
However, already thirty years ago the study of Cole et al. (1981) on funding decisions within the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) could not confirm this. They did not find a strong correlation 
between funding success and past performance of researchers. More recent studies using 
different types of data sources show inconsistent results. For example, in order to build statistical 
discriminatory models that can replicate peer review outcomes, Cañibano, Otamendi and 
Andújar (2009) used curricula vitae of applicants to a Spanish research program. They found 
research productivity to be the main determinant of grant success. Other studies comparing past 
performance of granted applicants with unsuccessful applicants generally found that the former 
have higher average performance than the latter (e.g., Bornmann & Daniel, 2006; Van Leeuwen 
& Moed, 2012). However, as competition has become harsh, successful groups are much smaller 
than rejected groups, which include also many low performing applicants. This has been subject 
to further investigation, and researchers have started to compare successful applicants with more 
restricted sets of good performing rejected ones - something that changed the outcomes: 
successful applicants do not outperform about equally large groups of best performing applicants 
(Melin & Danell, 2006; Van den Besselaar & Leydesdorff, 2007, 2009; Hornbostel et al., 2009). 
More generally, in terms of past performance, selection processes are characterized by large 
numbers of false positives (granted applicants performing less than rejected applicants) and false 
negatives (rejected applicants performing higher than granted applicants). Bornmann et al, (2008) 
found percentages between 26 and 48% in two grant programs within life sciences, and Bornmann 
et al (2010) similar percentages in grant programs in the life sciences and the social sciences.
More recently, the focus has shifted from past performance to post performance analyses: do the 
selected applicants indeed prove to be better in the years after having received grants? Here 
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similar patterns of results are emerging - granted applicants have in average a better post-
performance than all rejected (Bornmann et al., 2008) but not if compared with the best rejected 
(Melin & Danell, 2006; Van den Besselaar, 2013).
3.4.2 Implicit quality related criteria
Laudel (2006) disproves the dominant ‘quality myth’ in her interview study with German and 
Australian scientists about their research trails and funding sources. She suggested several 
non-quality related factors influencing funding decisions. For example, continuity of research 
trails, countries’ general investment in research and scientists’ research field. A research field bias 
was also found in several other studies. Bornmann and Daniel (2005) demonstrate that success 
rates for doctoral fellowship applicants working in the field of chemistry are approximately half as 
high as for applicants working in other fields within life sciences. The analysis of applications for 
post-doctoral fellowships however, does not confirm this bias, suggesting we cannot speak of an 
unambiguous relation between research field of applicants and grant success. A relevant issue 
here is whether choice of field is a ‘non-quality related factor’, as there are more promising and 
less promising research topics and fields, and selection of topics may be seen as a quality of the 
researcher at stake.
An important variable that should be taken into account is the research field of reviewers. In case 
of a disciplinary match between applicant and reviewer, review scores are significantly higher than 
when there is no match (Porter & Rossini, 1985). This can be explained in terms of cognitive 
particularism, meaning that people make decisions based on cognitive similarity, their member-
ship in a particular scientific school of thought. “It is not that panel members are not of goodwill 
but that they simply do not fight so hard for subjects that are not close to their hearts” (Travis & 
Collins, 1991, p. 336). Consequently, proposals on topics that are unrelated to the panel mem-
bers’ interests may be disadvantaged here, and that may also hold for interdisciplinary research 
proposals. Since interdisciplinary research can be seen as a novel way of integrating expertise, 
real peers may be hard to identify4. However, research on both peer review and bibliometric 
assessments found no significant bias with respect to interdisciplinarity (Rinia et al., 2001). 
Status also plays an eminent role in evaluation processes. This relates to academic status of 
applicants and status of their department, university or institute. Applicants with a higher 
academic and/or departmental status have better chances on securing grants than applicants 
with relatively lower status (Bazely, 1998; Bornmann & Daniel, 2005; Cole et al., 1981; Viner, 
Powell & Green, 2004). This shows that not only characteristics of applicants themselves are 
influential, but also those of institutes they are affiliated with. Another influential type of affiliation 
involves panelist affiliation. Wennerås and Wold (1997) found that higher competence scores are 
given to applicants who are affiliated with a panelist than to applicants without such ties. This 
affiliation may explain partly why the academic status of the applicants’ institution plays a role: 
the panelists themselves may predominantly come from the same high reputation institutes. 
Important to emphasize is that the affiliated panelists themselves are not allowed to participate in 
scoring of the specific proposals. ‘Neutral’ reviewers seem to compensate for the absence of 
4  One may use bibliometric methods to find those peers.
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scores by ‘biased’ reviewers by raising their scores assigned to applicants associated with one of 
their peers. Furthermore, applicants who are themselves member of a peer review cadre have 
more chance to be allocated grants than applicants who lack this type of membership (Viner et 
al., 2004), and this is not explained by performance differences (Van den Besselaar, 2012).
A highly contested variable in peer review literature is gender. Related to funding decisions it was 
demonstrated that women receive relatively fewer grants than men (Bornmann, Mutz & Daniel, 
2007). However, there consists general disagreement over the impact of gender on outcomes of 
peer review and grant allocation. In their well-known study Wennerås and Wold (1997) looked at 
applications submitted to the Swedish Medical Research Council. They observed that peer 
reviewers assigned lower scores to female than to male applicants, while their levels of scientific 
productivity were about the same. A similar study on grant applications in the Netherlands 
confirmed that gender matters (Brouns, 2000). How it matters was found to vary between 
disciplines. Whereas in some disciplines in case of equal average publication scores more men 
than women were evaluated as excellent, less productive women also obtained grants in others. 
This implies the use of double standards. Women have to perform to higher levels to be consid-
ered as qualified as men, according to both men and women (Foschi, 2004; Van den Brink, 2009). 
However, in accordance with several other studies (Bazely, 1998; Jayasinghe, Marsh & Bond, 
2001; Marsh et al., 2008; Mutz, Bornmann & Daniel, 2012; Sandstrom & Hallsten, 2008) Ceci and 
Williams (2011) in their recent review on discrimination against women in science, found no 
evidence supporting current discrimination of women in grant allocation.5 However, an extension 
and reanalysis of previous data by Marsh et al. (2009) shows it is important to distinguish between 
types of applications. Whereas there were no gender differences with regard to grant applica-
tions, there were differences in favor of men with regard to fellowship applications. 
Decreasing gender disparities can be the effect of changed (council) policies, as suggested by 
several studies (Sandstrom & Hallsten, 2008; Van den Besselaar & Leydesdorff, 2007, 2009). 
Among scientists themselves - male and female - it is even not seen as main concern in grant 
assessments (Van der Weijden & Calero Medina, 2014). However, as within science in general 
gender disparities persist (e.g. Lariviere et al., 2013; Ranga, Gupta & Etzkowitz, 2012) this issue 
still needs further study and attention.6
As we already saw with regard to research field and affiliation, review outcomes do not solely 
depend on characteristics of candidates under review. Evaluation outcomes are determined by 
interaction between characteristics of reviewers and the reviewed. With regard to panel review 
there is another type of interaction significantly affecting the review outcomes: interaction 
between panelists. Therefore we will now take a closer look at panels and describe review 
processes as social interaction between panelists. We will describe various factors inherent to 
5   Many studies included in their review did not use data on the performance of applicants - a general weakness of 
many studies on gender bias in grant decisions.
6   For example, the European Research Council recently launched the projects ERCAREER (Capturing gendered career 
paths of ERC grantees and applicants) and GendERC (Gendered dimensions in ERC grant selection), and the 
European Committee granted EGERA (Effective Gender Equality in Research and the Academia) and GARCIA 
(Gendering the Academy and Research: combating Career Instability and Asymmetries).
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social interaction, that influence decision-making processes and are subsequently expected to 
affect review outcomes. In the following paragraphs we will identify factors which need to be 
studied in more detail, in order to determine how they affect outcomes of grant allocation processes.
3.5 Peer review as social interaction
As processes of grant allocation generally involve quality assessment by panels, they can be 
considered to be social, emotional and interactional processes (Lamont, 2009). Panel decisions 
are the outcome of and are influenced by group interaction. Differences in for example status 
and expertise of the panelists can play an important role in this type of interaction. Furthermore, 
group interaction can make group members motivate each other and increase the amount of 
information that is collected and discussed, compared to individual decision-making. On the 
other hand, group interaction can result in poorer decision-making, because shared responsibility 
creates a situation in which everyone withdraws and no one really endeavors, better known as 
social loafing (Levi, 2007). It can also encourage members to focus primarily on reaching consen-
sus, so they are not really motivated to detect possible weaknesses in their decisions and to 
realistically appraise alternative decisions. This social psychological phenomenon is better known 
as groupthink (Janis, 1982). We will therefore look in more detail at panel review as a social 
interaction process. We will describe how specific characteristics related to the social nature of 
this process can affect panel decisions. Based on our observations we will successively focus on 
the composition of the panel, group norms and cohesiveness, information distribution, and finally 
we will look at the motivation and interests of panelists.
3.5.1 Panel composition
Several studies showed that outcomes of reviewing decisions to a great extent depend on who 
the reviewers are and how the panel is composed (e.g. Lamont, 2009; Van Arensbergen et al., 
forthcoming). According to Van den Brink (2009) in the Netherlands more women in appointment 
committees lead to higher numbers of women being appointed as full professor. The same was 
found in a Spanish study on promotion decisions: adding a female evaluator to the committee, 
increases the number of females promoted to full professor by 14% (Zinovyeva & Bagues, 2010). 
This indicates preferences for same-sex candidates. However, this type of bias was not found in 
promotion decisions for associate professors. Moreover, female associate professors were found 
to discriminate against female candidates from the same institution, possibly for strategic reasons.
In general scholars are asked for grant panels based on their disciplinary expertise and research 
experience. Often applicants may enclose to their proposal names of some reviewers they 
definitely do not want to be part of the panel. In some cases applicants also have the opportunity 
to nominate people for panel membership. Reviewers nominated by applicants are found to 
systematically give higher scores to all proposals than reviewers who are appointed by the board 
or otherwise (Jayasinghe et al., 2001; Marsh et al., 2008).
Another aspect of panel composition is the difference in expertise represented by panelists. The 
set of applications generally covers a broad range of topics, sometimes even from various 
disciplines. Consequently experts from different disciplines have to be included in the panel to 
enable a fair and comprehensive evaluation of all proposals. But also within a disciplinary panel, 
people can be considered experts on different topics or research areas. It is important to pay 
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attention to panel composition, since the composition sets the potential for interaction and 
conflict among its members. Overlap in competences is associated with better cooperation and 
with open conflict between scientific experts (Langfeldt, 2002). Research on decision-making also 
shows that groups with heterogeneous members with complementary skills take better group 
decisions than homogenous groups (Levi, 2007). However, the advantage of heterogeneous 
groups does not arise directly from the broad range of knowledge that is present in groups. 
Members have to be conscious of differences in areas of expertise. An experiment conducted by 
Bonner, Baumann and Dalal (2002) showed that when group members know who the experts are 
in reference to a specific task, they will adjust their group decision to the decision of the experts. 
This of course, does not necessarily mean that the group decision will be of better quality when 
decisions of experts are taken over. But it can be considered a stimulus for information sharing. 
A social psychological experiment using the hidden profile7 task demonstrates that when people 
know who knows what, distributed information is mentioned more often and the hidden profile is 
solved more often (Stasser, Stewart & Wittenbaum, 1995). Hence group decision-making can 
benefit from diverse panel compositions as long as this diversity is evident to everyone within the 
panel. We will come back to the issue of information sharing later.
Furthermore, within panels there may be differences in status. By this we mean the status as 
perceived and implicitly assigned to them by other panelists. Some people might be considered 
to be hotshots with very good reputation and hence have a high status. Others might be seen as 
newcomers or relatively insignificant in their field. These perceived status differences cause 
unequal power distribution amongst group members, which subsequently will disturb communi-
cation within groups. In general, high-status members talk more and receive more attention from 
other members. Low-status members generally talk less or even do not talk at all when their 
opinions deviate from those of high-status members. This can harm decision-making processes, 
since not all true opinions are expressed and high-status people will not be contradicted often. 
Communication plays an important role in processes of group decision-making. In order for a 
group to perform well, it is desirable that group members trust each other and that there is open 
communication between them. This can be facilitated by good social relations within the group 
(Levi, 2007). 
Finally, panel composition affects the way individual panelists identify themselves. Individuals do 
not have one fixed identity, but depending on the social context they are in, different identities 
can be addressed. Interaction between characteristics of individuals and of the specific situation 
determines which particular identity is activated. This process of social identity formation com-
prises two important activities, namely social comparison and self-categorization in terms of 
membership in particular groups (Stets & Burke, 2000). By means of self-categorization in-groups 
and out-groups are created, which leads to accentuation of perceived similarities between the 
7   This contains a group decision-making task in which the best solution cannot be detected by individual members 
based only on the information they received prior to discussion. There is a difference in the information individuals 
have at their disposal. Prior to the group discussion, partial information is given to all group members (shared 
information), whereas other pieces of information are known to some but unknown to other members (unshared 
information). Based on the available information individuals will detect different ‘best’ solutions. To find the only 
real best solution unshared information has to be pooled during the discussion.
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self and other in-group members and of perceived differences between the self and out-group 
members (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Grant panels can be considered by its members as (one) in-
group, but can also comprise several smaller groups. Panelists possibly identify themselves with 
some and not with other members. For example, when people share a disciplinary background, 
professional status or faculty membership, this can determine the in-group identity. 
Van Kleef et al. (2007) studied social identification in terms of prototypicality. A group that people 
identify with generally comprises one or more members that can be considered to be the group 
prototype. “Prototypes embody all attributes that characterize groups and distinguish them from 
other groups, including beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and behaviours” (Hogg & Terry, 2000, p.123). 
In two experiments Van Kleef et al. (2007) compared differences in negotiation behavior between 
prototypical and peripheral group members. Prototypical group members are those who strongly 
match group prototypes and those who hardly match are called peripherals. They demonstrate 
that in case of valued group membership, peripherals within the group are more competitive and 
less cooperative than prototypicals. Two studies conducted by Terry and Hogg (1996) show that 
social identification has an effect on the intentions and actual behavior of group members. 
“When social identity is salient, depersonalization occurs, such that a person’s feelings and 
actions are guided more by group prototypes and norms than by personal factors” (p. 790). 
3.5.2 Group norms and cohesiveness
According to Lamont (2009) panel discussions are steered by informal rules, generally known by 
all panelists. These unwritten rules defining appropriate and inappropriate behavior in groups, 
are called group norms. Norms usually emerge unconsciously and gradually through interactions 
of group members, and are not necessarily made explicit or formal. Sometimes people are 
unable to articulate norms which they clearly use to guide their behavior. Norms can have a 
strong impact on behavior of group members, even stronger than externally imposed rules e.g. 
by supervisors or organizational practices. Examples of group norms are that panelists are 
expected to give each other full liberty to express opinions without reprisal, they should be 
oriented towards producing consensual decisions, and they should maintain collegiality (Janis, 
1982; Lamont, 2009; Levi, 2007; Marques et al., 2001; Spector, 1996). 
According to Levi (2007) norms enable groups to create a clear group identity, as they express 
central values of groups and prescribe what is accepted and deviant behavior within groups. This 
way group members can distinguish themselves from others and have a sense of who they are as 
a group. The other way around, norms are found to be dependent on the social identity per-
ceived by individual panelists. As mentioned earlier, group norms have more effect on the 
behavior of individuals the stronger they identify themselves as being part of a social group and 
not merely as unique individuals (Terry & Hogg, 1996). Social identity is related to cohesiveness 
within groups. A highly cohesive group is characterized by strong interpersonal bonds holding a 
group together. Group cohesiveness refers to a sense of team spirit and the extent to which 
group members appreciate their group membership and share group goals. Conformity to norms 
is found to be more likely in groups that are highly cohesive (Levi, 2007; Spector, 1996). Groups 
characterized by high levels of cohesion are found to be better able to communicate and work 
together (Beal, Cohen, Burke et al., 2003). This could lead to better group outcomes. An analysis 
of case histories of seven corporations compared decision-making characteristics of top manage-
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ment teams in successful and unsuccessful times (Peterson et al., 1998). Group cohesiveness was 
one of the characteristics they studied. They found that successful decision-making groups 
showed more cohesiveness than unsuccessful groups. On the other hand, members of cohesive 
groups may want to preserve the group’s relationships and therefore avoid any kind of behavior 
considered to be harmful. This could mean that people agree to group decisions, while they 
actually don’t agree with it individually. According to Janis (1982) strong group cohesion is one of 
the important antecedent conditions for groupthink; “a mode of thinking that people engage in 
when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity 
override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (p. 9). Groupthink 
increases chances on flaws in the decision-making process, consequently leading to poorer 
decisions. However, Esser (1998) who reviewed two areas of groupthink research - historical case 
analyses and laboratory tests - poses that group cohesiveness is not a strong predictor of 
groupthink. Also with regard to the effect of cohesiveness on group performance or decision-
making, no unambiguous relation has been found (Spector, 1996). 
3.5.3 Distribution of information
The main advantage of panel compared to individual peer review is that there is more knowledge 
available as all individuals’ knowledge is pooled together. During panel meetings reviewers share 
their expertise and inform each other about their assessments. Generally, type of information can 
be classified in three different ways: shared versus unshared, preference consistent versus 
preference inconsistent, and instrumental versus non-instrumental. 
In terms of shared and unshared information, general knowledge most reviewers have about 
applications can be considered to be shared information, whereas additional knowledge some-
one has based on his specific expertise can be considered as unshared information. An experi-
ment using the hidden profile task showed that groups in which all information is shared make 
better decisions than groups in which some group members have unique information (Schulz-
Hardt et al., 2006). As grant panelists vary on level of expertise with regard to applications they 
have to evaluate, there will always be both unique and shared information. In general during 
group deliberations more attention is paid to shared than to unshared information. Consequently 
shared information has more impact on the final group decision (Baron, 2005; Gigone & Hastie, 
1993; Tindale et al., 2001; Winquist & Larson, 1998). This tendency would inhibit the added value 
of experts contributing their specific knowledge that other reviewers do not have to panel review 
processes. However, based on the study mentioned earlier of Bonner et al. (2002) we argue that 
for unique information to be influential on panel decisions, the person bringing in this informa-
tion should be recognized as being an expert. 
Information distribution is also affected by initial opinions or preferences of panelists. In panels 
characterized by divergent opinions more information is put into deliberation than panels in 
which there is high agreement to start with. Furthermore, heterogeneity in opinions stimulates 
group members to spend more time on (information steered) deliberation and results in better 
group decision outcomes (Scholten et al., 2007; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006). With regard to type of 
information that is put into discussion, we discern information that is consistent and inconsistent 
with one’s initial preferences. Mojzisch, Grouneva and Schulz-Hardt (2010) found in their experi-
ment on biased information evaluation, that people paid more attention to preference consistent 
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information than to information that conflicted with their preferences. This effect was even stronger 
when confirming information was introduced by the person himself than by other group members. 
Whether people adjust their initial preference based on new information that is contributed to 
the discussion is strongly influenced by social validation. Affirmation of preference inconsistent 
information by other group members raises the perceived quality of this information (Mojzisch et 
al, 2008). The bias of favoring preference consistent information can be explained as a tactic: 
people defend their initial preference and in order to convince others they mention more informa-
tion that supports their preference (Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004). But it can also 
be the result of more unconscious processes: people consider preference consistent information 
as more accurate and relevant and therefore pay more attention to it (Mojzisch et al., 2010).
Finally, we discern instrumental and non-instrumental information. Information that is relevant for 
and ought to impact decisions is called instrumental, whereas irrelevant information that should 
not affect decisions is called non-instrumental. According to Bastardi and Shafir (2000) people 
often give non-instrumental information instrumental value without being aware of this. In order 
to base their final selection decisions on thorough evaluations, review panels collect as much 
information as possible, both instrumental and non-instrumental. Next, also newly obtained 
non-instrumental information is used to make decisions, as “the very act of pursuing information 
may lead people to endow it with instrumental value” (p.217). As the mere act of obtaining adds 
weight to new information, disregarding its relevance, information that is known from the start 
might receive less attention than new information (Bastardi & Shaffir, 1998). This implies that for 
example anecdotal information about applicants mentioned by panelists rather coincidently can 
influence review outcomes.
3.5.4 Motivation and interests of panelists
Panelists might differ in their motivation to engage in allocation processes. According to Merton’s 
norm of disinterestedness reviewers should not have any personal, political or economical 
interests interfering their assessment of applications. Applications should be assessed purely on 
their academic merits. Nonetheless, several types of interests are conceivable to be held by 
panelists, like personal, departmental, university, disciplinary, gender etcetera. For example, 
reviewers might find it important to fund more research in his specific field or that more women 
get opportunities to build academic careers. Reviewers do not always have to be completely 
aware of these interests, they can influence their preferences in a more subtle way. The stronger 
individual preferences deviate from preferences of other panelists, the smaller its contribution to 
final panel preferences (Tindale et al., 2001). How panelists interact with each other and the 
extent to which they exert themselves during review processes, is influenced by their motivation. 
Next we will discern various types of motivation: epistemic, social and competitive motivation. 
The extent to which reviewers search for missing information and process newly obtained 
information depend on their willingness to exert oneself to come to accurate and well informed 
assessments of applications. This is called epistemic motivation. Interaction within groups 
characterized by high epistemic motivation is found to be more steered by information than by 
preferences and is less susceptible for reasoning errors. Furthermore, these groups are more 
open to deviating opinions and they develop more egalitarian and participatory interaction 
patterns (De Dreu, Nijstad, & Van Knippenberg, 2008). A way to increase the epistemic motiva-
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tion is to make reviewers accountable for review processes (De Dreu et al., 2007). We will come 
back to the role of accountability when describing procedural factors. 
The type of information reviewers search for and process is found to be influenced by their social 
motivation (De Dreu et al., 2006; De Dreu et al., 2008).There are two types of social motivation: 
proself and prosocial. People with proself motivation have a strong focus on reaching personal 
goals and interests. On the other hand, people with prosocial motivation focus more on fairness 
and common goals. Considering the general task of review panels (assessing the quality of 
applications) panelists are not expected to be proself motivated. Panels in which members do 
have personal interests and primarily strive for reaching personal goals, are less likely to reach 
consensus than panels focusing on common goals. This can be the result of the exchange of 
information being distorted, as people with proself motivation tend to neglect other people’s 
opinions. Social motivation consequently can lead to biases in information processing (De Dreu 
et al., 2008). Kramer, Pommerenke and Newton (1993) found that the extent to which one takes 
decisions based on self-interests or on the other party’s interests is also affected by the salience 
of a shared social identity. During a decision-making task that involved negotiation, people were 
found to show greater concern with outcomes obtained by the other party and to have preferences 
for more equal outcomes, when a social identity was salient. When a distinctive personal identity 
instead of a social identity was salient, negotiators focused primarily on their own outcomes 
guided by self-interests.
The process of grant allocation involves a certain extent of negotiation, when panelists have 
strong preferences and try to convince each other of these. Looking at panel review processes as 
a type of negotiation, panelists can be ascribed competitive motivation; assuming that an 
individual’s goal achievement is negatively related to goal achievements of others (Ten Velden, 
Beersma & De Dreu, 2011). Two types of competitive motivation can be discerned: appetitive 
and aversive. People with appetitive motivation focus on outdoing their counterparts, acquiring 
better results. Aversive competitors try to prevent their counterparts from doing better than 
them, they aim at avoiding worse results than their competitors. In a series of experiments Ten 
Velden et al. (2011) compared negotiation behavior of appetitive and aversive competitors. Their 
study showed that individuals with appetitive motivation were more confident that agreements 
would satisfy their goals, and they more easily reached agreements. Furthermore, identical pieces 
of information were found to have different effects on negotiation depending on motivational 
goals of negotiators. This shows that the same information can be used in different ways and that 
motivation influences the effect specific information has on negotiation processes.
We described earlier how social identity influences interaction and negotiation within groups: 
prototypical members are less competitive and more cooperative than peripherals (Van Kleef et 
al., 2007). This suggests that panelists may use different strategies or social tactics in processes of 
decision-making, e.g. consultation, pressure, personal appeals and coalition tactics. The use of 
social tactics to influence one another is affected by status differences. It is less plausible to 
imagine low-status members pressuring high-status members by making demands or threatening 
them, than vice versa. They will probably try to persuade high-status people by using factual 
information or flattery (Levi, 2007; Yukl, 1989).
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On a more unconscious level, group negotiation is liable to the use of cognitive heuristics. On 
the one hand these heuristics accelerate efficient decision-making, on the other hand they can 
undermine the quality of its outcomes. Kahneman and Traversky (1973) identified three types of 
cognitive heuristics which enable people to understand their complex environment, availability, 
representativeness and anchoring. Availability relates to the inclination to rely predominantly on 
information that is most salient in one’s memory. The representativeness heuristic refers to the 
tendency to judge something or someone based on its most evident features. Anchoring involves 
the strong reliance on randomly determined anchoring points. Often opening statements serve 
as point of reference for all statements being made thereafter. With regard to panel review this 
implies the comments of the first reviewer are very influential and set the tone for further discus-
sion (Van Arensbergen et al., forthcoming). Knowledge of these cognitive heuristics can be 
implemented as social tactics when panelists actively use them to influence negotiation outcomes.
So far we have described how outcomes of panel reviews are based on characteristics of the 
object (features of the applicant and application) and how panel review processes are affected by 
social characteristics of this type of group interaction (panel composition, group norms and 
cohesiveness, information distribution and motivation). How these latter factors influence review 
outcomes, is a major task of research within the field of SoS/SPS. Finally we will focus on the 
context of review processes. How do review procedures and external contextual factors influence 
review outcomes?  
3.6 The organizational context of panel review
The organization of panel reviews involves various aspects. For example, selecting and installing 
panelists, determining specific panel tasks, developing review procedures and guidelines, and 
implementing some sort of control mechanism, e.g. by the presence of independent supervisors 
or by having to write detailed review reports. Then there are contextual factors related to review 
processes like available budget and time pressure. With regard to panel composition we showed 
earlier how it may affect evaluation processes. For example, composition is found to determine 
the representation of expertise, social identities, status and interests among its members. These 
constellations can impact communication, behavior and information sharing within groups, sub- 
sequently affecting panel results.
The general task of review panels as discussed in this paper is to evaluate the quality of scientific 
work, of research proposals, or of scientists. The actual objects of review processes can therefore 
vary from hard copy research proposals and curriculum vitae to people in one’s own proper 
person. Review procedures are designed accordingly and panels are generally clearly instructed 
how to execute their task. The presence of clear decision-making procedures decreases the risk 
of groupthink (Esser, 1998). However, procedural rules and guidelines generally do not fully steer 
review processes. Behavior of panelists can for example be more susceptible for (implicit and 
explicit) group norms (Spector, 1996). Langfeldt (2001), who observed panel meetings of the 
Norwegian Research Council, furthermore found that although review protocols prescribed 
quality criteria to be used, the weight assigned to these criteria differed within and between 
panels. The kind of criteria eventually used by panelists depended strongly on budget restrictions 
and rating scales they had to use. For example tight budgets and fine-rating scales tend to 
strengthen established research and allow less pluralism in funded research. At the same time she 
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found that reviewers who individually reviewed applications and send their reviews per mail, 
more consciously attempted to follow guidelines than panelists who discussed applications in 
panel meetings. This underlines the limited effect of guidelines in processes of social interaction. 
With regard to funding decisions, often panels have to judge all applications, resulting in rank 
orders and subsequently in selections of the ‘best’. This final selection decision can be made by 
panel themselves or by organizing parties like research councils. Consulting (in writing) external 
experts for every specific application can also be part of the procedure. The specific task as-
signed to panels is found to affect decision-making processes (Hollingshead, 1996; Langfeldt, 
2002; Stewart & Stasser, 1998). In an experiment Hollingshead (1996) studied the effect of group 
decision-making procedures on information sharing. She compared groups who were instructed 
to rank all alternatives to those who had to choose the best alternatives. Ranking groups were 
found to exchange more information and to consider all alternatives, eventually taking better 
decisions than selecting groups. However, the beliefs panelist have about the correctness of their 
decisions also play a role. When people believe there is only one correct answer (solve task) 
instead of no correct answer (judge task), they tend to produce more discussion (Stewart & 
Stasser, 1998). According to Langfeldt (2002) also explicitness of review procedures influences 
decision-making processes. She distinguishes between sounding and open confrontation as two 
ends of a continuum. Sounding involves tacit exploration of opinions, no explicit voting and an 
emphasis on reaching consensus, whereas explicit voting without any preceding exploration of 
opinions is called open confrontation. The open confrontation method may be more efficient in 
terms of time needed for decision-making, but at the same time may have rather negative 
consequences for group cohesiveness. With regard to explicit voting, it is good to realize that the 
timing and sequence of voting calls influences the preferences of panelists (Davis et al., 1988).
Another aspect of review procedures is the degree of accountability of panels regarding their 
decisions. Accountability increases epistemic motivation of individuals, their need to search for 
information, the extent to which they repeat unshared information, and the quality of decision-
making (De Dreu et al., 2007; Scholten et al., 2007). Therefore it is an important factor influencing 
chances on groupthink (Esser, 1998). Groupthink is more likely to occur in groups where any 
degree of accountability is absent. Making individuals accountable is found to be more effective 
on reducing groupthink tendencies than making them accountable collectively as a panel (Kroon, 
‘t Hart, & Van Kreveld, 1991). 
A last important factor usually seen as complicating review processes is the available time. A 
thorough review of all applications generally requires a lot of time, which is often at the expense 
of valuable research time of panelists. The combination of the large scope of applications to be 
evaluated and the restricted time available, reduces the ambitions of panelists to execute very 
rigorous reviews (De Dreu et al., 2007; Langfeldt, 2002). When panels experience strong time 
pressure reviewers pay more attention to shared information and less to alternatives, consequently 
resulting in a closing of the mind. People tend to rely more on cognitive heuristics like the 
availability heuristic as mentioned earlier and are more focused on reaching (cognitive) closure 
(De Dreu et al., 2007). Therefore, high time pressure is considered an important antecedent for 
groupthink (Janis, 1982).
Talent Proof: Selection Processes in Research Funding and Careers52
3.7 Conclusions and implications
This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of panel review processes by combining 
literature from the fields of SoS and SPS with SP. Considering the complexity of review processes 
characterized by social interaction, innumerable factors can be identified influencing review processes 
and their outcomes. Since it is impossible to include them all, we chose to focus on a limited number 
of factors we consider to be most illustrating based on several observations of panel meetings. 
Figure 2 depicts a more detailed model of grant allocation processes, including the main social 
psychological factors discussed. Some of these factors - mainly related to applicants and propos-
als - are found to influence review outcomes too. Other factors - mainly related to panels and 
social interaction - need further research to determine their effect on outcomes of review 
processes. These factors (within the rectangle) contribute to the uncertainty with which review 
outcomes can be predicted outright using criteria related to scholarly quality. As shown, there are 
many non (directly) quality related criteria involved in review processes. 
Figure 2 More detailed model of grant allocation processes
Grant application
Quality
Research field
(disciplinary match 
with reviewer) Network
Co-applicants
Membership review panels
Affiliation panellists
Funding decision
Review scores
Social process in panel
Panel
Composition:
Nominated vs appointed
Coverage of expertise & skills
Acknowledgment of expertise
Intragroup status
Intragroup social relations
Ingroup vs outgroup identity
Group norms
Cohesiveness
Motivation
Type of motivation:
High vs low epistemic
Proself vs prosocial
Appetitive vs aversive
Accountability
Panel Membership:
Prototypical vs peripheral
Process organization
Procedural rules
Budget
Rating scale
Time pressure
Accountability
Required outcome:
judgement vs selection
Information distribution
Type of information:
Shared vs unshared
Preference consistent vs inconsistent
Instrumental vs noninstrumental
Applicant
Past performance
Status previous employer
Academic status
Gender
Research trail
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Despite the need for further research, we may be able to formulate recommendations on how to 
stimulate open and thorough panel discussions resulting in fair and good quality outcomes - 
based on general SP studies reviewed above. 
As groupthink leads to flaws in decision-making, situations facilitating groupthink should be 
avoided. Therefore panels should be heterogeneous with regard to their composition. At the 
same time an overlap in competences is recommended, as this is associated with better coopera-
tion between panelists and allows for open discussion between experts. However, in order to 
benefit from diverse panel compositions, this diversity should be evident to panelists. They 
should be aware of the specific expertise of individual members, so they can value their informa-
tion accordingly. Cohesiveness was found to be beneficial for team spirit and good communica-
tion. Therefore it is important to maintain a sense of collegiality and a good atmosphere during 
panel meetings. At the same time, there should be room for deviating opinions and open conflict 
between reviewers in order to stimulate information sharing. Next, time pressure should be 
reduced as much as possible, as this negatively impacts review processes. Of course this is easier 
said than done, however it is important to provide reviewers with sufficient time and resources to 
successfully do their job. Making panelists more accountable will reduce the risk of groupthink, as 
it has a positive effect on searching for and sharing of information and it prevents panels from 
wanting to reach decisions too easily and prematurely. Having to report on review processes, also 
involves being more explicit on which criteria were used. On the one hand this might decrease 
the impact of self-interests, and on the other hand it might increase the extent to which applica-
tions are reviewed in a similar way. For example by using detailed protocols including explicit 
standards for academic competence, decisions can be expected to be less influenced by double 
standards, non-instrumental information or personal interests. Another method is to assign an 
independent chair or moderator to each panel. This person should not be involved in review 
processes concerning the content, but should watch over review processes and should explicitly 
pay attention to types of information being discussed and weight given to it. So for example, 
point out the irrelevance of non-instrumental information, prevent that unique or preference 
inconsistent information is neglected, or too much weight is assigned to relatively unimportant 
information known by everyone. In order to avoid reaching agreement too quickly without 
considering relevant alternatives, (s)he could take on the role of devil’s advocate. This will involve 
reviewers in alternative ways of thinking and forces them to explicitly justify their decisions. The 
person guarding review processes should also make sure all panelists get the chance to express 
their opinions, disregarding perceived differences in status or social identity - as these factors 
cannot be easy moderated in another way.  
3.8 Future Research
Future research is necessary to test how factors related to processes of group decision-making as 
described above, affect outcomes of panel reviews. More specifically, the role of panel composi-
tion, motivation of panelists, type of information being distributed and exchanged, and account-
ability need further investigation. As does the role of implicit criteria deployed by panelists - 
compared to formal criteria as specified in official selection procedures. This future research on 
panel reviews should therefore also deploy observational research methods. Direct observations 
are hardly ever carried out. When the aim is to really understand review processes this can be 
considered a methodological problem, since results are now mainly based on indirect reconstruc-
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tions of review processes. Ethnographic observation is therefore desirable as it offers opportuni-
ties to investigate review and decision making processes where they happen. We plan to do 
observation studies in a just started project.8
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4  Academic talent selection in grant review 
panels1
Abstract
Career grants are an important instrument in selecting and stimulating the next generation of 1 
researchers. Earlier research has mainly focused on the relation between past performance and 
success. In this study, we investigate the evidence of talent and how the selection process takes 
place. More specifically, we investigate which quality dimensions dominate, and how changes in 
weighing these criteria affect the talent selection. We also study which phases in the process are 
dominant. Finally, we look at the effect of the gender composition of the panel on the selection 
outcomes. Using a dataset of the scores of 897 career grant applications, we found no clear 
‘boundaries of excellence’ and only a few granted talents are identified as top talents based on 
outstanding reviews compared to the other applicants. Quite often, the scores that applicants 
receive change after the interview, indicating the important role of that phase. The evaluation of 
talent can be considered to be contextual, as the rankings of applicants changed considerably 
during the procedure and reviewers used the evaluation scale in a relative manner. Furthermore, 
talent was found to have different (low correlated) dimensions. We also found that external peer 
reviews barely influence the decision-making. Finally, we found no gender bias in the decisions.
4.1 Introduction
Attracting and maintaining well-qualified staff is essential for organizations that want to improve 
their status and reputation. Therefore, universities and research councils aim to select the most 
talented young researchers, using explicit and also often implicit criteria (Van den Besselaar & 
Leydesdorff, 2009). As academic career opportunities are by far outnumbered by young researchers 
who hope to establish an academic career (Huisman et al., 2002; Van Balen, 2010), there is strong 
competition among researchers (De Grande et al., 2010). Securing a personal career grant seems 
increasingly crucial for a successful academic career. Besides the necessary resources to conduct 
research, it provides recognition of one’s talent by the scientific community. As both the quality of 
the research system and the careers of individual researchers depend on these selection processes, 
it is important to understand how they function. 
Most research on grant allocation focuses on the outcomes, searching for predictors for success. 
The internal selection mechanism has barely been studied and we therefore do not know what 
happens during the selection process (Bornmann et al., 2010). Only a few studies have been 
conducted into the individual steps of the selection process (e.g., Hodgson, 1995; Bornmann et 
al., 2008). Bornmann et al. (2008) applied a latent Markov model to grant peer reviews of 
doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships. Their model shows that the first stage of the selection 
procedure - external review - is of great importance for the final selection decisions. External 
1  This chapter has been published as Van Arensbergen, P., Van der Weijden, I. & Van den Besselaar, P. (2014). Academic 
talent selection in grant review panels. In: Prpic, K., Van der Weijden, I., Aseulova, N. (eds). (Re)searching scientific 
careers. St. Petersburg: IHST/RAS & SSTNET/ESA.
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reviews had to be positive for fellowship applicants to have a chance of being approved. 
However, Van den Besselaar and Leydesdorff (2009), using a different method, could not confirm 
this. Moreover, no correlation was found between the decision and the external review score 
among the top 50% of the applicants. 
In this paper, we study the process of selecting scientific talent through career grants. We will 
show how the selection proceeds through various phases, how consistent these phases are with 
each other, and which phases and criteria are decisive for the final selection. We will also look at 
the differences between disciplinary domains and between the three grant schemes under study. 
4.2 Theoretical background
Although ‘scientific excellence’ and ‘talent’ are commonly used (Addis & Brouns, 2004), the 
meaning of these concepts is contested (Hemlin, 1993). Much debated is, e.g., whether talent is 
innate or acquired. Talent has been explained by innate factors (e.g., Gross, 1993; Baron-Cohen, 
1998), but this research is often criticized as being mainly anecdotal and retrospective (Ericsson et 
al., 2007). Talent is also conceived in terms of personality (and its genetic components) effecting 
scientific performance (e.g., Busse & Mansfield, 1984; Feist, 1998; Feist & Barron, 2003). However, 
others claim that people are not born to be a genius (Howe et al., 1998), as excellence is mainly 
determined by environmental factors, including early experiences, training, preferences and 
opportunities. If that is the case, talent should not be considered as a quality in itself but more as 
innate potential. Talent is a process that enhances training and, with that, performance. It involves 
domain-specific expertise (Simonton, 2008). Consequently, it is difficult to decide who is a 
talented researcher and who is not. 
4.2.1 Peer review
Selection panel members review and discuss grant proposals or job applications and jointly 
identify the best ones - often using peer review reports. This decision-making process entails, 
among other things, reference to one’s expertise, explanations of preferences, discussion 
between proponents and opponents, obedience (or not) to procedures and rules and, finally, 
reaching agreement. To study this process of scientific reviewing and decision-making, different 
theoretical approaches can be used. A well-known approach which prescribes how scientists 
should behave according to the norms and values of science - the so called ‘ethos of science’ - is 
the Mertonian sociology of science (Bornmann, 2008). One of these norms is universalism, which 
means that the judgement of knowledge claims should be based on scientific criteria only, 
without interference by the personal or social backgrounds of the reviewed and reviewers 
(Merton, 1973 [1942]). Applied to talent selection, access to scientific careers should be based on 
scholarly competence alone. In this context, talent relates mainly to scientific excellence. 
However, Lamont (2009) describes this type of evaluation as a social, emotional and interaction 
process. In an observation study of grant review panels, she shows that scientific excellence does 
not mean the same to everyone. Panel members from different fields, with a variety of motivations, 
use different criteria. And even within fields, people define excellence in various ways. As excellence 
is not the same for everyone but rather subject to discussion and (dis)agreement, one might 
consider talent to be ‘socially constructed’ (Smith, 2001). More generally, emerging with criticism 
of the Mertonian sociology of science, social constructivism poses that scientific knowledge and 
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judgement thereof is constructed through interpretations, negotiations and accidental events 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1981). Cole (1992) used some elements of the constructivist approach to make a 
distinction between the research frontier and the core of scientific knowledge. The frontier 
consists of new work which is in the process of being evaluated by the community. The core 
involves a small number of contributions which are accepted by the community as important and 
true. In this respect, there is a low level of consensus on frontier knowledge and a high level of 
consensus on core knowledge.
Even within the Mertonian norms, grant applications (and job applicants) are not evaluated and 
selected separately but in comparison to competing applications (Smith, 2001). Quality is socially 
and contextually defined from a specific point of reference that evolves during the evaluation 
process (Lamont, 2009). As a result of this contextual ranking, one might expect that the same 
grant application can be valued differently across panels, process phases and time. This is exactly 
what Cole and Cole (1981) found in their study of the reviewing of applications for research grants 
from the National Science Foundation (NSF). After reviewing all and selecting half of the applica-
tions, a second group of peers reviewed and ranked the same set again. The two rankings differed 
substantially. Several proposals that were rejected by the NSF would have been granted if the 
selection had been based on the second ranking. What, then, determines whether one proposal 
is evaluated as being better than another? How is talent selected within peer and panel review?
Engaging peers is essential, as they are best suited to reviewing the work of ‘colleagues’ within 
their speciality (Eisenhart, 2002). However, peers are often close to the applicants, and this creates 
tension between peer expertise and impartiality (Eisenhart, 2002; Langfeldt & Kyvik, 2011). This 
relates to another tension: peer reviews ought to be neutral but not scholarly neutral. Personal 
interests should be eliminated and the evaluation should be based on scholarly discretion. But 
where are the boundaries? A third tension exists between unanimity and divergence. Grant review 
panels are expected to reach a unanimous decision, but at the same time divergence is consid-
ered of great value. Divergent assessments lead to discussion and contribute to the dynamics of 
science (Langfeldt & Kyvik, 2011). As scientific excellence is not unambiguous but defined by 
reviewers and panel members in their own way, grant allocation is clearly a dynamic process. 
4.2.2 Past performance
Earlier studies on the selection of applications focused mainly on the past performance of the 
applicant.2 Melin and Danell (2006) compared the past performance of successful and only just 
unsuccessful applicants to the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research. As the mean number 
of publications differed only slightly between the two groups, the awarded applicants could 
hardly be considered to be more productive than the rejected applicants. A study of the past 
performance of grant applicants in the Netherlands did find an expected difference between the 
tracked records of awarded and rejected applicants (Van den Besselaar & Leydesdorff, 2007, 
2009). However, in comparing past performance in terms of the publications and citations of the 
2  For a more elaborate literature review of the process of grant reviewing and group decision-making, see: 
Van Arensbergen et al. (forthcoming), Olbrecht and Bornmann (2010). For an elaborate review of peer review 
including the reviewing of scientific articles, see Bornmann (2011).
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awardees with the most successful rejected applicants, the latter had a slightly better average 
past performance than the awarded applicants. A later study found the same for German career 
grants (Hornbostel et al., 2009) and for international career grants in molecular biology 
(Bornmann et al., 2010). 
In their classical study of reviews of grant applications at the NSF, Cole et al. (1981) found a weak 
correlation between past performance and granted funding, concluding that the allocation of 
grants seems to be determined about half by the characteristics of the applicant and the pro-
posal, and about half by chance. Other research has shown that academic rank (Cole et al., 1981), 
research field (Laudel, 2006), the type of research (Porter & Rossini, 1985), and academic and 
departmental status (Cole et al., 1981; Bazeley, 1998; Jayasinghe et al., 2003; Viner et al., 2004) 
(weakly) correlate with quality assessments of applications or applicants. Interestingly, there is 
barely any literature on the predictive validity or performativity of peer review: do the selected 
applicants have a better ex post performance than the non-selected (Bornmann, 2011; Van den 
Besselaar, 2013), and is this because the better candidates were selected or because getting the 
grant produces the best researchers as they have better resources than others?  
The chance element reported by Cole et al. (1981) can be partly ascribed to the subjective charac-
ter of the reviewing process and the social construction of scientific quality. According to Lamont 
(2009), it is impossible to completely eliminate this subjectivity, given the nature of the processes. 
The outcomes of the review process, therefore, are affected by who is conducting the review and 
how the panel is composed (Langfeldt, 2001; Eisenhart, 2002; Langfeldt & Kyvik, 2011). Different 
mechanisms can be discerned. Firstly, panel members who are nominated by the applicants give 
higher ratings (Marsh et al., 2008). Secondly, relations between reviewers and applicants influence 
the ratings. Researchers affiliated with reviewers received better reviews than those without this 
type of affiliation (Sandstrom & Hallsten, 2008). Thirdly, the way in which the review process is 
organized influences the outcomes (Langfeldt, 2001). Finally, the importance of the gender dimension 
is often debated. Given the low number of females in top academic positions, and consequently 
the lack of female reviewers (Wennerås & Wold, 1997), as well as the persistence of the so-called 
‘glass ceiling’, an empirical analysis is hard to come by. The available empirical evidence provides 
contradictory results. Broder (1993) examines the rating of proposals from the NSF and finds that 
female reviewers rate female-authored NSF proposals lower than do their male colleagues. A 
study by Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) showed that the gender composition of committees in 
Spanish universities strongly affects the chances of success of candidates applying to full profes-
sorship positions but that it has no effect on promotions to associate professorships. De Paola 
and Scoppa (2011) did a similar study in an Italian university and showed that gender in the 
composition of evaluation committees does matter. In competitions in which the evaluators are 
exclusively male, female candidates are less likely to be promoted. However, gender discrimina-
tion almost disappears when the candidates are judged in a panel of mixed gender.
4.3 Data, research questions and methods
4.3.1 The case 
Our dataset consists of 1,539 career grant applications. These involve personal grants for 
researchers in three different phases of their careers:
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 –   The early career grant scheme (ECG) for researchers who have received a PhD within the 
previous three years. The grant offers them the opportunity to develop their ideas further.
 
 –   The intermediate career grant scheme (ICG) for researchers who have completed their doctor-
ates with a maximum of eight years and who have already spent some years conducting 
postdoctoral research. The grant allows them to develop their own innovative research line 
and to appoint one or more researchers to assist them.
 –   The advanced career grants scheme (ACG) for senior researchers with up to 15 years postdoc-
toral experience, and who have demonstrated the ability to successfully develop their own 
innovative lines of research and to act as coaches for young researchers. The grant allows 
them to build their own research group.
Figure 1 briefly describes the selection procedure. If the number of applications in the ECG and 
ICG programmes is more than four times as high as the number of applications that can be 
awarded (as is generally the case), a pre-selection will take place - this resulted, in our case, in an 
overall rejection rate of about 40% of the applications, but with substantial differences between 
the fields. Because our dataset contains no further information on the criteria and assessments 
involved in the pre-selection, we do not include this phase in our study. In the ACG programme, 
researchers first submit a pre-proposal. The selected applicants are invited to submit a full, more 
detailed proposal. In addition, the selection of pre-proposals is left out of our study, for the same 
reasons. This reduces the dataset to 897 applications.
Figure 1 The general grant allocation procedure.
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Next, the applications are sent to external referees who are considered to be experts in relation 
to the research of the applicant. The number of referees varies between two and six per proposal. 
The reviews and the applicants’ rebuttal are sent to the review panel. Partly based on this input, 
the panel evaluates every proposal on three criteria: the quality of the researcher (QR), the quality 
of the proposal3 (QP) and research impact (RI).4 The score on research impact is only taken into 
account if it is better than the proposal score.5 When this is the case (QP<RI), the final panel score 
is calculated as follows:
Total panel score = ½ QR + ¼ QP + ¼ RI
If the research impact is scored lower than the quality of the proposal (i.e., if QP>RI), the panel 
score is calculated as:
Total panel score = ½ QR + ½ QP
The total panel score leads to a ranking of the applications which determines who proceeds to 
the next round: the interview, where the applicants present their proposal for the panel. 
Hereafter, the panel again evaluates every interviewed applicant (N = 552) on the same three 
criteria, taking into account the information from the previous phases. To arrive at the final panel 
score, the same calculation rule is used as was the case prior to the interview. The ranking of the 
final panel scores determines which applications will receive funding and which are rejected.
The research council consists of eight scientific divisions,6 which are aggregated into three 
domains:7 1) the social sciences and humanities (SSH), 2) science, technology and engineering 
(STE), and 3) life and medical sciences (LMS). In our analyses, we will distinguish between these 
domains when relevant. Table 1 gives an overview of the number of applications per programme 
and domain. As mentioned earlier, we do not include the applications rejected in the pre-selec-
tion phase. 
Our data include several attributes of the applications and applicants: gender, the grant scheme, 
the scientific division and the domain of the application, the referee scores, the panel scores on 
the three criteria, and the decisions. Between a third (ACG) and a quarter (ICG) of the applica-
tions that made it through the pre-selection received funding (table 1).
3  More precisely, this is the quality, innovative nature and academic impact of the proposed research.
4   This is the intended societal, technological, economic, cultural or policy-related use of the knowledge to be 
developed over a period of 5-10 years.
5  From 2012, the Research Impact score will always be included in the calculation of the total panel score.
6   These are the following divisions: (1) earth and life sciences (ELS); (2) chemistry (CH); (3) mathematics, computer 
science and astronomy (MCA); (4) physics (PH); (5) technical sciences (TS); (6) medical sciences (MS); (7) social 
sciences (SS); (8) humanities (HU). Around 7% of the applications are cross-divisional (CD).
7   We aggregated the scientific dimensions to the domain level as follows: SSH: social sciences and humanities; STE: 
chemistry, mathematics, computer sciences and astronomy, physics, and technical sciences; LMS: earth and life 
sciences, and medical sciences.
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Table 1  Number of applications per scientific domain and funding programme across the 
selection procedure.
ECG ICG ACG
1st review* 2nd review# Granted 1st review 2nd review Granted 1st review 2nd review  Granted
SSH N 141 129 54 111 70 28 22 22 9
% 91.5 38.3** 63.1 25.2 100.0 40.9
STE N 151 70 40 124 65 33 34 34 12
% 46.4 26,5 52.4 26.6 100.0 35.3
LMS N 161 76 49 118 56 28 35 30 10
% 47.2 30.4 47.5 23.7 85.7 28.6
Total N 453 275 143 353 191 89 91 86 31
% 60.7 31.6 54.1 25.2 94.5 34.1
4.3.2 Research questions
The grant allocation procedure (Figure 1) resembles a pipeline model. At the start, there is a big 
pool of applicants but as the procedure progresses the number of applicants decreases, with only 
a minority successfully reaching the end: receiving funding. In this study, we aim to understand 
how applications pass the selection procedure and what determines which applications are 
eventually successful and which are expelled along the way. This should show how talents are 
identified or created by the selection process. We answer the following research questions:
1. How evident is talent?
   How strong are the correlations between the various reviewers’ scores? The stronger they 
correlate, the more ‘evident’ talent is. Secondly, do scores vary strongly? Do the selected 
applicants have significantly higher scores than the non-selected? Thirdly, can we clearly 
distinguish top talents from the other talents?
2. Is talent selection dependent on the procedure? 
   Do the rankings of applications in the different phases of the procedure correlate? Is the result 
stable or does additional information in later phases result in strong fluctuations? And, are 
reviewers using the evaluation scales consistently throughout the procedure - do scores have 
a stable meaning?
3. Which dimensions of talent can be distinguished? 
   Do the three main criteria used by the panels represent different dimensions - or do they in 
fact measure the same? If they are different, are the rankings dependent on weighting the 
dimensions? And, what does a change in weighting mean for the selection outcomes?
4.  Which phases of the process and which criteria eventually determine which applicants are 
considered to be talents? 
* :  external reviewers & 1st panel review; # 2nd panel review
** :   If we include all applications, also those rejected in the pre-selection phase, the SSH success rate is lower than the 
two others. This is due to the very high rejection rate in the SSH pre-selection.
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   A logistic regression analysis is used to identify which criteria and phases of the selection 
procedure have most influence on the final grant allocation decision.
5. Is talent gender-sensitive?
  Does the gender composition of the panel influence the selection outcomes?
After answering these questions, we will discuss the implications of the findings for the system of 
selecting and granting research proposals.
4.3.3 Methods
Some of the following analyses are conducted on the domain and programme levels, others on 
the complete dataset. In the latter case, the data is standardized beforehand on the domain and 
programme variables. This was done by calculating the z-scores at the levels of programmes and 
fields.
Agreement between reviewers is analysed by calculating the standard deviation and the maxi-
mum difference between review scores per application and by rank order correlation. We will 
rank the review scores for each step of the selection process and compare these rankings to see 
whether applicants were evaluated differently at various point in the procedure. The use of the 
evaluation scale is analysed with chi-square tests. Rank order correlations are calculated between 
the three evaluation criteria used by the panels. This will show whether talent has just one or else 
various dimensions. Finally, to identify the predictors for talent selection we conducted a multiple 
logistic regression analysis.
4.4 Results
Evaluation practices differ between scientific domains and funding programmes (for more details, 
see Van Arensbergen & Van den Besselaar, 2012). Therefore, we will distinguish between the 
three scientific domains and funding programmes in our analyses. 
4.4.1 The evidence of talent
The applications are refereed by external reviewers and (twice) by a panel. The number of 
external reviewers per proposal varies between two and six.8 In general, there are two reviewers 
for the ECG, three for the ICG and four for the ACG. The external reviewers assign scores on a six 
point scale ranging from excellent (1), very good (2) and very good / good (3), to good (4), fair (5) 
and poor (6); this scale (or a similar one) is used throughout the whole procedure. We calculated 
the difference between the maximum and minimum review scores per proposal. As Table 2 
shows, the reviewers disagree least in the ECG scheme (M = 1.59; SD = 1.27) and most in the 
ACG scheme (M = 2.22; SD = 1.33). The level of disagreement differs significantly between the 
schemes, F(2.895) = 18.72, p < .001, indicating that the further an applicant is in his career, the 
stronger the average disagreement about his quality.
8   Note that the applications are sent to different external reviewers, so generally reviewers are involved in the 
evaluation of a single application.
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Taking into account that the number of reviewers varies per grant scheme, we compare the 
average distribution of review scores per proposal (mean standard deviation, Table 2). The 
standard deviation can range from 0 (if all reviewers totally agree) to 3.54 (when reviewers totally 
disagree). However, no significant difference was found between the programmes. Although the 
maximum disagreement between reviewers increases with the career phases, the mean disagree-
ment remains the same. The higher number of reviewers in the IGC and ACG schemes explains 
this: the more reviewers per proposal, the smaller the weight of reviews with extreme scores.
We repeated the analysis for each of the domains to find out whether agreement on talent differs 
between the domains. Only in the ICG scheme did the average disagreement (standard devia-
tion) between reviewers significantly differ between the domains (F(2.351) = 5.25, p < .01). In the 
ECG and ACG schemes, no significant differences were found. Finally, for all career phases the 
reviewers in the SSH seem to disagree more strongly than in the other domains. 
Table 2 Disagreement in evaluations by external referees per domain and funding program.
Early Career Grant Intermediate Career Grant Advanced Career Grant
Maximum 
disagreement*
Average 
disagreement**
Maximum 
disagreement*
Average 
disagreement**
Maximum 
disagreement*
Average 
disagreement**
All 1.57 1.05 2.06 1.10 2.22 1.06
- SSH 1.60 1.13 2.25 1.21 2.75 1.28
- STE 1.68 1.09 1.76 0.95 2.03 0.95
- LMS 1.45 0.94 2.18 1.16 2.08 1.02
The selection of interview candidates is done by a panel, taking into account the external reviews 
and the applicants’ rebuttal. The correlation between the standardized external review scores and 
the panel reviews is used to determine the extent to which evaluators in different phases of the 
procedure agree on the quality of applicants. In all domains, the external reviews correlate 
moderately strongly (ECG and ACG: τ = .53, p < .001; ICG: τ = .52, p < .001) with the first panel 
scores.9 After the interview, the same panel evaluates the applicants again while including the 
new information. The correlation between the panel scores prior to and after the interview is also 
moderately strong in the domains of STE and LMS (τ = .42, p < .001) and strong in SSH (τ = .62, 
p < .001). 
The average scores are used to distinguish between the talented and less talented applicants, 
but how strongly do these scores discriminate? We ranked (for the complete set and per domain) 
all the applications using the standardized average review score. As Figure 2 shows for the 
complete set, the distribution has no clear cut-off point, and a similar pattern exists at the domain 
and programme levels. The dotted line indicates the de facto cut-off point of applications 
9  Since the dataset is characterized by a large number of tied ranks, we use Kendall’s tau instead of Spearman’s rho.
*  Mean of maximum difference between review scores per application
**  Mean of standard deviation review scores per application
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selected for the next (interview) phase. However, this selection boundary does not follow from 
the scores, as the difference between success and only just no success is very small. Similar 
patterns were found for the panel scores, where the difference between success and failure is 
very small too.
Figure 2 Standardized external referee scores for the complete set of applications.
In conclusion, no clear ‘boundaries of excellence’ could be identified between selected and 
not-selected applicants. Moreover, the average scores in the three phases of the procedure only 
correlate moderately strongly, and this may reflect considerable changes between the rankings. 
This issue will be addressed in the next section, after we have looked into the evidence of top 
talents.
Top talents
Figure 2 showed no clear delineation of talent but more gradual differences in talent assessment. 
Experienced reviewers often claim to easily identify the real top, there are always a few top 
talents who stand out from the beginning (Van Arensbergen, Van der Weijden & Van den 
Besselaar, forthcoming). To test this claim, we looked at the average total review scores per panel 
in order to identify the top talents. We determined: i) the number of positive outliers (= excep-
tionally high scores) in the evaluation round prior to and after the interview; ii) the distance 
between the outliers and the best of the gross evaluation scores; iii) the number of stable outliers 
(the same outliers in both evaluation rounds). 
Figure 3a is an example of a panel that clearly identified a top talent both before and after the 
interview. Figure 3b shows that a clear top was identified only after the interview. Looking at the 
x-axis, the four applicants eventually identified as the top talents did not stand out in the eyes of 
the panel members before the interview. An example of a case where no top is recognizable but 
where all the applicants are close together is depicted in Figure 3c.
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Figure 3a  Average panel scores before and after interview in panel which clearly identified a top 
talent in both review rounds.
Figure 3b  Average panel scores before and after interview in panel which identified top talents 
only after the interview.
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In general, we found that a clear top was identified more often after the interview than before 
(Table 3), making Figure 3b most representative for the 27 panels. In more than half of the panels, 
no applicants stood out from the rest before the interview, while after the interview 20 of the 
panels identified a top. This top predominantly consists of one person, with a maximum of four. 
For example, seven panels identified one top talent in the first selection phase, whereas two 
panels identified four top talents. 
Also, after the interview, the distance between the (lowest in the) top and the (highest in the) 
middle group is on average a little larger (0.51, SD = 0.19) than before the interview (0.48, SD = 
0.18). Panel members use an evaluation scale from 1 to 6. These average distances of 0.48 and 
0.51 clearly differentiate a top from the large middle area, where there is a great deal of overlap 
and where most applications are very close to each other in terms of their review scores (see 
Figure 2).
Figure 3c  Average panel scores before and after interview in panel which identified no top 
talents.
When we look at the stability of the top, we find that only in a few cases were the same appli-
cants identified as top talents both before and after the interview. In 17 out of 27 panels, none of 
the applicants were identified as a top talent in both the evaluation rounds. In seven panels, we 
discerned one stable top talent. In total, of the 53 applicants who were in the top at some point 
of the evaluation process, 15 belonged to the top in both rounds and can be considered to be 
stable top talents. However, the vast majority of selected applicants (210 out of 263) were never 
scored as exceptional talent.
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Table 3  Number of panels (n = 27) which identified top talents before and after the interview, 
and which identified the same top talents in both selection phases.
Number of identified 
top talents
Before interview After interview Both before and after interview
0 14 7 17
1 7 8 7
2 3 3 1
3 1 6 2
4 2 3 0
4.4.2 Effects of the procedure
The selection procedure includes three evaluation phases in which new information is added and 
which may influence the resulting assessment. Figures 4 and 5 show how applications are 
evaluated differently at different points in the procedure based on the standardized review 
scores. 
Figure 4 The 1st panel review by external reviewer score.
Right of the diagonal in Figure 4 are the applications that had a better (= lower) first panel score 
than external review score. On the left side are the applications that had a better external review 
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score. Clearly, the scores and the relative positions of the applications change during the 
procedure. If external (peer) review scores had been leading, the set of applicants invited to the 
interview would have been rather different. Since both evaluations are based on roughly the 
same information, this implies that talent evaluation depends upon the way in which it is organ-
ized - it is ‘contextual’.
In Figure 5, the panel reviews before and after the interview are compared, with right from the 
diagonal those applications that scored lower (= better) after the interview than before, whereas 
left of the diagonal the opposite is the case. Panels adjust their assessments after the interview, 
and some applicants scored rather differently after the interview compared with before. 
Figure 5. The 2nd panel review by 1st panel review.  
This implies that if grant allocation had been based on the evaluation scores before the interview, 
the outcome would have been different. How strong is this effect? To answer this question, we 
compare the rankings of applications between the three evaluation moments, showing the impor-
tance of the various phases of the selection process.10 We found that 48 (17%) of the interview 
candidates would not have been invited for the interview if the external referee scores had been 
paramount. According to the procedure, the panel score is decisive. However, there were 24 
rejected applicants with a higher total panel score than the selected applicants. This means that 
9% of the successful applicants were not selected simply because they were among the highest 
total panel scores. The panel thus in fact has additional autonomy in decision-making.  
10   In some divisions and in the ACG, all the applicants were invited for the interview; these are excluded from this part 
of the analysis.
Average panel scores before interview
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Grant allocation is the final step in the selection procedure. If the grant allocation had been 
based entirely on the evaluation by the external referees, 26% of the applicants would not have 
been allocated a grant. If interviews would not have been part of the procedure - and this is the 
case in many funding schemes - and the first panel reviews would have determined the grant 
allocation, 22% would have been allocated to currently unsuccessful applicants. These findings 
imply that the interview considerably changes the assessment of talent.11 As the procedure 
prescribes, the eventual allocation decision largely corresponds to the final panel score - only 2% 
of the granted applicants had a lower panel score than the best rejected applicants.
Differentiating between the funding programmes and scientific domains, differences were found 
between domain-programme combinations but no overall pattern could be identified (for more 
details, see Van Arensbergen & Van den Besselaar, 2012).
What do the scores represent?
Having shown how the perception of talent changed, we will now study changes in the use of the 
evaluation scale (as distinct from the evaluation of the applications). As has been said, the six 
point scale ranges from excellent (1), very good (2) and very good / good (3), to good (4), fair (5) 
and poor (6). Clearly, it is an ‘absolute scale’. The panel members assign a score between one 
and six to each application on three criteria (quality researcher, quality proposal and research 
impact). Table 4 shows the mean scores and standard deviations for two typical evaluation panels 
both before and after the decision about which applicants are invited for an interview. 
Table 4 Use of evaluation scale.
Case programme 
& domain
1st panel review 
all applications
1st panel review 
selected applications
2nd panel review 
selected applications
researcher proposal total researcher proposal total researcher proposal total
1
ECG-
STE
N 34 34 34 18 18 18 18 18 18
Mean 2.89 3.43 3.10 2.28 2.87 2.55 2.56 3.23 2.84
SD .84 .78 .73 .54 .45 .47 .83 .95 .84
2
ICG-
SSH
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Mean 1.69 2.18 1.91 1.69 2.18 1.91 1.79 2.20 1.98
SD .38 .43 .35 .38 .43 .35 .38 .49 .39
In case one, about 50% of the highest scoring applications were selected. As expected, the 
means for all applicants (first review, all applications) are lower than the means for selected 
applicants only (first review, selected applicants).12 The standard deviation of the entire set of 
applicants is larger than for the selected candidates only - indicating an expected smaller 
11   In a follow-up study, we investigate the dynamics, the criteria (implicitly) applied, and the effects of the interview 
(Van Arensbergen et al., forthcoming).
12  Please also note that, here, lower scores correspond with higher numbers.
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variation among the selected applicants. However, the average and standard deviation of the 
scores after the interview (second panel score) are equal to the values for all applicants in the first 
review, suggesting that the panel has again applied the whole scale: some of the applications 
scoring very good and excellent in the first round are now only fair or even poor. In this case, the 
scale is used in a relative way, and not as an absolute one. In case two, no selection took place, 
as all the applicants were interviewed. The interview influenced individual scores, but the average 
and the standard deviation before and after the interview remained about the same. No changes 
in the use of the scale seem to have occurred here. 
Comparing the 14 ‘selective’ panels with the 12 ‘non-selective’ panels (in Table 5) sees a signifi-
cant correlation between the change of context (selection between the phases or not) and the 
change of the use of the scale (relative or absolute scale). Consequently, the assessment of talent 
depends on the context, on the procedure: e.g., an interview, as shown in the previous section, 
and the number of competitors, as shown in this section. 
Table 5 Changing use of the scores by changing context (n = 26).
Reduction of nr applicants after 1st panel evaluation
yesa no
Decrease average score* no 4 (28.6%) 10 (83.3%)
yesb 10 (71.4%) 2 (16.7%)
Increase standard deviation** no 4 (28.6%) 8 (66.7%)
yesb 10 (71.4%) 4 (33.3%)
Total 14 (100%) 12 (100%)
4.4.3 The dimensions of talent
Earlier, we saw that the external reviews correlated moderately strongly with the panel reviews. 
Distinguishing between the three criteria used by the panel shows that this moderate correlation 
is mainly due to a relatively weak correlation between the external reviews and the panel scores 
for research impact, τ = .22, p < .001 (SSH); τ = .29, p < .001 (STE); τ = .36, p < .001 (LMS). In the 
LMS domain, however, the external referee scores correlate even more weakly with the panel 
scores for the researcher, τ = .32, p < .001. The external reviews are strongest in relation to the 
panel scores for the proposal, τ = .55, p < .001 (SSH); τ = .55 p < .001 (STE); τ = .64, p < .001 
(LMS). 
The three criteria are found to correlate moderately with each other (Table 6). Research impact 
correlates most weakly with the quality of the researcher in all domains both before and after the 
interview, ranging from τ = .31 to .41. The correlation between quality of the proposal and quality 
of the researcher increased after the interview in all domains, strongest in LMS, from τ = .44 
before the interview to τ = .59 after the interview.
a yes  = changing context. 
b yes =using the score values in a relative way. 
* X²=7.797, p=0.005; ** X²=3.773, p=0.05.
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Table 6  Correlations between the standardized panel review scores for the three criteria per 
domain.
SSH STE LMS
QR QP QR QP QR QP
Before interview QP .50* .50* .44*
RI .33* .41* .38* .49* .37* .47*
After interview QP .57* .56* .59*
RI .37* .49* .31* .44* .41* .47*
This suggests that the three criteria represent different dimensions. The total score of the panel 
(as calculated with the formulas from the method section) therefore depends on the weights 
attributed to the different dimensions. This may change with the decision-making context. In 
2012, a change in the weighting of the research impact score was implemented in the review pro-
cedures. From now on, research impact accounts for 20% of the total panel score, and the quality 
of the researcher and the proposal for 40% each. We applied this new procedure to our dataset 
to explore how this would affect the selection outcomes.
The issue that comes up is: to what extent does the changing of weights influence the selection 
procedure? Would other applicants have been selected if the three criteria were weighted 
differently? To answer these questions, we performed some simulations in which we changed the 
weights. Two analyses can be done: (i) a rank order correlation between the different simulated 
scores informs us about the impact of the scores. The lower the rank order correlation, the 
greater the effect the weighting has on the resulting order of applicants. This, by the way, does 
not imply that changing the weight would also influence the decisions as the altered rank order 
may be within the set of successful applicants and within the set of unsuccessful applicants. 
Therefore, (ii) one should check whether the changed order would move applicants from below 
the success threshold to a place above the threshold, and vice versa. 
Does changing weights imply changes in the rank order?
We simulated the outcomes using five different sets of weights, as shown in Table 7. We check it 
here for the first decision as to whether an applicant is invited or rejected for the interview. For 
each of the sets, we calculated the score of the applicant, and this led to five rank orders. 
Rathenau Instituut
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Table 7 Used weights for the three criteria.
Weights: 1 2 3 4 5
Researcher 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.4 0.4
Proposal 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.4 0.2
Societal impact 0  + 0.33 0.2 0.4
Using these weights, we found for the interview selection that the rank order correlations are 
rather high. For almost all instrument/field combinations, Spearman’s Rho remained between 
0.83 and 0.97 (Table 8, left part). The lowest correlations (between 0.62 and 0.80) were all between 
weights set at 1 (where societal impact would not be taken into account) and weights set at 5 
(where societal impact would be strongly taken into account). If it is taken into account, the exact 
weight may not be very important for the rank order of the applications, as the correlation remains 
in all cases above 0.83. For the grant decision, we find a similar pattern (Table 8, right part).
Table 8  Simulations: average correlations between rank orders based on five weights for each 
funding programme and field*.
Decisions before the interview Decisions after the interview
ECG ICG ACG ECG ICG ACG
ELS 0.93 ** 0.90 0.89 ** 0.97
CH 0.91 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.82 0.97
MCA 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.82 0.84 0.88
CD 0.94 0.90 0.97 0.95 0.90 0.83
HU ** ** 0.88 ** ** 0.99
SS 0.84 0.88 0.84 0.83 0.92 0.93
PH 0.87 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.92
TS 0.88 0.88 0.96 0.89 0.89 0.99
MS 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.92 0.86
  
What would this mean in terms of the decisions and success rates in the ECG and ICG 
programmes? 
Table 9 shows that the selection of grantees does depend on the selected weights. Scenario five 
would have changed the grant allocation between 10.4% (ECG) and 14.4% (ICG), and this is, of 
course, important for the involved applicants. Furthermore, the table shows that there is significant 
variety between the fields, as in some fields the percentage of different grantees under scenario 
five would be more than 50%. Independently of whether this would have had an effect on the 
science system, the analysis suggests that what counts as talent is indeed context dependent.
+:  If ‘societal impact’ scores higher than proposal, a new value for ‘proposal’ is calculated as the mean of the old value of 
 ‘proposal’ and the value of ‘societal impact’
Rathenau Instituut
*  We use here the more detailed division in fields (see notes 5 and 6) 
**  Societal impact scores not available
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Table 9 Scenario 5* versus scenario 2**: Number of different grantees.
    
ECG ICG
different grantees % different grantees %
ELS 1 5.6 - -
CH 1 10.0 4 57.1
MCA 3 33.3 3 50.0
CD 1 11.1 2 28.6
SS 3 10.3 0 0.0
PH 0 0.0 0 0.0
TS 1 8.3 1 5.9
MS 3 11.1 1 5.0
Total 13 10.4 11 14.4
    
4.4.4 Predictors for talent selection
The first decision is when panels select and reject applications for the interview round, based on 
the external reviews, the applicants’ responses to these reviews, and the panels’ own scoring on 
three criteria. In order to determine which of these variables best predicts whether an application 
will be selected for the interview, we conducted a stepwise logistic regression analysis, including 
the average external referee score and the three panel scores.13
The model with only the external reviews correctly predicts in 69.1% of the cases who goes 
through to the interview - slightly above the random correct prediction of 61.5%. In the full 
model, only the panel scores for the quality of the proposal and the researcher’s quality are 
included, whereas the other variables are excluded (Table 10). These two variables correctly 
predict in 77.3% of the cases whether a researcher was invited for the interview or not. 
13   As the following results show, the stepwise method eliminates two variables because they do not contribute 
significantly to the model.
*  Impact with heavy weight
**  Reality (until 2012)
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Table 10 Logistic regression of the selection of interview candidates.
B (SE) X² (df) Nagelkerke R² % correct
Constant -0.61* (0.10)
Quality Researcher 0.71* (0.13)
Quality Proposal 1.36* (0.15)
Model 283.96* (2) .48 77.3
Not included
External Reviews 0.23 (0.16)
Research Impact 0.15 (0.14)
   
    
After the interviews, the panel again scores the applications on the three criteria. A logistic 
regression analysis was performed to predict the allocation decisions from the external referee 
scores and the three panel scores (Table 11). Again, the external referee scores and the research 
impact scores do not contribute significantly to the prediction. The panel scores for the proposal 
and for the researcher result into a correct classification in 83.1% of the cases. The model with 
only the external reviews correctly predicts in 65.2% of the cases who receives funding - slightly 
above the random correct prediction of 52.3%.
Table 11 Logistic regression analysis to predict grant allocation decisions.
    
B (SE) X² (df) Nagelkerke R² % correct
Constant 0.46* (0.15)
Quality Researcher 1.40* (0.23)
Quality Proposal 1.80* (0.23)
Model 294.97* (2) .65 83.1
Not included
External Reviews 0.21 (0.18)
Research Impact 0.08 (0.19)
 
Distinguishing between the three funding programmes, in short we found that for early career 
researchers to a greater extent other factors are taken into account in decision-making. Moreover, 
the de facto weights of both of the included criteria are found to differ between the funding 
programmes. For the early career researchers, the evaluation of the proposal and the researcher 
almost evenly determine the final selection decision, whereas for the intermediate and advanced 
career researchers, the quality of the proposal is more important than the quality of the research-
er (for more details, see Van Arensbergen & Van den Besselaar, 2012).
 
*p < .001
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*  p < .001
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4.4.5 Is talent gendered?
As suggested in the literature, panel composition is often found to influence decision-making: 
decisions of panels with no or only a few female members are found to be gender-biased. As 
councils increasingly claim to support female applications, it is interesting to investigate whether 
this effect still exists. Do ‘male dominated’ panels still exist and, if so, do these panels decide 
more often in favour of male than of female applicants? If no gender bias were to exist, then one 
would expect that the percentage of granted applications within the set of female applicants is 
similar to the percentage of granted applications in the set of male applicants. Gender bias is 
calculated as:
Gender bias = (success rate of women / success rate of men)
Of course, this is under the assumption that male and female applicants and applications are, on 
average, of equal quality. One way of tentatively testing this is by comparing the referee scores 
for female and male applicants. These are individually given by external reviewers - before the 
proposals enter the decision-making process. We found that the mean score of male applicants is 
slightly higher (9%) than the average score of female applicants. In most fields, this difference is 
not statistically significant (if we consider the data as a random sample), and insofar as the 
differences are significant, it is in the more advanced career schemes. For the ECG, differences 
are small(er) and never significant. We therefore assume that the - comparable - peer review 
scores are hardly gender biased - if at all (Marsh et al., 2009).
We analyse here the relation between the gender composition of panels and the final selection 
decision. One may do the same for the interview decision. Figure 6 shows gender bias according 
to the number of women in the panel. As the figure shows, there are still panels with no or only 
one female member. However, one cannot conclude that these panels exhibit a gender bias 
against female applicants. In the lower range of female panel membership, we actually find a 
large variation in the bias variable. If there is a pattern, it more often seems to actually be in 
favour of female applicants. Panels with larger numbers of female members consistently seem to 
have no gender bias in their decisions. 
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Figure 6 Gender bias by number of female panel members.
Why this difference occurs needs further investigation. However, one factor may be whether a 
field has many or only a few female applicants. In the latter case, the success rate of women is 
heavily influenced by a single decision. Indeed, as Figure 7 shows, in those fields with few female 
applicants, the spread in the success rate is large, whereas this is not the case in those fields with 
many female applicants. Furthermore, one might expect that fields with only a few female 
applicants would also have somewhat male-dominated panels - since these fields may simply lack 
female researchers to occupy panels. A study of Van den Brink (2009) suggests that a gender bias 
in promotion decisions is due to the composition of panels. However, we cannot confirm this, as 
our data suggest no correlation between the number or percentage of women in a panel and the 
gender bias in the results.
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Figure 7 Gender bias by number of female applicants.
4.5 Conclusions and discussion
First of all, the moderate correlations between the criteria indicate that talent has different dimen-
sions. This implies that the weight of the criteria may strongly influence the selection process. For 
example, the weight of research impact is very low in the case we studied, but the current 
tendency to include expected societal impact more strongly in the evaluation of proposals 
potentially leads to the selection of other types of applicants as ‘the most excellent’. However, 
our simulations suggest that this can only happen if the weight of the societal relevance criterion 
were to be more substantial than currently implemented. 
Secondly, the scores change considerably between the phases. Some applicants - top ranked by 
the external referees - are not even invited for an interview by the panels. In addition, these same 
panels regularly change their evaluations of applicants radically after the interview. A clear top 
can more often be distinguished after the interview than before; however, the actual number of 
identified top talents is relatively low. The interview seems decisive, but how this works needs 
further investigation. Does the interview bring new information, leading to a different evaluation? 
In that case, the procedure does influence the outcome considerably, which can of course be 
intended and desirable. As such, should the many existing procedures without interviews be 
abandoned?14 Or is it because other aspects of talent (such as communicative skills) and several 
cognitive, motivational and social processes (Lamont, 2009) play a role during the interview, as 
well as various psychological factors (Hemlin, 2009)? 
14  Interestingly, the very prestigious ERC advance grants do not include an interview with the applicants.
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Thirdly, the role of the external peer review in the quality assessment seems modest (Langfeldt et 
al., 2010). Using only external review scores as predictors, the percentage of correctly predicted 
applications is only slightly higher than random (65.2% versus 52.3%) and much lower than for 
the two other predictors (83.1%). Combined with the moderately (but not very) high correlation 
(τ = .52) between review scores and panel scores, this suggests that the panel takes the review 
scores into account, but not very much.15 Further study is needed, to reveal whether (and if so, 
how) panel members value and use the peer review reports. 
Fourthly, reviewers disagree, and the further a researcher is in his/her career, the more reviewers 
disagree. In line with earlier studies, consensus about quality is lower in the SSH than in the 
natural sciences, technical sciences and life sciences (Cicchetti, 1991; Simonton, 2006). Panels 
and external reviewers also do not draw a clear line between talented and less-talented research-
ers, as for the middle group very small differences in scores eventually decide who receives a 
grant and who does not. As the funding decisions are of great importance for the careers of 
(especially) young researchers, career success becomes partly a question of luck.
Finally, the composition of the panel does not seem to result into a gender bias in the decisions. 
This suggests that councils’ policies to stimulate female participation in science appear effective 
- at least at the level of their panels. Under these conditions, gender bias in outcomes seems to 
be related to the low number of female candidates in some fields.
In summary, our findings clearly indicate the contextuality of evaluation and decision-making. 
In improving the transparency, quality and legitimacy of grant allocation practices, it would 
therefore be desirable to analyse in more depth the details of the de facto (implicit and explicit) 
applied criteria. As the selection procedure influences the evaluation of scientific talent, we suggest 
using a variety of procedures instead of standardizing. The interview was found to have an important 
impact on the evaluation of the applicants. If communicative skills and self-confidence are decisive, 
the selection outcomes will be biased towards these qualities at the moment that all evaluation 
procedures would include interviews. Since no evident pool of talents could be identified based 
on the various scores, and as the differences between granted and eventually rejected applica-
tions were small, a variety of procedures may result in the selection of a variety of talent. 
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5 Gender differences in scientific 
productivity: a persisting phenomenon?1
Abstract
There is substantial literature on research performance differences between male and female 
researchers, and its explanation. Using publication records of 843 social scientists, we show that 
performance differences indeed exist. However, our case study suggests that in the younger 
generation of researchers these have disappeared. Moreover the top is no longer strongly 
dominated by men, as the share of top performing women has increased considerably. If this 
indicates a new trend, a cultural change in developed societies, where women increasingly 
outperform men in all levels of education, is also becoming effective in the science system.
5.1 Introduction
The academic world has been dominated by men for a long time. However, the share of women 
in academia is gradually increasing. Worldwide female students nowadays even outnumber male 
students, with 55% in the UK and USA and with 59% in the Scandinavian countries (OECD, 2010). 
And of the new entrance in European higher education about 55% is female.2 Figure 1 shows the 
percentage of women in different academic positions in the Netherlands. There, the position of 
women in higher academic positions is even lower than elsewhere. The growing share of women 
is characteristic for all positions, however the general rule still is ‘the higher the rank in academia, 
the lower the number of women’ (Brouns, 2000; De Weert, 2001; Timmers, Willemsen & Tijdens, 
2010). Although female researchers are improving their position, the process is rather slow. Is the 
weak position due to women having in average fewer ambitions in pursuing an academic career? 
Are career decisions characterized by gendered social closure, structurally disadvantaging 
women? Or are women weakly represented in high ranks because their male colleagues outper-
form them? In this paper we will address the last question by focusing on differences in research 
performance between male and female researchers.
1   This chapter is a slightly modified version of the paper published earlier in Scientometrics as Van Arensbergen, P., 
Van der Weijden, I. & Van den Besselaar P. (2012). Gender differences in scientific productivity: a persisting 
phenomenon? Scientometrics, 93(3), 857-868.). For details about the changes see footnote 4 and 12.
2   Of course this differs between the various fields of study. In most science, technology and engineering fields, the 
share of women is low.
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Figure 1 Share of women in academic positions in the Netherlands 1998-2010 (source: VSNU)
Ample evidence has been provided for a productivity difference between men and women over 
time, with men producing more research output than women (Abramo, D’Angelo, Caprasecca, 2009; 
Cole & Zuckerman, 1984; Ledin, Bornmann, Gannon et al., 2007; Long, 1992; Nakhaie, 2002; 
Penas & Willett, 2006; Prpic, 2002; Symonds, Gemmell, Braisher et al., 2006; Taylor, Fender & 
Burke 2006; Xie & Shauman, 1998). However, with regard to citations per publication no gender 
differences were found (Penas & Willett, 2006; Ledin et al., 2007; Tower, Plummer & Ridgewell, 
2007), or even a difference in the opposite direction; women having a higher citation score than 
men (Long, 1992; Powell, Hassan, Dainty et al., 2009). The lower research productivity of women 
implies that female researchers receive in average a lower total number of citations than men do.
Zuckerman (2001) suggest four different types of explanations of the productivity puzzle (Cole & 
Zuckerman, 1984): scientific ability, self-selection, social selection, and accumulated disadvan-
tage. According to the scientific ability explanation, male and female academics have different 
biological and psychological characteristics that directly affect the research output. However no 
direct gender effect has been found in earlier research (e.g. Xie & Shauman, 1998).
The self-selection explanation argues that scientific productivity is influenced by the individual 
choices of the academics themselves. Several studies confirm the influence of individual choices. 
For example, women more often interrupt their career to have children and start a family 
(Prozesky, 2008). Having children causes a decline in research productivity growth, more for 
women than for men (Fuchs, Von Stebut & Allmendinger, 2001; Hunter & Leahey, 2010). Women 
were also found to initiate their careers at a later age than men (Karamessini, 2004; Prozesky, 
2008). This also holds for their publication career: women produce fewer publications than men 
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during the first decade of their career, but later in their career they more or less catch up with 
male researchers (Long, 1992; Symonds et al., 2006). Other factors which are found to affect 
research productivity and can be considered as self-selection are marital status3, career ambitions, 
amount of research time, extent of specialization, discipline, reputation of the university and 
department, international network (collaboration and co-authoring), and academic rank (Allison 
& Long, 1990; Bland, Center, Finstad et al., 2006; Carayol & Matt, 2006; Dundar & Lewis, 1998; 
Leahey, 2006; Lee & Bozeman, 2005; McNamee, Willis & Rotchford, 1990; Prpic, 2002; Puuska, 
2010; Taylor et al., 2006). Many of these factors have a gender dimension, as women in average 
work at lower ranks, in less prestigious institutions, have in average less experience and a weaker 
(inter)national network. They also specialize less (Leahey, 2006) and more often concentrate on 
teaching and service, and therefore spend less time on research (Snell, Sorensen, Rodriguez et 
al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2006). However one should recognize that these factors cannot always be 
fully ascribed to self-selection. For example, decisions related to collaboration and academic rank 
are partly in the hands of other people and the organization of the university. 
Zuckerman’s third type of explanation, social selection, outlines how research productivity of 
women is affected by gender-based decisions made by others (Zuckerman, 2001). Just as in 
society in general, there may exist mechanisms of discrimination in the social organization of 
science (Prpic, 2002). Men outnumber women in positions of formal power, authority and high 
income (Timmers et al., 2010; Xie & Shauman, 1998). Research on professorial appointments 
shows there are gender differences in the selection and recruitment procedures. A clear disparity 
was found in the success rates of male and female applicants to the disadvantage of females 
(Van den Brink, Brouns & Waslander, 2006). This implies that career decisions are characterized by 
gendered social closure (Van den Brink, 2009). 
A similar situation has been observed in the procedures of grant allocation. Quite some research 
has focused on gendered aspects of peer review, especially since Wenneras and Wold (1997) 
published their study on nepotism and sexism in science. They showed that women needed a 
higher performance to be as successful as male researchers. And, researchers without committee 
members in their network needed much higher performance than those with an adequate network. 
A similar study on grant applications in the Netherlands confirmed that gender matters (Brouns, 
2000). However it showed that the way it matters varies for different disciplines. Whereas in some 
disciplines in case of equal average publication scores more men than women were evaluated as 
excellent, less productive women also obtained grants in other disciplines. Replicating the study 
of Wenneras and Wold ten years later, Sandstrom and Hallsten (2008) found no sexism anymore; 
female researchers even had a slightly better chance than males. Clearly, the council studied in 
both papers changed its policy in the meantime. However, nepotism was as strong as before. If 
that is the case, this may still influence female researchers, as male researchers generally have 
better networks than female researchers (Fuchs et al., 2001; Kyvik & Teigen, 1996) and collabora-
tion influences performance (Lee & Bozeman, 2005). Furthermore, women receive less academic 
support and mentoring than men (Fuchs et al., 2001; Landino & Owen, 1988). This may disadvan-
tage women too, as academic careers depend on support by academic mentors (Van Balen, 2010). 
3  Other evidence suggests that the effect of marital status is less univocal (Fox, 2005).
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The factors described above may overlap and constitute the source of other events influencing 
research productivity. For example status in science can be both the cause and effect of scientific 
collaboration. The same holds for the relation between scientific status and publication produc-
tivity (Fox, 2005). The accumulation of decisions or events over time generally placing women at 
a disadvantage is called cumulative disadvantage (Zuckerman, 2001). However, if productivity 
differences relate to individual (often gendered) factors, such as ambition, focus on research and 
changing gender roles and responsibilities in family life (Prozesky, 2008; Taylor et al., 2006; Xie & 
Shauman, 1998), one may expect that gradually changing gender roles in the last decades may 
have resulted into changed behavior. 
In a recent review, Ceci & Williams (2011) discuss the evidence about discrimination against 
women in science, in journal reviewing, grant funding, and in hiring. They suggest that no 
evidence is available that supports the current discrimination against women in science. As a 
consequence, the unequal position of women in science is based on quality differences between 
male and female researchers that may partly be based on free choices, and partly on discrimina-
tory arrangements in society at large - e.g., inequalities related to division of domestic work and 
child care. If this is correct, a careful analysis of these performance differences between male and 
female researchers is necessary - especially an analysis of changes in performance differences 
over time. We would actually expect changes, as women increasingly perform better at all levels 
in the educational system (Buchmann, DiPrete & McDaniel, 2008; Pekkarinen, 2008).     
5.2 Research question
In this study, we answer the question of whether the gendered productivity differences are persis-
tent or whether they change over time. As it was suggested that the productivity gap occurs in 
the early career (Symonds et al., 2006), we especially focus on the gendered performance 
differences among the youngest generation. Research performance in this paper is defined in 
terms of productivity (number of publications), and in terms of impact (number of citations). 
5.3 Materials and methods
Comparing male and female researchers requires a good identification of the population. We use 
data on research grant applications in the Netherlands to analyze productivity differences. The 
dataset4 covers about 1100 applications, in a three years period (2003-2005), covering three 
programs: early (ECG) and advanced career grants (ACG), and an open competition scheme 
(OC), all within the social sciences. 
4   For this chapter, we redid the data collection compared to the original publication (Van Arensbergen et al., 2012). 
There we used data based on automatic coupling of application data with Social Sciences Citation Index data, using 
family name and first initial. This is of course never perfect, and cannot avoid error based on homonyms and 
synonyms, applicants using different first initials in applications compared to publications, and titles taken for first 
names. For this version, we recollected all data manually in order to avoid all these problems. We also extended the 
search, as we now also included non-Dutch addresses and Science Citation Index-expanded publications. In the 
previous version only publications with a Dutch address and indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index were 
included. We now also used a slightly longer citation window (up to 31-12-2006). The new data indeed show many 
small and several larger differences compared to the original dataset. However, the results of the analyses and the 
conclusions remain highly similar, suggesting that the error in the data even out. Details about the new data 
collection will be published elsewhere (Van den Besselaar, forthcoming).
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1.  The young career grant scheme is meant for researchers who got a PhD within the previous 
three years. The grant allows them to continue to develop their ideas further.
2.  The advanced career scheme is for senior researchers with a long (up to 15 years) post-doc-
toral experience, and who have shown the ability to successfully develop their own innovative 
lines of research and to act as coaches for young researchers. The grant allows them to build 
their own research group.
3.  The open competition is for professors and senior researchers. They can apply for a 4-year 
full-time PhD research project or a 3-year full-time postdoc project.
We had name, field, and institutional affiliation of all applicants. This enabled us to find almost all 
applicants on the Web, and through that we could identify their résumé and their publications. 
Those applicants that could not be found were removed from the analysis5. This set of applicants 
can be considered as a good representation of active social science researchers, as active 
researchers are expected to apply regularly in these programs. As several researchers applied 
two or more times during the three years, the number of researchers is smaller than the number 
of applications: 843 researchers, of which 269 (32%) female. The advanced career applicants and 
the open competition applicants belong to the established generation. The young career grant is 
clearly for the new generation of scientists. This means we can distinguish two generations of 
researchers:
1. 355 young researchers, having finished their PhD studies within the last three years; 
2. 488 established researchers, generally within the associate or full professor rank.
Full and associate professors are generally older than 40, with an average of 51 years and a 
standard deviation of 7 years. Those with an ACG grant are on the younger side within this 
group: they are in average 40 years old with a standard deviation of 4 years.  
The ECG grantees represent the young researchers; in our sample, they are between 27 and 41 
years, with a few older: researchers who got their PhD at an older age. In average, the young 
researchers are 33 years old, with a standard deviation of 3 years. 
For this paper we define research performance as the number of articles in scholarly (peer 
reviewed) journals, and as the number of citations received. Research managers and science 
policy makers increasingly emphasize this type of output and the performance indicators based 
on it.6 More specifically, we measured scholarly performance of all researchers, in terms of 
publications from the three years before the application and citations to these publications 
received until the end of 2006. So we take recent performance and not lifetime performance into 
account. We used the Web of Science for measuring performance. As we had the résumés and 
publication lists of almost all applicants, we did not have the problem of synonyms and homo-
nyms (of names). Thus, only the correct publications were included.
5  This also explains some of the differences with the original article.
6   Of course, this does not cover all scientific output, let alone the societal output of researchers (De Jong, Van 
Arensbergen, Daemen et al., 2011).
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The social sciences are heterogeneous, as they consist of psychology, education, pedagogy, 
anthropology, sociology, communication studies, geography, demography, economics and law. 
As publication and citation patterns differ between these fields, performance should be standard-
ized in order to use the social and behavioral sciences as one population. However, as the next 
table shows, three fields dominate the applications: psychology, economics and law. In this 
paper, we therefore do the analysis first for the (unstandardized) total sample, and then repeat it 
for the psychology and economics individually.
Table 1 Applications by field and funding instrument7
ECG OC + ACG
Psychology 97 146
Law 40 110
Economics 105 104
Sociology 27 55
Political science 13 31
Communication 6 15
Geography 12 16
Anthropology 12 9
Education 50 9
Demography 1 5
Grand Total7 355 488
 
5.4 Gender differences 
First of all, distribution of research performance is heavily skewed. Generally, a small number of 
the researchers produce the far majority of publications, and a large amount of researchers have 
a very small output - therefore we use non-parametric statistics. More specifically we use the 
Monte Carlo method, a powerful simulation technique for obtaining an accurate significance level 
for highly skewed distributed data, especially regarding small samples.
7  The grand total is smaller than the sum of field counts, as in the overall analysis for applicants who submitted in more 
than one field only the most recent application was included.
OC = open competition; 
ACG  = advanced career grant; 
ECG  = early career grant
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Figure 2 Productivity by gender, established generation social sciences, 2003-2005
In the established generation, we have 488 applicants, of which about 22% are female. In the 
three years period, male researchers did publish in average more than female researchers 
(mn8=5.4 publications versus mn =4.0). The distribution of publications by gender for the 
established generation (ACG and OC) is shown in figure 2. Clearly, the distributions are very 
skewed, and we test whether these distributions differ significantly. They do (men mdn9 = 3 
versus women mdn = 2, Mann-Whitney U10 = 18514.5, p (Monte Carlo, 1-tailed11)= 0.048).
8  mn = mean
9  mdn = median
10  From now on will be referred to as U
11  From now on will be referred to as p
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Figure 3 Impact by gender, established generation social sciences, 2003-2005
Also in line with earlier findings, in the established generation male researchers receive more 
citations than female researchers do (mn= 36.6 versus mn= 27.2). The differences are smaller 
than in the publications. Figure 3 presents the again skewed distributions, which are found to 
differ (men: mdn= 6 versus women: mdn = 4, U=18933.0, p=0.092).
5.5 Changing gender differences?
We repeated the analysis for the young generation (ECG applicants) with a different result. First 
of all, of the 355 applicants, about 45% are women. This is a huge increase compared with the 
established generation (women 22%). In the young generation of scientists, the publication 
differences have decreased and seem to be disappearing (figure 4). Male researchers still have a 
slightly higher average number of publications than female researchers (mn=2.3 versus mn=1.9) 
but the gender difference has become much smaller. That also holds - to a somewhat lesser 
degree - for the rank order comparison (mdn=2 versus mdn =1, U=14202.5, p=0.068). 
Also the citation patterns have changed, and differences have disappeared more or less (figure 
5). Male researchers have a somewhat higher median (mdn=2 versus mdn=1.5) but a lower 
average (mn=13.4 versus mn=14.0). The Monte Carlo test fails to show a significant difference 
between the distributions (U=15077.0, p=0.292). 
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Figure 4 Productivity by gender, young generation social sciences, 2003-2005
Figure 5 Impact by gender, young generation social sciences, 2003-2005
WomenMen
Pu
b
lic
at
io
ns
20
15
10
5
0
WomenMen
C
ita
tio
ns
400
300
200
100
0
Rathenau Instituut
Rathenau Instituut
Rathenau Instituut 95
When we look specifically at the top of the distribution (the 9-10%), women considerably caught 
up with men (table 2). While in the established generation 4.6% of the women belonged to the 
top compared to 10.3% of the men, of the young women 8.8% belongs to the top. In terms of 
impact the catching up by women is even stronger. In the top 10% impact ranks, women are 
overrepresented in the young generation. This result differs from what we found for the esta-
blished generation and is generally found in the literature: an overrepresentation of female 
researchers in the lower part of the distribution, and an overrepresentation of male researchers in 
the higher part of the distribution.
Table 2 Performance by gender
Established generation Young generation 
% men in top % women in top % men in top % women in top
Top ± 10% nr. publications *  10.3 4.6  10.8  8.8
Top 10% nr. citations** 12.1 2.8  9.2 10.6
5.6 A more detailed view on specific disciplines: psychology and economics
The previous analysis was done at the level of the social sciences as a whole. What if we focus on 
specific disciplines? We took two social science disciplines with the highest number of applica-
tions and in which English language journal articles are the main form of scholarly output. 
5.6.1 Psychology
Also within the group of the established psychology researchers, men (N=104) in average 
outperform women (N=42) in publications (mn=12.1 vs mn=7.7; mdn=10 vs mdn=4, U=1276.5, 
p=0.000) and in citations (mn= 107.3 vs mn=64.3; mdn=60.5 vs mdn=29, U=1352.0, p=0.000). 
The younger generation (N=97) consists of more women than men, about 55%. Here, the picture 
is different - in line with the findings for the social sciences as a whole. Output differences 
between male and female researchers have strongly declined (Mn=4.1 vs Mn=3.1; Mdn=3 vs 
Mdn=3, U=1028.5 p=0.158) in the younger generation, as have citation differences  (Mn=35.4 vs 
Mn=24.7; Mdn=16 vs Mdn=9, U=1064.0, p=0.234). 
As shown in table 3, the female researchers are underrepresented in the higher part of the 
ranking of the established generation. However, in the top of the younger generation ranking 
they are still underrepresented, although their representation has slightly increased.12  
12   In the previous version of the paper (Van Arensbergen et al 2012), we found that women outperformed men in the 
top of the distribution. This has changed with the new data. The potential reason is that we now also include publications 
in the Science Citation Index, reflecting the more (life) science part of psychology - characterized by higher numbers 
of publications and citations. Men are overrepresented there. Field normalization might change this again. 
*:  For older generation: >13 publications, for younger generation: >5
**: For older generation: >92 citations, for younger generation: >39
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Table 3 Performance by gender - Psychology
Established generation Young generation 
% men in top % women in top % men in top % women in top
Top ±10% nr. publications*  8.7 4.8 13.6  5.7
Top ±10% nr. citations** 11.5 4.8 13.6 5.7
5.6.2 Economics
In line with the general findings, in economics established male researchers have more publica-
tions (mn=5.0 vs mn=3.0; mdn=3 vs mdn=3, U=376.0, p=0.281), and receive more citations 
(mn=18.2 vs mn=7.7; mdn=9 vs mdn=5, U=362.0, p=0.221) than established female researchers 
do. The differences are considerable, however not statistically significant. This could be ascribed 
to the small number of women (N=9) among the established generation of economists.
In the younger generation, performance differences have changed in favor of women. Average 
publication and citation numbers are found to be almost equal. More specifically with regard to 
publications, men do slightly better (men: mn=1.6 vs women: mn=1.2; men: mdn=1 vs women: 
mdn=1, U=904.5, p=0.100). In terms of citations, women do slightly better (men: mn=4.6 vs 
women: mn=5.2; men: mdn=2 vs women: mdn=0, U=902.5, p=0.091). However, according to the 
Monte Carlo tests these differences are not significant. 
Table 4 shows that in the established generation women are not present in the in the top 10% of 
the population. Yet, they are to a considerable extent entering the higher performance groups. In 
the younger generation about 7% of the women economists belongs to the top 10% in terms of 
publications compared to 13% of the men. When we look at the top performing researchers with 
regard to number of citations, women are even stronger represented than men. This suggests a 
similar generational trend as observed within social sciences as a whole. Also in line with the 
general trend is the increase in the share of women. In the established generation (N=104), 
women are some 9% and in the younger generation (N=105) this has increased to 27%. However, 
compared to the share of women among the young researchers within psychology (55%) and the 
social sciences as a whole (45%) this can still considered to be low.
Table 4 Performance by gender - economics
Established generation Young generation 
% men in top % women in top % men in top % women in top
Top ±10% nr. publications* 10.5 0 13.0 7.1
Top ±10% nr. citations** 10.5 0 9.1 10.7
*:  For older generation: >23 publications, for younger generation: >7
**: For older generation: >224 citations, for younger generation: >66
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**: For older generation: >48 citations, for younger generation: >14
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5.7 Conclusions and discussion
Our analysis suggests that the gendered performance differences are disappearing. In the older 
generation, men outperformed women in terms of publications and citations, but this is not any 
more the case in the younger generation. In other words, the traditional performance differences 
seem to disappear over time. This is in line with experiences in other parts of the education 
system, where female pupils and students are increasingly even doing better than male.
This finding is significant as earlier studies found that the performance gap between male and 
female researchers emerged in the early career phase (Symonds et al., 2006), and exactly in this 
phase the differences seem to be disappearing. This also suggests that the gendered division of 
domestic labor, and gender differences in motivation and career planning, may be weakening. As 
publication and citation scores are increasingly influencing academic careers, the disappearing 
performance differences may be a stimulus for changing gender relations within science. Of course, 
the question has to be answered as whether performance differences now emerge in later phases 
of the research career, a question that requires additional - preferably longitudinal - research. 
The current analysis is restricted to the social sciences, and it would be useful to extend the 
analysis to other fields, such as science, technology, engineering and medicine. Possible perfor-
mance differences in these fields may be partly due to the low number of female researchers in 
many of these fields. However, it is also often argued that men have better math and science 
capacities than women, which would lead to performance differences. This question has been 
studied intensively, and research suggests these differences - as far as they exist - are decreasing 
over time (EACEA, 2009; Hyde, Fennema & Lamon, 1990). 
Moreover, this study is on a west European case. As the position of women (and consequently of 
female researchers) differs between countries, the introduction of a cross-cultural perspective 
would be another useful extension.
Our study indicates that the gender distribution in the group of active social science researchers 
has changed considerably. In the older generation only about 22% of the applicants are female, 
in the younger generation this has increased to 45%. Within economics the share of women can 
still be considered to be low, although it tripled up to 27%. Within psychology, female research-
ers even have become the majority in the younger generation. If ‘mass’ explains performance, 
the remaining performance differences (in fields were the share of women is still relatively low) 
may disappear when women enter those research fields at a larger share. In those fields, efforts 
to increase the number of female researchers remain important.
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6   Determinants of success in academic 
careers1
The competition for top positions in university rankings has put a stronger emphasis on the 
quality of university staff. Recruitment of excellent scholars is a core activity for university HRM. 
In this study, we compare the careers of pairs of similar researchers that were considered as very 
talented in their early careers. Of every pair, one has a continued academic career, whereas the 
other does not. We investigate to what extent success in academic career is determined by 
cultural, social and intellectual capital, and organisational and contextual factors.
6.1 Introduction
Higher education (HE) and research are increasingly global, as is indicated by the growing 
obsession with rankings (Deem et al., 2008; Labi, 2008; Mok & Chan, 2008). To reach the aca-
demic top, recruiting and keeping the best staff is crucial, as a critical mass of competent highly 
skilled people is decisive for excellence (Ivancheva & Gourova, 2011). Van den Brink (2009) 
describes ‘recruiting the best scholars’ as the core business of universities. As the scientific labour 
market is increasingly global (Regets, 2007), competition for excellent academic staff is growing 
(Levin et al., 2006; Mohrman et al., 2008). The reputation of universities plays an important role in 
attracting excellent researchers (Van Vught, 2008), as does universities’ HRM (Thunnissen et al., 
2010), and the prevalent career system (Huisman et al., 2002; Van Balen & Van den Besselaar, 
2007). The latter lacks transparency, as Van den Brink (2009) has shown, leading among others to 
an underrepresentation of women in higher positions. If a transparent and formalised method 
does not exist, what then determines whether excellent talents are preserved for a successful aca-
demic career, and do not ‘leave the system’?
Empirical studies about academic careers are hardly available. This paper is an explorative and 
qualitative study of the factors influencing talents to stay in academia. As universities want to 
select and preserve the best scholars, we focus on careers of high potentials only. Through 
semi-open interviews, we explore possible relevant factors such as differences in social back-
ground (cultural capital), in networks (social capital), in contextual factors (such as the labour 
market) and in academic performance (intellectual capital).
6.2 Research questions
According to Baruch and Hall (2004) the academic career system has unique features, which have 
made it different from the conventional hierarchical, bureaucratic model of careers. Earlier 
attempts have been made to describe careers in academia, such as Frost and Taylor (1996), but 
this was very personal and introspective, with the authors reflecting over their own careers (and 
thus was past- rather than future-oriented). Research in career development usually concentrates 
on socio-cognitive factors (De Pater, 2005; Lent et al., 1994) such as the interaction between 
1   This chapter has been published as Van Balen, B., Van Arensbergen, P., Van der Weijden, I., & Van den Besselaar, P. 
(2012). Determinants of success in academic careers. Higher Education Policy, 25, 313-334.
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self-efficacy, expectations and career position. Publications on academic career development are 
mainly restricted to describing potential obstacles for Ph.D. graduates and postdocs entering an 
academic career or obtaining tenure (Van Balen & Van den Besselaar, 2007), and are less focused 
on the development of the entire career (Baruch & Hall, 2004).
In a comparison with the academic labour markets of France, Germany and the USA, Musselin 
(2010) shows that career dynamics differ between these countries. This divergence is mainly 
caused by the nation-specific ‘university configuration’. The three countries differ in terms of the 
degree of autonomy of the academic profession, the role and frequency of the hiring process, 
selection principles and incentive mechanisms. For example, Germany is characterised by a 
strongly hierarchical model and a strong dependence on the external market: to obtain a higher 
position, one needs to apply to a university in another ‘Bundesland’.2 In contrast, within the USA 
and to a lesser extent also in France, academics can have a career within the same university. 
Another example is the procedure of getting tenure. In the US, this is much more formalised than 
in the other countries. Our study is about career dynamics in the Netherlands. The Dutch case is 
interesting, as the Netherlands has one of the better performing HE systems, with high publica-
tion and citation scores, and a high position in university rankings (THE, 2012).
In this paper we focus on the whole career. Our research question is: Why do some talented 
researchers have a continued academic career, whereas others do not? More specifically, we will 
address the following issues:
 –  Do the scholars who stay report more cultural capital than the leavers, such as higher edu-
cated parents and better performance in (pre-) university education? 
 –  Do the talents who stay report a different private situation, especially with respect to child-
care? 
 –  Do the stayers report more social capital, such as a better network, more support (mentoring, 
networking), and access to job and promotion opportunities? 
 –  Do the stayers report more support from the HRM and career system in their university than 
the leavers? 
 –  Were the labour market conditions better for the researchers who continued their career in 
university?
 – Do the stayers have a higher performance than the leavers in crucial career phases?
6.3 Data and methods
This study is based on semi-structured interviews with 42 researchers. The interviews provided us 
with various types of information. First, we asked them about the relevance of various factors put 
forward in literature on careers, and that are mentioned in the research questions formulated 
above. Much of this literature is about countries other than the Netherlands. This study explores 
whether similar or different mechanisms work in the Dutch HE career system. Second we wanted 
to be informed about other relevant factors that the researchers experienced themselves to be 
important for their careers, leading to a description of their career and major events that affected 
2  Germany consists of states, in German Bundesland.
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their career. In order to analyse the interview material, we organised the data in a timeline with 
critical career events, such as obtaining Ph.D., receiving important research grants, becoming 
tenured, being promoted to professor, leaving the university.
The careers of these scholars may be influenced by many different factors, not controlled for in 
this study. Therefore we decided to use a (case study) strategy of selecting cases with enough 
variety but also enough similarity. Cases were therefore selected from a variety of disciplines, 
universities and regions. Within this approach, we selected pairs of a talent who stayed and a 
talent who left. The pairing is based on similarity in research field and in generation, and may 
minimalize the uncontrolled effects. This enables us to compare the group of stayers with the 
leavers, but also between and within the pairs.
In order to create the pairs, we asked HRM departments of universities for excellent ‘glad that we 
could keep them’ talents, without indicating their career phase. From the responses, we com-
posed a group of 21 scholars with a thriving university career. In practice these are researchers 
that were full professors. The stayers were selected in a way to create a variety of discipline, 
region and gender. In order to find a comparable talent who left, we asked the interviewed 
stayers to name someone who started an academic career in the same period as they did and 
who was considered to be very talented, but at some point moved to a non-academic career. Not 
all stayers could name a leaver, and we could not trace all the people who were named. So we 
completed the leavers group by asking professors with long-term experience in the same field to 
provide us with the names of highly talented leavers. A consequence of this recruiting method is 
that we could not make 21 perfectly matched pairs. Table 1 gives the details.3
Apart from the interviews, we collected labour market and performance data. First, data about 
the academic labour market were obtained from the Netherlands Association of Universities 
(VSNU).4 Labour market fluctuations are defined in terms of changes in the number of academic 
positions within the universities in the period the talents in the research group made their career 
steps. Due to data availability, this was done on the fairly aggregate level of the main disciplines. 
In periods the number of relevant positions (e.g., associate professor in the social sciences) has 
increased, vacancies have been available. In periods of decrease, this was much less the case, 
taking into account the relatively low mobility in the academic labour market.
3  This sample is not representative for all research careers, as we focus here on the top talents only.
4  http://www.vsnu.nl/Universiteiten/Feiten-Cijfers/Personeel.htm.
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Table 1 The sample distribution according to gender, discipline and region
Talents who stayed Talents who left
Region West North  East South Total West North East South Total
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Humanities 2 2 4 1 3 1 5
Natural Sciences 2 1 1 1 2 7 2 2 2 1 7
Social Sciences 1 1 1 1 4 3 2 1 1 7
Technical Sciences 1 1 1 3 0
Medical Sciences 2 1 3 1 1 2
Total 8 5 2 1 2 0 2 1 21 7 6 0 2 3 0 2 1 21
Second, we retrieved all the scholars’ publications from the Web of Science (WoS) and from 
Publish or Perish (PoP), in order to determine their academic performance (publications, citations, 
H-index) in the various phases of their careers. In this way, academic performance of successful 
and unsuccessful interviewees can be compared. The WoS and PoP data were cleaned: the 
authors as well as the publications were (manually) disambiguated.
6.4 The case
Academic behaviour and career dynamics differ between countries, and this relates to differences 
between the systems of HE (Musselin, 2010). We therefore briefly describe how the Netherlands’ 
system works.
6.4.1 The Dutch system of HE
In the Netherlands, distinction is made between research universities and universities of applied 
sciences. Research universities offer degree programmes on three levels: bachelor, master and 
Ph.D. and have the ‘lus promovendi’, the mandate to award doctorates. All Dutch research universi-
ties want a place at the top of university rankings, as can be illustrated by their mission statements.5 
Universities of applied sciences mainly offer bachelor programmes aimed at professional educa-
tion. Our study focuses at the 14 research universities of the Netherlands, with 40,000 staff and 
200,000 students. Ph.D. students are employed by the university on a temporary (4-year) contract 
to do research and some teaching.6 Ph.D. students also have to follow courses for their own 
training and education. Over the last 20 years the number of Ph.D. students successfully defending 
their thesis in the Netherlands has doubled - from 1898 to 3,736 per academic year (CBS, 2011). 
5  http://cf.bc.uva.nl/download/instellingsplan_2007-2010.pdf; http://www.uu.nl/university/utrecht/nl/profielenmissie/
hoofdlijnenstrategie/Pages/default.asp; http://www.tue.nl/universiteit/over-de-universiteit/profiel-en-missie.
6  Next to these Dutch universities have the category ‘external doctoral students’, Ph.D. students not employed by the 
University. They generally work in other (public) research organisations, in educational jobs or in companies.
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Most Ph.D. students leave the university upon graduation, but many aim at an academic career.7 
Therefore they apply for a post-doctoral position (Sonneveld et al., 2010), which is considered as 
preparation for their first ‘real’ academic position: assistant professor. The next step could be an 
associate professor position, succeeded by the final step of becoming a full professor.
Until recently, the numbers of positions at various levels were fixed, and the higher the level, the 
fewer the positions available. Promotion was dependent on vacancies - not on individual perfor-
mance. Over the last decade, the career system has become less rigid, and universities are 
implementing a variety of career systems that are increasingly allowing for promotion trajectories 
based on individual performance for example tenure track systems (Thunnissen et al., 2010; Van 
Balen & Van den Besselaar, 2007), leading to a fairly heterogeneous career system. 
6.4.2 Academic labour market issues
A decade ago the expectation was that Dutch universities would be facing tremendous shortages 
of eligible candidates for higher academic positions in the near future (Van Vucht Tijssen, 2000). 
Similarly, the Council for Science and Technology Policy (AWT, 2005) emphasised that more 
opportunities were needed for research talents to develop their capacities. Others, however, 
feared an oversupply, leading to a growing gap between the ambitions of young researchers and 
their chances for an academic career (Hoffius & Surachno, 2006; Keijzer & Gordijn, 2000). In an 
earlier study we showed that there was neither an under or an oversupply. The real problem is the 
hierarchical nature of the academic labour force, where it can take a long time for talented young 
researchers to reach a position as independent researcher: professor (Van Balen & Van den 
Besselaar, 2007). In this follow-up project, we therefore study the careers of talented researchers, 
and will try to identify the decisive factors influencing success in academic careers.
6.4.3 Criteria for talent?
Although talent is often defined as a natural ability or capacity8, in an academic context it 
generally refers to the academic quality of someone’s past achievements (Thunnissen et al., 2010; 
Van Arensbergen & Van den Besselaar, 2012), as emerged by interviewing leading professors in 
different fields. In their view talented students and researchers produce a very good master’s 
thesis and an excellent doctoral dissertation, and have high grades. Also excellent teaching skills 
are sometimes mentioned. ‘The “talented” students are eager, focused and deeply interested in 
the discipline, they have passion and drive’. This suggests that criteria for talent relate to research 
performance, teaching skills and motivation. However, the professors interviewed remained 
rather vague about the exact criteria used to decide on talent and excellence. They feel that one 
does not need criteria, as talents will be noticed anyway. This is in sharp contrast with for example, 
the situation in the US, where tenure depends on explicitly formulated criteria with respect to 
quality and quantity of research output.9
7   Ph.D. students are employed by the university, which in practice creates expectations that an academic career is the 
normal road.
8   http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/talent; http://www.vandale.nl/vandale/zoekService.do?selectedDictionary=
nn&selectedDictionaryName=Nederlands&searchQuery=talent; http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/talent, 
last accessed 14 September 2011.
9   For example, http://www.american.edu/provost/academicaffairs/upload/Sociology-Tenure-and-Promotion-
Guidelines-FINAL-2-7-2011.pdf.
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6.5 Findings
When we look at the duration of the various career steps, there are huge differences within and 
between the pairs. Sometimes it takes only a few years to take the next career step, sometimes 
many. Table 2 shows the lengths of the phases of several pairs as an illustration. The career data 
do not indicate that it is necessary to take short career steps to achieve a successful academic 
career or the other way around. For example, the stayer in pair 7 had a postdoc trajectory of 12 
years, but became a full professor in the end, 19 years after obtaining her Ph.D. 
Table 2 Duration of career steps in years
             
 
Talents Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4 Pair 5 Pair 6 Pair 7 Pair 8
S1 L1 S2 L2 S3 L3 S4 L4 S5 L5 S6 L6 S7 L7 S8 L8
Ph.D. trajectory 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 3 2 4 5 4 5 6 7 13
Postdoc trajectory 2 8 4 1 3 4 1 - 1 1 6 8 12 5 - -
Assistant professor 7 1 5 7 7 - 7 11 11 - 4 - 3 14 18
Associate professor 2 - 2 - 3 3 5 4 5 -
             
6.5.1 Individual factors
Cultural capital: Educational level of parents
Family background, that is parents having undergone HE, used to be an important factor 
determining the chances for an academic career (Bourdieu, 1988; Van Heek et al., 1958). Among 
those who influence students’ educational expectations, parents play an early and critical role. 
Wells et al. (2011) present a literature review indicating that the social origin of the family sets the 
financial, social and cultural context for education. Parents’ educational attainment influences 
their children’s educational expectations. Wells et al. (2011) note that the level of education the 
parents attained indirectly defines the value of HE for their children, but this effect appears to 
have decreased recently. This last development seems to be confirmed by our study. The 
interviews showed that the majority of the interviewees’ parents did not have an academic 
degree. This is valid for both groups, the stayers and the leavers. Eight of the interviewees in 
both groups reported that one parent had undergone HE and 13 indicated that neither parent 
had. Within the pairs, almost all possible situations arise, except for one: both talents have an 
academic family background. These findings suggest that the level of education of the parents is 
not a main factor, a hypothesis that needs further testing.
Cultural capital: School performance
Did the successful researchers have better school performances? Most of the interviewees 
reported high grades during secondary education, which can be seen for the S group as well as 
the L group (Table 3).
S= Talent who stayed; L= Talent who left.
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Table 3 Comparing school success
S high grades, L not Both high grades Both no high grades L high grades, S not
Secondary education 3 8 2 4
Master’s degree 4 1 10 2
Ph.D. 2 0 7 3
High grades during secondary education motivated several talents to aim for university study. 
Others did not perform very well during secondary education, and only became motivated later 
on. The grades did not differentiate between stayers and leavers. Thirteen interviewees of the 
first group reported high grades during secondary education against 14 of the second group. 
High grades10 during secondary education also do not distinguish between the groups at the pair 
level. Actually, in slightly more pairs, the leavers had higher grades than the stayers, than the 
other way around, but the differences are small. 
During the master’s degree, as well as the Ph.D. study period, high grades were less common. 
For most of the interviewees other stimuli were more important. They mention, for example, 
interesting research subject, cooperation with their supervisor, extra tasks they performed and 
participation on student boards. Comparing the pairs shows that at the master’s level, the pairs 
where the stayers scored better were more abundant than those where the leavers scored better. 
However, at the Ph.D. level, this pattern reversed again. In concluding, educational performance 
does not seem to differentiate between the two groups of talents. We should emphasise here 
that the sample is an ‘elite’ selection. The group that stayed and the group that left were both 
nominated as ‘talent’. All belong to the group of excellent talent. The findings result in the 
hypothesis that within this group, cultural capital does not seem to influence success in obtaining 
higher academic positions. 
Family situation
Several studies have shown that men and women tend to inhabit different sex-based family 
situations, which may affect development of their academic careers. These include lower mar-
riage rates of women in academe (Probert, 2005), lower geographic and job mobility linked to 
marriage (Rosenfeld & Jones, 1987), and more significant childcare responsibilities (Hamovitch & 
Morgenstern, 1977). Furthermore, women who have reached the top in academia seem to be 
remarkably often childless. Despite improvements in the academic gender balance in recent 
decades, women are still more likely than men to occupy temporary and part-time positions on a 
lower level in the academic hierarchy (Baker, 2008). Combining children and an academic career 
was not easy, as was already noticed in the Netherlands several years ago (Beekes, 1991; Van 
Doorne-Huiskes, 1979).
10  High grades are defined as ‘cum laude’ or a comparable level.
S= Talent who stayed; L= Talent who left.
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More recently, Wolfinger et al. (2008) explored the effects of gender and family formation on 
academic employment subsequent to receiving a Ph.D. They showed that having a family and 
children lowers the chance of obtaining tenure-track positions. Single women without young 
children fare better than their male counterparts on the market for assistant professorship. 
However, according to Wolfinger et al., family formation cannot account for women’s difficulties 
at later career stages — namely tenure and promotion to full professor. Not all interviewees 
provided information about their personal situation. Those who did reported that support from a 
partner is necessary to develop a successful academic career. 
The partner of S4 did not aspire to have an academic career, although she obtained her 
PhD. She looked for a job that enabled her to be at home more often and take care of the 
children. That way she made his career possible.
The data in Table 4 indicate that the talents who stayed felt more often supported by their 
partner, than the talents who left. Partners who choose to put all their effort and time in their own 
career and corresponding residence and working hours, do not stimulate the academic career of 
the academic talents. As there is no great difference in the number of stayers and leavers having 
children, this seems to have less influence on the academic career chances. However, the 
relatively low number of women compared to men who stayed and had children is in line with the 
observation of Ann Mason (2008) that ‘Babies do Matter in Science’. Our findings suggest that 
this is mainly the case for women.
Table 4 Family conditions
6.5.2 Organisational factors
Social capital: Mentoring
Sponsorship and mentorship are a ‘nurturing process in which a more skilled or more experi-
enced person, serving as a role model, teaches, sponsors, encourages (y) a less skilled or less 
experienced person for the purpose of promoting the latter’s professional and/or personal 
development’ (Anderson & Shannon, 1988, 40). Ehrich et al. (2004) conducted a meta-review of 
more than 300 research-based articles on mentoring. Their analysis showed that mentoring offers, 
despite some shortcomings, many far-reaching benefits for mentees as well as for mentors, 
mentees experience personal support and opportunities for career development. Furthermore 
S yes, L no Both yes Both no L yes, S no
Have children 1 10 0 2
Supported by partner 9 3 1 0
Talents who stayed Talents who left
Male Female All Male Female All
Have children 10 3 13 8 8 16
Supported by partner 8 5 13 2 1 3
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many academic researchers learn from their mentoring relationships how to collaborate and how 
to interpret social dynamics of collaboration (Mayer et al., 2008). Mentorship can also be impor-
tant for (pre-doctoral and early-career) research productivity, self-efficacy, grants, and level of 
promotion and professional network of young researchers (Cameron & Blackburn, 1981; Gardiner 
et al., 2007; Janasz & Sullivan, 2004; Paglis et al., 2006). A study on the mentoring of junior 
female academics shows that academics who received mentoring were more likely to stay at the 
university.
In line with the latter findings, all our interviewees indicated that the support of a mentor, coach 
or supervisor is very important for an academic career, for some even crucial. ‘You will not survive 
without the support of a mentor’. This can also be reported in a negative sense: some of the 
interviewees reported that the absence of a coach or supervisor influenced their departure. All 
four interviewees who had not had a mentor, or even indicated that they were deprived of a 
mentor, left the university. 
S20 met several people in her career who were at some time very stimulating. During secondary 
education the teachers in Dutch literature were her role models. Literature offered a perspective 
on the world she could not find at home. During her study at university she was inspired by a 
teacher in French film studies, later on her PhD supervisor gave her a lot of confidence. When she 
was a starting scholar she was supported by two female professors, who stimulated her to apply 
for a full professorship.
Table 5 Influence of mentors according to the interviewees
However, we have to keep in mind that the answers on this question were retrospective views of 
the interviewees on their career. This view can be influenced by the tendency to attribute ‘the 
failure’ of an interrupted academic career to an external cause (Bem, 1972). When comparing the 
influence of mentors, differences do occur (Table 5 — lower half). This does not hold for the 
stimulating role of the mentor, but it does for the career advice role. There, in more than 50% of 
the pairs the talent who stayed owes a piece of crucial career development advice to a mentor, 
whereas the talent who left did not. And in only a few pairs it worked in the opposite way. These 
data are in line with findings by other researchers: Mentoring of young scholars is important; 
giving the right guidance and motivation at the right moment by teaching talented Ph.D. 
students and postdocs the who, what and how of academia may help (Baruch & Hall, 2004; 
S did, L didn’t Both did Both didn’t L did, S didn’t
Felt stimulated by a mentor or sponsor 5 8 0 4
Career development advices 9 3 4 1
Talents who stayed Talents who left
Felt stimulated by a mentor or sponsor 17 15
Career development advices 14 5
Did not have a mentor 0 4
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Scaffidi & Berman, 2011). But mentoring is certainly not the only factor that counts; also the 
institutionalised career system matters, which is discussed below.
Social capital: Networking
Networking is in many studies described as equally important for an academic career as mentor-
ing or sponsoring (e.g. Shin & Cummings, 2010; Zuckerman, 1991;). Network building very often 
starts with the mentor or supervisor. The person indicated as mentor was not always, but very 
often, the same as the Ph.D. supervisor of the talent. The findings from the interviews that 
network building is important for a successful academic career are in line with earlier research 
(Burt, 1997, 1998; De Grande et al., 2010).
According to Burt (1997), social capital or networks are crucial for a career. A mentor or sponsor is 
particular necessary for academics not having social capital themselves. As we showed above, 
the majority of the talents in our study had no background in academia when starting their 
academic career. This explains why many of the interviewees refer to the support of a mentor or 
sponsor.
Table 6 Influence of networks
Burt (1998) also argues that professionals starting out in their career should aim at building their 
social networks within an organisation. On the basis of his research Burt advises ‘freshmen’ to 
start a career by borrowing the networks of a mentor or sponsor, but advises talents who are 
advancing to build their own network with a central position for themselves. This is in line with 
our findings. We indeed found that successful talents more frequently report that they acquired 
important relations or job opportunities through their mentor than the leaving talents did - as 
Table 6 shows. 
University characteristics: Career development system
Among the factors spontaneously indicated by the interviewees as crucial for their career are the 
‘career system’ and the ‘career policies’ of the universities. They hold the opinion that the Dutch 
career system is inflexible and limiting the possibilities for talents. Tenured positions only become 
vacant when someone else is leaving and this is (with the exception of retirement) not predict-
able. Universities are reluctant to give the talents a clear perspective. Several Dutch publications 
(Broersen, 2003; Hoffius & Surachno, 2006) indicate that talents often have to hop from one 
temporary job to another, awaiting their chance of tenure. Not everyone is able to afford this, 
since it is difficult to buy a house and support a family with this insecure financial position.
S yes, L no Both yes Both no L yes, S no
Owed a job or crucial contact to mentor/sponsor 9 5 0 3
Talents who stayed Talents who left
Owed a job or crucial contact to mentor/sponsor 17 9
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L2 worked for 4 years on a temporary basis, with in total 23 contracts for one university. 
After some more temporary contracts at another university and two pregnancies, she 
came to an agreement with the Department on the path to a tenured position. When the 
end of the temporary contract came, this agreement turned out to be worthless. The 
Department had financial problems and could not afford to tenure her.
The system does not have enough flexibility to promote and keep those people who have 
demonstrated their quality. Consequently professors try to keep their talents with vague prom-
ises, which they are not able to uphold. The lack of flexibility did turn out to be unfortunate for 
some of the talents. They reported, for example, that the department or the university was not 
able or willing to adjust the career rules to people with caring duties. Others, however, men-
tioned that there were some individual exceptions possible. The rate of flexibility, as reported by 
the interviewees, depends partly on the faculty and partly on the persuasiveness and effort of 
individual professors.
L12 agreed with the dean of his Department on the criteria for promotion to associate 
professor. He should have a number of international publications within three years. After 
these three years however the rules were changed, he then could get his promotion when 
he was accepted as a member for a research school. At the moment he met this require-
ment a new one was added. That was the moment L12 decided to continue his career 
elsewhere.
Table 7 Career development systema
The interview reports often paint a portrait of a supervising professor who started optimistically 
making plans and coaching a promising researcher. However, when leaving the faculty or his or 
her managerial position, the plans and promises turned out to be worthless. Several interviewed 
talents who left, but also a few talents who stayed, felt cheated by their university. The career 
plans made with a supervisor could not be effectuated and rules and standards were changed 
during the period the talents were trying to meet them. Interestingly, financial issues were not at 
stake for the talents. None left university for a better salary. Consistency and perspective, that is 
a  The interviewees may have experienced problems with the system and with the HRM practice, so these categories do 
not exclude each other.
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S did, L didn’t Both did Both didn’t L did, S didn’t
No problems concerning career development 5 3 9 0
Problem with career system 2 3 7 5
Problem with HRM practice in the department/university 2 6 3 6
Talents who stayed Talents who left
Problem with career system 5 11
Problem with HRM practice in the department/university 8 12
No problems concerning career development 12 4
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knowing that there would still be a position for them in the university in the near future was far 
more important (see also Thunnissen et al., 2010). In summarising, the talents experienced two 
kinds of problems in regard to career development:
 –  Problems related to the career system as such: no tenured positions available at the crucial 
moment, postdocs hoping and waiting for vacancies. 
 –  Problems related to the HRM practice in the department: unkept promises, no flexibility, no 
clear career perspectives, no facilities for talents with caring duties (Table 7).
Obviously, talents who left experienced more problems related to academic career develop-
ments. These problems concern equally the career system and the HRM practice in the depart-
ment. These organisational factors indicate what type of talent (HRM) policies could be imple-
mented by universities. We will return to this in the concluding section.
6.5.3 Contextual factors: Labour market fluctuations
Some of the talents in this study were born before 1960, and their career suffered from the strong 
growth of universities in the Netherlands in the 1970s. In the seventies, universities had appointed 
many staff members to meet the strong increasing student inflow. In the years that followed, 
these relatively young staff members remained in their tenured positions and no vacancies were 
available for new talents. Furthermore universities faced severe financial cut-backs, especially in 
the 1980s. Consequently, for the generation of talents that started their career in the eighties, an 
academic career was very improbable.
In order to investigate whether labour market fluctuations do play a role in the careers of the 
talents under study, we used data on the size of the labour force of the universities. For every 
discipline we obtained the annual change of assistant professors, associate professors and full 
professor. In some periods the number of staff in a discipline increases. Labour market conditions 
are more favourable than in periods the number of positions is stable, or in phases with a decline. 
We distinguished three labour market situations, a growing, a stable and a shrinking labour 
market, and we related these to the crucial events11 in the career of the talents.
Data about the labour market fluctuations in the disciplines were available starting from 1990. For 
some of the pairs we could therefore not analyse the labour market situation at their crucial 
career events, and the analysis is therefore limited to eight pairs (Table 8). More talents who left 
had their crucial career events during a shrinking labour market, but the differences are small.
11  That is first tenured position, promotion and departure.
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Table 8 Labour market fluctuationsa
 
So far we described several factors that may account for the different career paths of the aca-
demic talents. These are factors based on the interviews. Now we will look at their academic 
performance: are the scholars who stayed at the university simply better than the ones who left? 
From the university perspective: are universities succeeding in preserving the best academics?
6.5.4 Academic performance
In order to belong to the top of the academic world, universities try to attract and to retain the 
best scholars. Since the number of available job opportunities and positions decreases the higher 
they are in ranking, researchers leaving the university is unavoidable. However, for most doctor-
ate holders, this is not a voluntary choice (De Grande et al., 2010; Schwabe, 2011). For universi-
ties this is not a problem, as long as the best scholars stay. Academic performance should 
therefore be decisive for the development of one’s academic career. According to Long and 
McGinnis (1993) historical analyses indicate that quantity of publications is the most important 
factor predicting rank advancement of academic scientists.
We compared the academic performance at various stages of the careers.12 This enabled us to 
compare the publication and citation scores at the moment one left with the scores of his or her 
staying counterpart at the same moment. This informs us whether academic performance 
determines careers: do better performing researchers stay, and do less performing researchers 
leave?
12   For several reasons a straightforward performance match was not possible for all 21 pairs, for example, when the 
person that left did so in an early career phase when academic performance is still modest. For one third of the 
pairs, a performance comparison turned out to be possible.
S did, L didn’t Both did Both didn’t L did, S didn’t
Growing labour market* 2 1 3 2
Stable labour market 3 1 4
Shrinking labour market 1 4 3
Crucial career phase in a Talents who stayed Talents who left
Growing labour market* 3 3
Stable labour market 4 1
Shrinking labour market 1 4
a Discipline specific
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Table 9 Comparing performance of eight pairs
Publications Citations
Performance when obtaining Ph.D.
Pairs with S perform higher than L 4 5
Pairs with S perform equal to L 2 2
Pairs with S perform lower than L 2 1
Performance at start tenure (track)
Pairs with S perform higher than L 4 4
Pairs with S perform equal to L 4 0
Pairs with S perform lower than L 0 4
Performance after next promotion/leave
Pairs with S perform higher than L 2 3
Pairs with S perform equal to L 2 0
Pairs with S perform lower than L 4 5
In Table 9 we show the performance indicators for three crucial phases in the careers. We include 
in this analysis eight pairs, four from the sciences, one from the social sciences and three from the 
humanities. For the first four, we used the WoS for measuring the number of publications and 
citations, and for the last four we used PoP.13 The pairs are compared at three moments in their 
careers: (a) the moment of obtaining their Ph.D. degree; (b) the moment where the researcher 
obtained a tenured or tenure track position. Of course, more important career events may have 
taken place, and in that case, we have selected events that are almost similarly positioned in the 
life cycle: a similar number of years after the Ph.D.; (c) the moment when one of the two leaves, 
and this compared with a promotion in the career of the other that takes place at about the same 
moment in terms of ‘career age’. For every of the three career events, we distinguish three groups: 
a group where the stayer performs better than the leaver (S>L); a group where both perform about 
equal (S¼L); and a group where the leaver performs better than the stayer (SoL). The table shows 
the size of each of the groups for both performance indicators: (publications and citations) we 
classified the pairs in three groups. Table 9 shows the resulting distribution over the six categories.
a.   At the time of obtaining their Ph.D., the future stayers (S) who outperform the future leavers 
(L) are the largest group, followed by the equal pairs and the leavers outperforming the 
stayers.
b.   At the mid-career event, this still holds for publications, but not any more for citations: the 
leavers are as often better than the stayers as the other way around.
13   In both cases, we had to clean the data in order to have the right persons included. Especially in PoP, we unified the 
publications that appeared in the list in different versions.
S= Talent who stayed; L= Talent who left
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c.   In the final stage, the picture has changed more radically, and the pairs where leavers 
outperform stayers have become the majority for publications as well as citations.
These results suggest that there is no systematic relationship between the career success and the 
commonly used indicators for scholarly performance. Within the group of talented scholars, 
academic performance does not seem to determine success in a university career.14
6.5.5 Combining factors
So far we have analysed the data per factor individually. However, interviewees often mention a 
combination of factors that have affected their career. Moreover the interviews suggest that 
success is the effect of a number of cascading factors and accumulating advantages, whereas 
accumulating disadvantages determine whether a talented researcher leaves the university. To 
test this, we compared the stayers and leavers not in terms of scores on specific factors, but in 
terms of the number of positive and negative factors they reported. To illustrate this we counted 
the factors that, in the view of the interviewees, had implications for their academic career. These 
factors are: (i) support by partner; (ii) a stimulating mentor; (iii) career development advices; (iv) 
no problems experienced by the academic career system; (v) positive labour market at the crucial 
career phases.
Table 10 Pairs and combined effects
S more positive factors than L 12
Equal number of positive factors 4
L more positive factors than S 1
Table 10 indeed shows that in 12 out of 17 pairs, the talented scholar that continued an academic 
career accumulated more positive factors than the one that left. Only in one pair is it the oppo-
site. In four pairs, both talents reported an equal number of positive factors. Comparing the two 
groups (in Table 11) supports this finding.
14   In a study comparing successful grant applicants with good rejected applicants, we also found that past 
performance did not differ between the two groups (Van den Besselaar & Leydesdorff, 2009).
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Table 11 Combined effects
  
Balance Talents who stayed Talents who left
5 factors positive 2 0
4 factors positive 5 2
3 factors positive 8 2
2 factor positive 6 8
1 factor positive 0 7
0 factors positive 0 2
  
  
 
6.6 Conclusions and discussion
Human resources are recognised as being the key to the creation, commercialisation and 
diffusion of innovation (Auriol et al., 2010). In this respect, academic scholars are the top of  
educational hierarchy and specially trained to conduct research and teaching, representing a 
particularly specialised group in the ‘human capital stock’ of a society (Schwabe, 2011). The 
competition for top positions in university rankings has put stronger emphasis on the recruitment 
of excellent scholars. An important question in HE policy is whether excellent talents are pre-
served for an academic career, and do not ‘leave the system’. In this study we explored which 
factors influence a successful academic career in the Dutch situation.
The literature analysis and the interviews were performed to see to what extent the factors 
generally said to influence career development were of importance for the talented scholars and 
to identify other factors that were important from the viewpoint of the talents themselves. A 
comparison of researchers who continued and discontinued an academic career seems to confirm 
the importance of some of the factors (e.g. social capital), whereas others did not (cultural and 
intellectual capital) differentiate between staying and leaving.
Cultural capital was not found to influence the career paths of stayers and leavers, as no real 
differences were revealed between stayers and leavers in their educational background and of 
their parents. Furthermore, support of a partner is necessary in the development of an academic 
career, while having children was not found to be influential. However, only 50% of the female 
stayers have children compared to 100% of the males. This suggests that having children does 
matter for successful female scholars.
The interviews also indicate the importance of social capital. The support of a mentor is impor-
tant for a successful academic career. In more than half of the pairs the talented stayers owe a 
piece of crucial career development advice to a mentor whereas the leaver did not. Mentors are 
also important with regard to access into the networks that they provide, as we found that in 
more than half of the pairs the talented stayers owe a job or crucial contact to a mentor whereas 
the leavers did not. Talented scholars reported problems with career policy [organisational factor] 
as developed on the macro level — within the Netherlands — and with the career policy and 
opportunities within their own department. In one third of the pairs, the leavers indicate prob-
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lems with the career system whereas the stayers did not. These results suggest that the career 
system does influence career success of talented scholars.
By linking the crucial events in the career of the talented scholars to the labour market conditions 
[contextual factor] in that period of time, we have shown that talented researchers left academia 
more often during a shrinking labour market. However, it should be noted that differences are 
small and because of limited data concerning labour market fluctuations only a proportion of the 
pairs could be compared. We found no systematic relationship between the career success and 
the academic performance of highly talented scholars, measured as the number of publications 
and citations. In the final career phase the leavers even seemed to outperform the stayers, 
showing that high productive researchers are not always preserved by the university system.
6.6.1 Accumulation of (dis)advantages
In conclusion, our exploration does not reveal one deciding factor that determines which talents 
are preserved for the university. We actually found a wide variety of combinations. Our results 
suggest that academic careers of talented researchers are stimulated (for those that stayed) or 
inhibited (for those that left) by an accumulation of advantages or disadvantages, including, 
according to several of the interviewees, coincidences. Future research on a larger and represen-
tative sample of pairs of talented scholars should further test this hypothesis.
What does our study mean for HE career policy? If accumulation of positive and negative factors 
more than talent as such is decisive, universities could take a proactive stance towards talent 
management, and create conditions in which competition based on talent and performance is 
supported, more than only ‘being at the right place at the right moment’. The coincidence factor 
could be more decisive for the Dutch situation than elsewhere because of the absence of a 
transparent career system and the lack of criteria for career advancement. Unlike for example, the 
procedures in major US research universities, early career talents often lack information about the 
number of articles or books they need to have written in order to get tenure. Above that, 
appointments are often not based on advice of external scholars assessing the work of the 
candidates (Van den Brink, 2009). Our findings suggest that university policy should aim at 
clarifying the criteria for career advancement, and at introducing individual performance-based 
promotion mechanisms. This development has to some extent started with new initiatives, such 
as mentorship programmes and tenure track systems (Van Balen & Van den Besselaar, 2007). Both 
could contribute to a consistent, transparent and better ‘talent management’ approach.
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7 Conclusions and general discussion
The past decades can be characterized by a growing awareness of the importance of human 
capital. Across all industries, the quest for talent has generally invaded society. Academia is no 
exception to this. Universities have openly made it one of their main goals to attract scientific 
talent. Human resource management is more and more turning into talent management, with 
several talent programs being implemented to attract, develop and retain excellent academics. 
Is talent within academia so scarce that we need this focus and these programs? Although there 
are differences between disciplines in supply and demand, in general it seems there is no real 
shortage of talent. The term ‘War for Talent’ (Michaels, Handfield-Jones and Axelrod, 2001) was 
introduced in times of increasing demand and decreasing supply, referring to talent as being a 
highly sought-after commodity. However, currently with regard to science, there rather seems to 
be a ‘war between talents’, with an oversupply of talents and an undersupply of academic career 
opportunities. 
In this study we have aimed to unravel the frequently used term ‘talent’. What exactly is academic 
talent? Here a distinction needs to be made between definitions and practices of recognition. 
Asking members of the academic community to describe the characteristics of talent is, in a way, 
a bottom-up approach to formulate a definition. We have also used a top-down approach, 
starting from the outcomes of talent selection processes to determine what is considered to be 
talent. Because of the growing importance of personal grants in the funding of academics, we 
chose the Innovational Research Incentives Scheme (Vernieuwingsimpuls) of the Dutch Research 
Council as specific context in considering talent selection. We studied how academic talent is 
assessed and selected, both by individuals and panels, taking into account the social and 
competitive nature of these processes. Furthermore, we looked at the role of gender in talent 
selection and studied performance differences between male and female academics. Finally, we 
analyzed the careers of academics who once were labeled as talents to identify factors support-
ing or impeding academic careers. This chapter will summarize the main results, instigating 
reflection on the current mechanisms of talent selection and its potential consequences for 
individual academics and academia in broader sense. While doing that, we will refer back to the 
validity of some of the claims and critique described in the introductory chapter. It concludes with 
several implications for practice and further research.
7.1 Summary of most important results
Chapter 2 analyzed the notion of talent based on 29 interviews with established researchers 
involved in the allocation of personal career grants. We compared the general notion of talent 
that academics value in their daily work to the concrete notion of talent within grant allocation 
processes. Everyone seems to have ideas about what talent is, but making these ideas explicit is 
quite a challenge. Generally it is found easier to point out talents amongst people we know 
directly or indirectly. This relates to the tacit dimension of talent, reflected in popular statements 
like ‘you know it when you see it’ and ‘everyone will recognize real talent’. When predefining 
talents as those who stand out and can be considered of great value for a research group, 
university or science in general, experienced scholars largely agree upon which characteristics to 
ascribe to talent. First of all, they do not excel on one single dimension, but they possess both 
Rathenau Instituut 121
social, professional and predominantly individual capital: most importantly, they are social 
people, have acquired prestigious grants, are able to work very hard, are ambitious and have 
published extensively. Seemingly, having outstanding research skills and an extensive publication 
record do not suffice to be considered an academic talent. Rather these academic skills and 
expertise are a basic requirement, and it is personal and social characteristics which distinguish 
real talents from their peers. As academic work is increasingly becoming team work, social skills 
like communication skills, ability to motivate others and to fit in a group, gain more importance. 
In the context of grant allocation, the definition of talent can be narrowed down to mainly 
professional capital: talents have published a lot, including as single author and preferably also 
without their current promoter and on new topics, they have written a well reasoned proposal in 
a generally comprehensible way, and they have international working experience. 
Moreover, the obtainment of grants (especially personal grants) is considered a particularly 
important indicator for talent, also outside the concrete context of grant allocation. Personal 
research grants like ERC’s starting grants and NWO’s Veni and Vidi grants, provide grantees not 
only with financial resources, but also with considerable academic prestige due to their high 
symbolic value. Established scholars indicated the necessity of grants for further career develop-
ment and generally perceived them as one of the few options for early career researchers to stay 
within science. The high symbolic value not only has to do with being able to acquire funding (a 
skill of increasing importance also for early career researchers), but with previous recognition of a 
person’s quality, seeing that assessment criteria not necessarily include actual obtainment of 
grants, but also receiving positive reviews of grant proposals. The general claim of ‘you know it 
when you see it’ might therefore be rephrased to ‘you know it because they saw it’.
Which components of talent are valued the strongest depend on the context in which evaluation 
takes place. With regard to talent selection within the Dutch funding program, the Innovational 
Research Incentives Scheme, the goal is set in advance in the call: to select talented, creative 
researchers who engage in innovative research. The procedure determines the input, the 
information available to reviewers. A written résumé and research proposal expose different 
characteristics compared to a face- to-face interview with the applicant. The interview phase was 
found to be very important (as also shown in chapter 4), enabling panellists to assess especially 
the candidates’ individual and social capital and to test the tenability of their previous reviews 
based on the written applications. 
With regard to the process of grant allocation, panellists indicated they faced two main prob-
lems: the broadness of the set of applications they needed to review and the small quality 
differences within the main share of applicants. As with the panel deliberation, no clear differen-
tiation could be made using the objective and most common criteria (e.g. scholarly performance, 
international experience, innovativeness of proposal); more tacit and subjective criteria (e.g. 
personality, fit in the group, perseverance) come into play. Talent cannot fully be captured by 
objective criteria or expressed in scores even to two decimals places. Our study illustrates this by 
panellists describing how they reach their final decisions. At the end of the panel meeting when 
all proposals and applicants were elaborately discussed and scored, a ranking is calculated based 
on these scores. Several panellists described how they checked this ranking for correctness. Not 
whether the ranking was calculated correctly, but whether candidate A rightfully stood above 
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candidate B, disregarding the better score of A. Besides these more subjective criteria, selection 
outcomes are affected by factors inherent to the social nature of the group decision-making 
process (e.g. panel composition, speaking order and atmosphere within panel). Many panellists 
indicated to be aware of these various ‘uncontrollable’ influences. Despite the thorough selection 
procedure and time investments, they acknowledged their final decisions regarding the large set 
of applicants of equal average quality to partly be the product of arbitrary and subjective influences.
More insight on the social nature of grant allocation was detailed in chapter 3, which covers an 
extensive literature review on panel review processes. Many of the review and selection processes 
within science involve panel reviewing, a group activity. As this entails social interaction, group 
dynamics influence the review process. For this reason we combined studies from the sociology 
of science and science policy studies with literature from social psychology. Where the first mainly 
focus on how peer review affects review outcomes, the latter focuses on actual review processes. 
Research within social psychology predominantly deals with central mechanisms involved in 
decision-making processes and the context in which these are carried out. We designed a 
conceptual model of grant allocation processes, including factors related to the applicants, their 
application and their network, to the social process of reviewing and to the context in which it is 
performed. Characteristics of the applicant which were found to affect review outcomes are, for 
example, past performance, status of previous employers, research trail and research field, more 
specifically cognitive similarity between applicant and reviewer. With regard to panel delibera-
tion, for example, the composition of the panel affects the represented expertise and sharing of 
information, the social identities of and status differences between panellists, and the communi-
cation within the panel. The decision-making process furthermore is open to influences from 
factors like group norms, motivational differences and strategic behavior. Finally, the available 
time and budget, procedural guidelines and the condition of accountability were found as 
influential context factors. The complexity of these types of processes reduce the predictability of 
its outcomes. Due to the (social) nature of this process, these influences can never be completely 
excluded (Lamont, 2009). According to Opthof and Wilde (2009), politics and personal bias affect 
review outcomes due to the difficulty of their task: while they succeed in filtering out work that 
should not be granted, it is generally impossible for reviewers to distinguish between good or 
excellent applications. This chapter explained how grant allocation is the product of human 
interaction, and therefore liable to a certain extent of subjectivity and arbitrariness.
Chapter 4 described a quantitative study on grant allocation and the evidence of talent. 
Statistical analyses of the review scores of about 900 grant applications were conducted. These 
involved personal career grants from the Innovational Research Incentives Scheme for researchers 
in different career phases. First of all, we found no clear ‘boundaries of excellence’, as there were 
very small differences in scores between those who were successful and those who were just 
unsuccessful. We did not find any evidence for the general claim (as also often heard in the 
interview study of chapter 2) that ‘top talent is easily recognized by everyone’. Furthermore, the 
moderate correlations between the evaluation criteria suggests that talent is multidimensional 
and people can excel on different dimensions. Consensus on quality was found to be lower for 
researchers who were further in their career, as also within the Social Sciences and Humanities 
compared to Technical and Life Sciences. 
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The considerable changes in the assessment scores through the various phases of the selection 
process, indicate that talent evaluation is dependent on how it is organized, confirming that talent 
is context dependent as shown in chapter 2. The interview phase was found to be very influential 
proven by the considerable changes in the ranking of applicants after the interview, indicating the 
importance of the new information added to the selection process. At the same time we saw that 
the weight of reports of external referees, peers who are asked to review an application based on 
their specific expertise, is modest. Panellists, who cannot be considered real peers to all applica-
tions they have to review, can overrule these external reviews, e.g. when they disagree or when 
the reviews lack a clear motivation (see chapter 2). Furthermore, the panel has additional auto-
nomy in decision-making. Finally, no evidence was found for a structural gender bias due to the 
panel composition. However, our findings do show that when women are better represented 
amongst the applicants and the panellists, biases in either direction seem to diminish.
Despite the rise of female academics, men are still overrepresented at the higher positions within 
academia. Can this be related to gender differences in academic performance? Chapter 5 
investigated whether the generally claimed performance differences between men and women 
still persisted in the younger generation of researchers. Based on publication and citation records 
of about 845 social scientists, recent scholarly performance was compared between established 
and early career researchers, in all social science fields together, and separately for psychology 
and economics. In the established generation, men were indeed found to outperform women. 
However, in the younger generation these differences had disappeared. Furthermore, in the 
younger generation the share of women in the top increased considerably compared to the 
established generation. An important factor that may contribute to the changing differences is 
the considerable increase of the share of women. Compared to the established generation, the 
share of women in the younger generation has doubled (from 23% to 45%) and in psychology, 
women are even overrepresented (55%). If these differences do not emerge in later career phases 
after all, the disappearing performance differences may be a stimulus for changing gender 
relations in science, as numbers of publications and citations increasingly influence academic 
careers, especially in the early career phase.    
Chapter 6 explored which factors influence academic talents to stay in academia or to leave. This 
qualitative study was based on 42 interviews, labour market data and performance data. We 
compared the careers of pairs of similar researchers (in terms of generation and research field) 
that were considered as very talented in their early careers. One had a continued academic 
career, the other left academia. First of all, we found considerable differences between academic 
career structures, implying it is not necessary to take short career steps to achieve a successful 
academic career. Next, whereas cultural capital (educational background of parents and school 
performance) does not seem to influence career paths, social capital does. Mentor support and 
network building opportunities were found to be especially important. With regard to family 
situation, support of a partner is necessary, and as amongst the stayers, far fewer women than 
men had children, our findings suggest that having children does matter for successful female 
scholars. Furthermore, an important problem related to the career system that was generally 
mentioned was the lack of flexibility and clear career perspectives. With regard to intellectual 
capital (scholarly performance), no systematic differences were found between stayers and 
leavers. This study does not confirm that the university system always preserves the highly 
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productive researchers, as leavers were even found to outperform the stayers in the final career 
phase. Finally, we did not find one single factor determining which talents are preserved for the 
university, but rather an accumulation of (dis)advantages, including coincidences. 
Next, we will reflect on potential consequences of the current selection practices for the supply 
and development of talent. Taking the results of this study as a starting point, we will outline a 
few potential scenarios that will refine some of the claims described in the introductory chapter. 
These scenarios are no direct results of this study, but are meant to stimulate further debate on 
talent selection and academic career development.
7.2  Further reflection upon the current selection system and its accompanying 
criticism 
Science is growing more and more competitive, especially with regard to resources and positions. 
The general principle of competition is that it should improve quality and transparency. At the 
higher levels of science and universities this might largely be valid, but at the individual level only 
a small group benefits from it. Those who ‘win’ receive considerable recognition and a positive 
boost to their career (Bloch, Graversen and Pedersen, 2014). But many of those who ‘lose’ (even 
when they are considered to be ‘just as good’) leave academia or stay in temporary positions 
without any clear career prospects. After years of insecurity and job-hopping, a switch to a career 
outside academia could be complicated by a high degree of specialization and a higher age 
(Broersen, 2003). But there seems to be a growing awareness that at higher levels, competition 
does not only yield positive results. Most extreme are people caught out after unethical behavior 
and fraud, claiming they felt forced towards this because of severe competition. Starting from our 
findings and taking them a step further for reflection, what potential consequences do the current 
selection mechanisms have for the supply and development of academic talent? 
7.2.1 The significance of publication records and competition
The strongest criticism concerning current scientific practices is directed at the overpowering role 
of publishing in ‘surviving’ and building a career within science. Quality nowadays seems to a 
large extent to be defined as productivity. Universities seem to have internalized the performance 
culture and rhetoric to such an extent that academics even define and regulate themselves in 
terms of dominant performance indicators like numbers of publications, citations, or the H-index. 
Academics are evaluated on their contribution to the performance of the organization instead of 
their contribution to the professional and intellectual community (Morley, 2005). Consequently, 
publishing scientific articles seems to have become the goal of academic labour. The enormous 
pressure to publish is criticized to a growing extent, as it is considered to have detrimental 
effects, e.g. encouragement of fraud and salami science. In fact in my opinion it leads to an 
inflation of the scientific article: who still has the time and interest to read the multitude of 
publications? What is the added value of each publication, more often describing smaller parts of 
research, to knowledge production or to its societal use? Due to the perception of publishing as 
a goal of academic work instead of a means to distribute knowledge, less attention is paid to 
what is really done with newly accumulated scientific knowledge.
High numbers of publications and citations indeed seem to be particularly important to aim for 
when you want to succeed in academia as an early career researcher. Having an extensive 
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publication record adds to career opportunities within science, although this study showed that it 
is a condition but not a guarantee for success. Moreover, our results question the overpowering 
significance assigned to these performance measures in the debate, as they were not found to 
be entirely decisive. If they would have been, we would have seen clear cut decisions, but we did 
not. Where previous studies already showed that allocation outcomes are not just based on 
publication records (see also Bornmann, Wallon and Ledin, 2008; Melin and Danell, 2006; Van 
den Besselaar and Leydesdorff 2007, 2009; Hornbostel et al., 2009), this study described what 
other types of information are used in selection processes. Various personal and social character-
istics are included, particularly in face-to-face assessment during the interview, which was found 
to be highly decisive. This can be considered a positive finding, as academics are involved in 
more activities than only publishing excellent papers, e.g. teaching, providing supervision, 
managing research groups, collaboration or distributing knowledge to society. Referring to the 
last activity, attention is being paid to the contribution of academic research to wider society to 
an increasing degree.
 
Nevertheless, publication counts are dominant in the rhetoric of current debates on performance 
measures and talent selection. This rhetoric seems to be very powerful, although its exact power 
needs further research. It would indeed become dangerous if the various players within academia 
will start to believe and adjust to it, as we already see happening. Should this rhetoric affect 
academic career opportunities, it might induce a constriction of academic talent. Henceforth 
talent might mainly stand for proven academic achievements instead of potential quality and 
performance, predominantly supporting career opportunities for academics who manage to 
publish a lot and obtain lots of external funding. This scenario could potentially lead to a more 
uniform model of ‘the talented academic’, as the variety in types of talented academics and their 
skills would be diminished. 
A more uniform model of talent may also be a consequence of growing competition. As science 
is getting more competitive, especially with regard to research funding, talent selection is also 
strongly characterized by competition where excellence is required. Generally candidates are 
compared to each other and the number of candidates who can be identified and selected as 
talent is limited. The challenge of having to compare candidates is that it forces reviewers to 
make their criteria explicit. On the one hand this contributes to the fairness of the procedure, as it 
avoids candidates being assessed on different (implicit) criteria. On the other hand, it causes the 
‘objective’ performance criteria to predominate over criteria related to personal or social skills. 
Numbers of publications, citations and grants, or years of international experience, are easier to 
compare than, for example, motivation, perseverance or communication skills (see also Musselin, 
2002). While academic talent ideally is perceived as someone excelling on a broad range of 
characteristics, academic, personal and social, talent selected within these competitive programs 
might to a large extent be narrowed down to more easily and objectively measurable characteris-
tics, like academic performance. However, when ‘measuring’ academic performance by counting 
numbers of publications and citations, one should realize that more need not always be better, as 
high performing scholars may be less influential than low performing scholars (Waltman, Van Eck 
and Wouters, 2013).
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7.2.2 The high symbolic value of grants
Besides publications, research grants are strongly related to prestige. Academics who managed 
to obtain significant grants are seen as very talented, considerably increasing their chances of 
receiving subsequent resources compared to those who have not obtained grants (yet), in line 
with the well- known Matthew effect. Universities currently tend to strongly focus on supporting 
and improving the grant success of their academic staff. There have even been opportunities in 
the recent past to apply for grants which enabled academics for some period to prepare a grant 
application for the Dutch national or the European research council. Grant acquirement is often 
explicitly included in universities’ selection criteria in recruitment or promotion procedures.1 
However, this study showed there is quite some uncertainty regarding grant allocation decisions. 
Although the few at the top and at the bottom are rightfully granted and rejected respectively, 
within a large pool of applicants quality differences seem minimal. Moreover, due to the social 
character of the panel review process, decisions are liable to subjectivity and arbitrariness. Then 
there is the time and information available to reviewers to found their decision with regard to 
talent selection. There was a general awareness amongst panel members that the grants they 
distributed were vitally important financial resources for early career researchers in order to 
develop an academic career. As these grants therefore are considered career grants instead of 
just research grants, the assessment of the applicant is an important part of the selection proce-
dure. The information available on which to base the assessment, is composed of written 
résumés, a half-hour presentation by a selection of the applicants and perhaps some anecdotal 
information. Compared to the richness of information that can be gathered by people working 
close to the applicant, for example, this input can be considered fairly restricted, when we take 
into account that the resumes of early career researchers are generally not clearly distinctive. 
Despite acknowledgement of the various uncertainties characterizing the allocation process, 
these grants are still ascribed major symbolic value. Minor differences in quality are enlarged to 
major differences in recognition and thus in career opportunities.
 
7.2.3 Gendered impediments
With regard to gender, the rhetorical emphasis on publishing and acquiring funding can be 
considered to be detrimental to female academics. It reinforces the ‘masculinity of excellence’, as 
it forces people to work long days, fulltime and overtime, with inflexible work schemes, to always 
be available and because it attributes more value to research than to teaching achievements. As 
women generally are entrusted with more caring tasks, therefore being less flexible and as they 
are more involved in teaching, women are disadvantaged (Bleijenbergh, Benschop and Vennix, 
2013; Mason, Wolfinger and Goulden, 2013). This may result in fewer women making a career in 
science, encouraging them to seek an alternative career path and consequently resulting in a 
potential loss of talent for academia. 
Next, implications for practice will be given to prevent a loss of academic talent and support 
academic careers of early career researchers.
1 See for example http://www.ugent.be/nl/actueel/vacatures/zap/erc-consolidator-grants
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7.3 Implications for practice to uphold and stimulate talent
7.3.1 Create more clarity on career perspectives
A complicated issue with regard to talent selection is the question of what is the right moment 
for selection. While research career opportunities are scarce, it may be more efficient to select at 
an early stage of people’s careers. Resources can be invested more effectively in a smaller group 
of high potentials, enabling them to fully focus on developing themselves as excellent research-
ers. Those who do not make it through the selection can concentrate on other career paths, 
saving many of them years of drudging work, submitting numerous grant applications and 
cherishing hopes without yielding any career certainty. However, the disadvantage of early 
selection is that talent has not yet had the opportunity to fully develop, leading to more differen-
tiation between academics. Selecting too early in the development process, when diversity is 
limited, creates the risk of missing out on talent and potential excellence in the long run.
7.3.2 Pay attention to a broad scope of skills 
Because of the high level of uncertainty and the lack of clear career perspectives particularly for 
most of the early career researchers, high potentials should be well supported and supervised. 
Currently the focus in HRM policy seems to be on organizational interests, increasing the distance 
from the needs of individual employees (Thunnissen and Fruytier, 2014). Instead HRM programs 
could stimulate academics to broaden their view and to reflect upon their capabilities, not only in 
terms of performance, but in terms of skills and experience. Currently, the résumés of researchers 
predominantly convey their publications, grants, international experience, awards and teaching 
experience. When this is perceived to be most relevant, other experiences and skills (e.g. related 
to organizational expertise, entrepreneurship activities or software use) are often overlooked and 
not described on résumés. Consequently, these other features cannot be reviewed and will not 
play an important role in selection processes. In order to enable reviewers to broaden their 
review criteria and to facilitate comparison of these broader criteria, academics should develop 
portfolios in which these are included.2 This may enhance their self-awareness of their usefulness 
and employability inside and outside academia.  
Moreover, the state of academic talent may benefit from a softening performance culture. 
Because of the emphasis on publications and grants, other valuable skills are often far less 
appreciated. Although criticism on the dominance of productivity measures and requirements is 
augmenting, no real alternatives are currently implemented. For example, to reduce the publica-
tion pressure, academics may no longer be assessed on their total number of publications, but 
on a limited number of their best achievements (not necessarily scientific publications). To an 
important extent it is up to academics themselves to initiate change, since they are mainly 
responsible for the assessment, selection and recruitment within science. It is the academic elite 
sitting in review panels for the evaluation agencies or research councils who set the norms, 
criteria and priorities according to which academic activities, and thus academic reward and 
2  Part of the ACUMEN project (funded by the European Committee in the 7th Framework Programme) is development 
of portfolio’s reflecting researchers’ careers and experiences. These portfolio’s enable researchers to provide 
adequate evidence regarding their various activities and development (http://research-acumen.eu/).  
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careers, are evaluated (Musselin, 2013; Thunnissen and Fruytier, 2014). Reviewers tend to search 
for candidates who look like themselves, have similar characteristics, work in similar ways and can 
be imagined as their colleague; also described as a bias towards homothetic recruitments 
(Musselin, 2002). This is in line with the rationale of composing grant panels in the Dutch 
Vernieuwingsimpuls: they generally consist out of former laureates. Academics previously 
identified as talent are equipped with the task of identifying new talent. This automatically sets a 
kind of blueprint for the candidates they are looking for. Due to the growing importance of 
review practices and its use by university managers as management tool, the academic elite is 
reinforced (Musselin, 2013) and therefore the main target group when it comes to changing 
performance culture or selection criteria.
 
7.3.3 Dare to commit
As shown in this study (chapter 6), linking early career academics to a mentor is an important 
instrument for career support. Furthermore, to prevent loss of talent, high potentials should be 
offered clear career prospects. Nowadays career opportunities are still strongly dependent on 
(unpredictable) vacancies and obtainment of grants. Universities should create more possibilities 
for departments to retain early career academics who are considered to be highly talented. Their 
talent policy does not need to depend to a great extent on decisions taken by grant panels. If 
they are convinced of someone’s talent, they should have the courage of their convictions and 
organize their resources to commit themselves to this person and to invest in him or her. In order 
to rightfully appreciate talent, especially with regard to early career researchers, researchers 
should not only be assessed within competition, but to a larger extent on their own (unique) 
merits, offering more room to a broad variety of talent dimensions, including the often distinctive 
tacit dimension. 
Another way to retain talent, particularly female talent, is to enhance the flexibility of the HRM 
system. Inflexibility is an important factor impeding academic careers, as shown in this study. 
Career development could for example be supported by more flexibility in working schemes, 
working on and off site, opportunities to work part time and to better balance professional and 
family life (Dikkers, Van Engen and Vinkenburg, 2010). This could subsequently stimulate gender 
equality within academia by contributing to a change in the organizational culture at universities, 
making it less masculine. 
7.3.4 Aim for differentiation
To conclude, the current focus on research excellence contributes to the image that academia is 
only looking for top researchers. Obviously, Dutch universities are not exclusively involved in 
research, as their main task still remains education. There is more to academic work than conduct-
ing research, and not all starting academics aspire to become a professor or a top researcher, 
(which is just as well as there are insufficient posts for these aspirants). Due to the increased size 
of the higher education system, universities therefore need to aim for differentiation in academic 
functions and careers. Besides researchers and teachers, universities need people with expertise 
in management, organization, fundraising and valorization for example. Excellence can also be 
applied to these other tasks, and enhancement of academic prestige should also be possible 
through achievements related to these tasks. Universities should provide room for top teachers or 
top ‘valorizers’, who are hardly or not involved in research activities. Various types of career paths 
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should be stimulated and supported, in which the variety of academic tasks are more equally 
valued, instead of predominantly valuing research activities.
 
With regard to evaluation and selection of academics, differentiation of assessment procedures 
could result in a broader variety of talent being recognized in practice. For example, including 
interviews in evaluation procedures enables reviewers to assess communication and personal 
skills, which cannot properly be assessed from written applications or résumés. Variation in 
procedures prevents a bias towards preferences for a restricted set of skills. Finally, attention 
should also be paid to diversity within evaluation panels in terms of gender, expertise and status, 
as panel composition affects the evaluation outcomes. 
7.4 Implications for future research
In the interviews with panellists gender was not put forward as an important or sensitive issue. 
While talking about the review process and describing talent, gender was hardly ever mentioned, 
neither by male nor female respondents. Only to the concluding question, if they had any 
questions or final additions, several of them responded with ‘I expected you to ask me about 
gender too’, followed by ‘it did not play any role within our panel’. From other studies we know 
gender biases can be unconsciously influencing people’s behavior, for example, as it is often 
implicitly embedded in organizational cultures. Asking people about their behavior implies asking 
them to reconstruct their behavior. This is expected to yield different results from actually 
observing their behavior. Systematic observations of review or recruitment panels would be very 
valuable in order to identify the more subtle impact of gender on review processes. They will also 
enable researchers to better understand the implicit mechanisms which enter into panel review 
processes and to understand how group dynamics affect the panel decisions. We looked at grant 
allocation from a social psychological perspective and identified various factors and mechanisms 
inherent to the social nature of panel reviewing that influence these selection processes. 
Selection outcomes were found not to be fully determined by track records, leaving them partly 
unpredictable and intangible. We consider our study a valuable contribution to the existing body 
of knowledge on peer review and grant allocation, but it requires further investigation on how 
these factors and implicit mechanisms more precisely affect the actual selection outcomes. 
Observational studies would be an important and essential method to answer these questions.
  
This study showed how grants are given strong symbolic value and are perceived to be almost a 
requirement for academics to develop their academic careers. At the same time we pointed out 
the power of rhetoric and its potential influence on people’s behavior and on policy. Further 
research is needed on the effects of rhetoric and to find out what the real value and impact of 
these grants are on individuals’ careers. To what extent are they requirements or guarantees for 
successful academic careers? Is it possible to have a successful career without these grants and 
does being awarded a prestigious grant always mean you will have a successful career? As career 
opportunities differ per discipline, comparisons between disciplines would be relevant to get 
more insight into the impact of grants. 
Furthermore, gender differences in scientific performance were found to be disappearing. While 
in the established generation of researchers men were outperforming women, in the younger 
generation women performed at least equally to men. This study covered the social sciences. 
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Although fields like psychology, economics and education are covered rather well in publication 
databases of Web of Science, fields like law and political science are included to a smaller extent, 
therefore limiting our results. To determine how solid and generally valid our findings are, 
replication of this study in other disciplines (with high Web of Science coverage) is recommended. 
Finally, longitudinal research is needed to study if these performance difference have really 
disappeared in the long run or if they have shifted towards later career phases. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Talent Proof:
Selectieprocessen in 
onderzoeksfinanciering en -loopbanen
Focus op talent en excellente prestaties
Binnen de academische wereld is er een sterke focus op talent en excellente prestaties ontstaan, 
met name in de eerste fases van de academische carrière. Universiteiten richten zich meer dan 
ooit expliciet op het aantrekken en behouden van talent door het aanbieden van coaching- en 
stimuleringsprogramma’s en door het werven van nieuwe medewerkers volgens het Tenure Track- 
beginsel. Dit is een loopbaantraject voor high potentials dat leidt naar hoogleraarschap als men 
voldoet aan de vooraf opgestelde prestatie eisen. Voor met name startende wetenschappers zijn 
talentsubsidies zoals de Veni-, Vidi- en Vici-beurzen (onderdeel van NWO’s financieringsprogramma 
de Vernieuwingsimpuls) en de ERC Starting Grant van groot belang om hun academische carrière 
te ontwikkelen. Deze Nederlandse en Europese persoonsgebonden subsidies bieden weten-
schappers gedurende drie tot vijf jaar de mogelijkheid om hun eigen onderzoekslijn verder te 
ontwikkelen en ondersteunen hen bij het opzetten van hun eigen onderzoeksgroep. 
Het groeiende aantal aanvragen en het lage honoreringspercentage (11-17%), wijzen erop dat dit 
systeem van talentselectie onder druk staat. Daarnaast klinkt er vanuit de academische gemeen-
schap in toenemende mate commentaar op de grote publicatiedruk, ook wel beschreven als de 
publish or perish-cultuur. Excellente prestaties staan in de wetenschap voornamelijk voor hoge 
aantallen publicaties, ook wanneer het gaat om onderzoekers in de beginfase van hun carrière. 
Tussen deze onderzoekers bestaat er een groeiende competitie om financiering en (het verkrij-
gen en behouden van) posities. Deze toenemende druk en ontwikkelingen vragen erom het 
huidige systeem van talentselectie onder de loep te nemen.   
Inzicht creëren in proces van talentselectie
Aan de hand van diverse kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve onderzoeksmethoden poogt deze 
dissertatie meer inzicht te creëren in het proces van talentselectie. Gezien het grote belang van 
individuele onderzoeksfinanciering, gaat dit onderzoek specifiek in op selectieprocessen bij de 
verdeling van persoonlijke onderzoekssubsidies.
De hoofdvragen die hierbij centraal staan, zijn: wat is academisch talent en hoe wordt het 
geselecteerd? Deelvragen met betrekking tot het selectieproces, zijn: welke mogelijke groeps-
factoren zijn van invloed op het selectieproces? Welke rol spelen competitie en publicaties voor 
academische carrières? Welke genderverschillen kunnen er worden waargenomen als het gaat 
om academische prestaties? En welke factoren belemmeren of bevorderen de ontwikkeling van 
academische loopbanen? 
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Conclusies
Verschillende opvattingen over academisch talent
Wat is academisch talent en hoe vindt talentselectie plaats? Om antwoord te krijgen op deze 
vragen zijn 29 gevestigde wetenschappers geïnterviewd over twee verschillende onderwerpen: 
talentselectie aan de universiteit in hun eigen vakgroep en talentselectie binnen het financierings- 
programma de Vernieuwingsimpuls waarbij zij lid zijn van de beoordelingscommissie. Om het 
selectieproces beter te begrijpen, zijn daarnaast ook de cijfermatige beoordelingen van onge-
veer 900 Vernieuwingsimpulsaanvragen geanalyseerd. 
Wanneer je ervaren wetenschappers vraagt om academisch talent te omschrijven, zeggen ze 
vrijwel allemaal: ‘De echte talenten herken je meteen.’ Toch blijkt het expliciet benoemen van de 
kenmerken die hen tot talent maken, nog een lastige opdracht. De basisvoorwaarden waarover 
de talenten beschikken, zijn volgens de geïnterviewden in elk geval: excellente onderzoeksvaar-
digheden en een uitgebreide publicatielijst. Vervolgens zijn het de persoonlijke en sociale 
kwaliteiten die de echte talenten onderscheiden van hun vakgenoten. Een belangrijke indicator 
van talent voor de wetenschappers is daarnaast de verwerving van een prestigieuze onderzoeks-
subsidie, zoals een Veni-, Vidi- of ERC-beurs. Gezien de lage honoreringspercentages moeten de 
laureaten wel toptalenten zijn, zo luidt de redenering.
Binnen het selectieproces van de Vernieuwingsimpuls wordt een smallere opvatting over talent 
gehanteerd. Hierbij ligt de nadruk allereerst op academische prestaties. Uit de interviews en de 
cijfermatige analyse blijkt wel dat het zwaartepunt gedurende de selectieprocedure verschuift. 
Aan het begin van het selectieproces is een talent een aanvrager ‘op papier’ die vooral veel 
gepubliceerd heeft, ook als eerste auteur, in vooraanstaande tijdschriften en het liefst ook 
onafhankelijk van zijn of haar promotor; hij of zij heeft beurzen verworven en buitenlandse 
werkervaring opgedaan, en heeft een goed uitgewerkt voorstel geschreven in algemeen begrij-
pelijke taal. Later in de procedure, wanneer de commissieleden de aanvragers in levenden lijve 
kunnen beoordelen, onderscheiden de echte talenten zich sterker op basis van hun enthousi-
asme, overtuigingskracht en doorzettingsvermogen. Dit betekent dat sommige aanvragers die 
op basis van hun voorstel en curriculum vitae als echt talent werden beschouwd, na de interview-
ronde terugzakken naar de middenmoot en vice versa. 
Kortom, talent wordt contextueel gedefinieerd vanuit een bepaald referentiepunt, dat verschuift 
gedurende het beoordelingsproces.
Talentselectie: omgaan met dilemma’s
De gevolgde procedure is van invloed op de uitkomst van het selectieproces. De meeste geïnter-
viewde commissieleden binnen de Vernieuwingsimpuls ervaren twee problemen die het beoor-
delingswerk bemoeilijken: de breedte van de set aanvragen en de kleine verschillen in kwaliteit 
binnen een grote groep aanvragers. 
Een commissie moet een groot gebied dekken in termen van expertise om alle aanvragen te 
kunnen beoordelen. Dit betekent dat commissieleden slechts voor een klein aantal aanvragen als 
specialist beschouwd kunnen worden en voor de meerderheid als ‘generalist’. Ze beslissen over 
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voorstellen die buiten hun directe expertise vallen. In deze gevallen waarbij ze de voorstellen 
minder goed op de specifieke inhoud kunnen beoordelen (bijvoorbeeld het innovatieve karakter 
of de onderzoeksmethoden), baseren ze zich in de eerste fase sterker op meer algemene criteria 
zoals het curriculum vitae van de aanvrager en de leesbaarheid van het voorstel. 
Naast een klein aantal uitschieters aan de boven- en onderkant, bestaat er een grote groep 
aanvragers waarbij geen duidelijke differentiatie mogelijk is op basis van de algemene criteria, 
zoals publicaties, beurzen, en internationale ervaring. Toch moet er binnen deze groep een 
selectie worden gemaakt. Hiervoor worden additionele criteria toegepast die meer impliciet en 
subjectief zijn, zoals persoonlijkheid, doorzettingsvermogen en ambitie. De druk om tot een 
beslissing te komen terwijl duidelijke kwaliteitsverschillen ontbreken, maakt het selectieproces 
vatbaar voor de invloed van oncontroleerbare factoren zoals subjectiviteit, toeval en groepsdyna-
miek. Commissieleden zijn zich hier terdege van bewust en zetten dan ook vraagtekens bij een 
gedeelte van de selectie-uitkomsten. Niet omdat de aanvragers die een beurs toegekend krijgen 
niet van hoge kwaliteit zijn, maar omdat een gedeelte van de afgewezen aanvragers in kwaliteit 
nauwelijks van de geselecteerde onderzoekers onderscheiden kan worden.
Talentselectie: groepsdynamische factoren dragen bij aan besluitvorming 
De subjectieve en veelal oncontroleerbare invloeden op het selectieproces, zoals hierboven 
beschreven, zijn onvermijdelijk. Niet alleen vanwege de geringe kwaliteitsverschillen, maar ook 
vanwege het beoordelingsproces zelf, dat zich kenmerkt door sociale interactie en groepsbesluit-
vorming. De literatuurstudie in dit onderzoek heeft geleid tot een conceptueel model dat diverse 
factoren onderscheidt die van invloed zijn op het selectieproces in de beoordeling van onder-
zoeksaanvragen. 
Naast factoren gerelateerd aan de aanvragers, hun netwerk, hun voorstel en de selectieproce-
dure, wordt groepsbesluitvorming beïnvloed door factoren inherent aan sociale interactie. Het 
model maakt hierbij onderscheid tussen factoren die te maken hebben met de samenstelling van 
het panel, met de motivatie en inspanning van panelleden en met de verzameling en versprei-
ding van informatie. 
Factoren die een rol spelen ten aanzien van de aanvragers en die van invloed zijn op hun 
beoordelingen, zijn bijvoorbeeld bewezen prestaties, status van voormalige werkgevers en 
onderzoeksveld. Belangrijk hierbij is de mate van cognitieve gelijkheid tussen de aanvrager en de 
beoordelaar. Als er sprake is van een disciplinaire match, heeft de beoordelaar vaak meer 
expertise en affiniteit met betrekking tot het onderzoek van de aanvrager, wat kan leiden tot een 
positievere beoordeling. Daarentegen kan een ‘match’ er ook aan bijdragen dat de beoordelaar 
juist kritischer naar het voorstel kijkt. 
Daarnaast beïnvloeden procedurele factoren zoals tijd- en aanvraagdruk en richtlijnen de 
uitvoering van het beoordelingsproces. In situaties van hoge tijdsdruk besteden groepsleden 
bijvoorbeeld meer aandacht aan gedeelde dan aan unieke informatie en is er minder ruimte voor 
alternatieve beslissingen. Eerder onderzoek wijst bovendien uit dat de mate waarin beoordelaars 
hun keuzes moeten verantwoorden, effect heeft op het groepsproces, met name op de motivatie 
van de beoordelaars en op het delen van informatie.
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Een belangrijke factor in groepsbesluitvorming is de samenstelling van de commissie, aangezien 
hierdoor wordt bepaald welke expertise beschikbaar is binnen de groep. Welke informatie het 
zwaarste weegt en de wijze waarop commissieleden dit delen en waarderen, wordt onder meer 
bepaald door (waargenomen) statusverschillen en onderlinge machtsverdelingen. Ook groeps-
normen, motivatieverschillen en de sociale cohesie tussen groepsleden zijn van invloed op het 
besluitvormingsproces. De exacte wijze waarop veel van deze sociaal-psychologische factoren de 
uitkomsten van deze groepsprocessen beïnvloeden (bijvoorbeeld de uiteindelijke honoreringen), 
verdient nader empirisch onderzoek.
Afnemende genderverschillen in wetenschappelijke productiviteit
Ondanks de wereldwijde toename van het aantal vrouwen op alle niveaus in de wetenschap, 
bestaat er in de hogere wetenschappelijke posities nog altijd een sterke ondervertegenwoor-
diging van vrouwen. Vooral Nederland scoort laag met een gemiddeld percentage van nog geen 
15 procent vrouwelijke hoogleraren. De ondervertegenwoordiging van vrouwen is onderwerp van 
veel onderzoek en heeft geleid tot verschillende verklaringen: mannen en vrouwen zouden 
verschillen in hun ambities; mannen worden impliciet bevooroordeeld in selectieprocessen; 
mannen presteren beter dan vrouwen. Aansluitend bij de algemene opvatting dat academische 
prestaties de loopbaankansen van met name jonge onderzoekers vergroten, neemt deze 
dissertatie prestatieverschillen als uitgangspunt en stelt de vraag of deze prestatieverschillen nog 
steeds gelden voor de nieuwe generatie onderzoekers.
Om tot een antwoord te komen op deze vraag zijn de aantallen publicaties en citaties van onge-
veer 850 sociaal wetenschappers aan het begin van hun carrière voor drie groepen verzameld en 
geanalyseerd: voor de sociale wetenschappen als geheel, en specifiek voor psychologie en voor 
economie. Daarbij is onderscheid gemaakt tussen de gevestigde generatie (Open Competitie- 
en Vici-aanvragers) en de jonge generatie (Veni-aanvragers).
De vergelijking maakt duidelijk dat de mannen in de gevestigde generatie inderdaad beter 
presteren dan vrouwen, in de zin dat ze meer publiceren en vaker geciteerd worden. Deze 
traditionele prestatieverschillen lijken echter in de meer recente periode te verdwijnen. In de 
jongere generatie worden namelijk geen of aanzienlijk kleinere prestatieverschillen aangetroffen 
tussen mannen en vrouwen. Ook het aandeel vrouwen in de top van meest publicerende en geci-
teerde onderzoekers, is in de jonge generatie aanzienlijk toegenomen ten opzichte van de 
gevestigde generatie. 
De resultaten van deze studie zijn met name interessant omdat eerdere studies aantoonden dat 
de prestatiekloof tussen mannen en vrouwen in de vroege carrièrefase ontstond. Dit is precies de 
fase waarin de prestatieverschillen nu verdwenen lijken te zijn. Aangezien academische prestaties 
in termen van publicaties en citaties een belangrijke rol spelen in de loopbanen van - met name 
startende - onderzoekers, zou het verdwijnen van prestatieverschillen wel eens aanleiding kunnen 
zijn voor verandering van genderrelaties binnen de wetenschap. 
Duidelijke factoren voor talentbehoud in de wetenschap ontbreken
Talentselectie draagt er in belangrijke mate aan bij dat wetenschappers hun wetenschappelijke 
carrière verder kunnen ontwikkelen. Toch is daarmee niet gezegd dat de eens geselecteerde 
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talenten binnen de wetenschap blijven functioneren. Om meer inzicht te krijgen in factoren die 
ertoe leiden dat talenten in de wetenschap blijven of hieruit vertrekken, zijn 42 personen geïnter-
viewd die aan het begin van hun wetenschappelijke carrière als talent zijn aangemerkt. Deze 42 
onderzoekers zijn voor de analyse in paren van twee verdeeld - gelijke onderzoekers, in termen 
van generatie en onderzoeksveld - waarbij een van hen nog binnen de wetenschap werkt en de 
ander een baan buiten de wetenschap heeft gevonden. Daarnaast zijn ook hun curriculum vitae, 
hun prestatiegegevens en arbeidsmarktgegevens geanalyseerd.
Snelle carrièrestappen blijken niet noodzakelijk om een succesvolle loopbaan binnen de weten-
schap te hebben. ‘Sociaal kapitaal’ is daarentegen wel van groot belang: ondersteuning van een 
mentor, mogelijkheden om te netwerken en steun van de partner. Het hebben van kinderen lijkt 
geen belemmerende factor te zijn, al is het aantal mannelijke blijvers met kinderen aanzienlijk 
hoger dan het aantal vrouwelijke blijvers. 
Belangrijke belemmeringen voor talenten om door te gaan in de wetenschap, zijn de beperkte 
academische loopbaanmogelijkheden en de inflexibiliteit van het academische carrièresysteem. 
Vertrekkers wijzen veelal op het ontbreken van heldere carrièreperspectieven, niet nagekomen 
loopbaanafspraken - waarbij individuele hoogleraren een belangrijke rol spelen - en het niet 
willen of kunnen aanpassen door de universiteit van prestatie-afspraken, bijvoorbeeld in het 
geval van mensen met zorgtaken. 
Een vergelijking van de academische prestaties binnen de paren laat niet zien dat het altijd de 
best presterende onderzoeker is die binnen de wetenschap blijft. In termen van aantallen 
publicaties en citaties is er geen relatie tussen academische prestatie en loopbaansucces. Er zijn 
zelfs een aantal paren waarbij de vertrekker later in de carrière beter presteert dan de blijver. 
Samenvattend blijkt er niet één doorslaggevende factor te zijn die bepaalt of talenten binnen de 
wetenschap blijven of een baan daarbuiten vinden. Het gaat doorgaans om een opeenstapeling 
van voor- of nadelen die een academische loopbaan respectievelijk bevorderen of belemmeren. 
Toeval is hierbij een niet te onderschatten factor. Een volgende carrièrestap was volgens meer-
dere wetenschappers het resultaat van ‘op het juiste moment op de juiste plaats zijn’. 
Vragen bij talent en talentselectie
In de huidige selectiesystemen binnen de wetenschap wordt veel waarde toegekend aan het 
verwerven van onderzoekssubsidies. Niet alleen vanwege hun financiële waarde, maar vooral 
vanwege hun symbolische waarde: het is een belangrijke indicator van talent. Gezien de sterke 
competitie tussen onderzoekers, moeten de laureaten wel toptalenten zijn. Op basis van de 
onderzoeksresultaten in deze dissertatie, kunnen echter vraagtekens worden geplaatst bij de 
sterke symbolische waarde die de academische gemeenschap toekent aan dit type persoonlijke 
onderzoeksfinanciering. 
In de eerste plaats kent het selectieproces meerdere onzekerheden. Door de kleine kwaliteitsver-
schillen tussen de aanvragers, worden de uitkomsten beïnvloed door factoren die losstaan van de 
kwaliteit van de aanvragers. De samenstelling van de commissie en de organisatie van de 
procedure spelen een belangrijke rol. Daarnaast zijn er factoren inherent aan de sociale aard van 
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het beoordelingsproces, die bijdragen aan een belangrijke mate van onvoorspelbaarheid en 
toevalligheid in de beslissingen van de commissie. Kleine verschillen in kwaliteit worden door de 
honoreringsbeslissingen omgezet in grote verschillen in erkenning en daarmee in academische 
loopbaanmogelijkheden. Dit betekent niet per definitie dat het selectieproces niet goed wordt 
uitgevoerd. Deze invloeden zijn nu eenmaal niet uit te sluiten in processen waarbij het gaat om 
mensenwerk. Waar wel iets aan gedaan kan worden, is de wijze waarop met de selectie-uitkom-
sten wordt omgegaan en de betekenis die hieraan wordt toegekend. Gezien de onzekerheden in 
het selectieproces zou een bescheidener symbolische waarde van deze beurzen voor verdere 
loopbaanmogelijkheden gepast zijn. 
Wanneer het gaat over excellente wetenschappers en academisch talent, staan naast persoon-
lijke onderzoeksbeurzen voornamelijk publicaties centraal. In het huidige debat binnen de 
wetenschap is veel kritiek op de hoge publicatiedruk en de eenzijdige focus op aantallen 
artikelen als criteria voor kwaliteit. Deze dissertatie laat zien dat publicaties inderdaad van groot 
belang zijn voor academische loopbanen. Zonder een mooie publicatielijst kun je het binnen de 
wetenschap wel vergeten. Ze dienen echter als ondergrens waaraan wetenschappers minimaal 
moeten voldoen, waarna verdere selectie plaatsvindt op basis van andere criteria, zoals ambitie, 
doorzettingsvermogen en communicatievaardigheden. De huidige focus op publicaties is echter 
eenzijdig. Publicaties zijn geen goed middel om te differentiëren tussen talenten. Die eenzijdige 
focus leidt tot een onderwaardering van andere belangrijke academische activiteiten en vaardig-
heden, zoals onderwijs, begeleiding, leiderschap, management, ondernemerschap en valorisatie. 
Om academici te stimuleren zich verder te ontwikkelen op deze andere waardevolle gebieden, is 
het van belang hier ook expliciet waardering aan toe te kennen binnen evaluaties en beoordelin-
gen.
Ten slotte staat deze eenzijdige beoordeling waarbij de nadruk ligt op publicaties en onderzoeks-
beurzen, momenteel onder druk. Niet alleen door het huidige debat dat wetenschappers 
onderling voeren, maar ook door bijvoorbeeld de recente invoering van maatschappelijke 
relevantie als expliciet criterium in het nieuwe Standaard Evaluatie Protocol (2015-2021). Al het 
onderzoek dat wordt uitgevoerd aan de Nederlandse universiteiten en binnen de NWO- en 
KNAW-instituten, wordt volgens dit protocol geëvalueerd. Deze ontwikkeling vereist een 
verandering in het denken en doen van wetenschappers en bestuurders. Toekomstig onderzoek 
moet uitwijzen wat de gevolgen van deze ontwikkeling zijn voor de (h)erkenning van talent en de 
ontwikkeling van academische loopbanen. Worden andere talenten geselecteerd en leidt het tot 
meer differentiatie van academische functies en loopbanen? En wat zijn de gevolgen voor 
loopbaanmogelijkheden en ontwikkelingen met betrekking tot gender en diversiteit?
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Dankwoord
Al was het schrijven van dit boekje een behoorlijk solitaire bezigheid, ik had dit nooit kunnen 
doen zonder de hulp van velen. De afgelopen jaren heb ik het geluk gehad veel inspirerende, 
boeiende, kritische, hulpvaardige en mooie mensen te ontmoeten, die me op de een of andere 
manier geholpen hebben mijn onderzoek te (blijven) doen, mijn ideeën vorm te geven en mijn 
resultaten te delen.
Als eerste wil ik graag Peter en Inge bedanken. Peter, je was een zeer enthousiaste, inspirerende 
en creatieve promotor. Gesprekken met jou brachten altijd veel nieuwe ideeën en motivatie. Jij 
hebt me als voormalig afdelingshoofd van SciSA de ruimte geboden mijn onderzoeksinteresse 
uit te werken en me het vertrouwen gegeven te gaan waar ik voor sta. Van jou heb ik ook een 
goed inkijkje gekregen in het spel dat wetenschap heet en heb ik geleerd me hierin staande te 
houden. Inge, je was een geweldige co-promotor voor wie ik veel bewondering heb. Al ben ik 
erop vooruitgegaan, jouw plan- en organisatietalent zal ik nooit evenaren. Dank voor de fijne 
samenwerking en voor de steun op de momenten dat ik het nodig had. 
Dank gaat ook uit naar mijn commissie, die tijd heeft vrijgemaakt om mijn manuscript kritisch te 
lezen. Ik bewonder jullie expertise en werk, en voel me vereerd dat jullie mijn werk wilden 
beoordelen en mij hierover bevragen.
Iedereen die bereid was mee te werken aan een interview, dank voor jullie openheid en interes-
sante verhalen. Zonder jullie was het niet mogelijk geweest mijn onderzoek uit te voeren.  Dit 
geldt ook voor hen die me de mogelijkheid boden in hun commissie mee te kijken hoe discussies 
over onderzoeksvoorstellen nu in de praktijk verlopen. Dank voor jullie medewerking en vertrouwen. 
Het Rathenau Instituut wil ik graag bedanken voor de mogelijkheden die het me geboden heeft 
om mezelf te ontwikkelen – op meerdere gebieden tegelijk – en om een deel van mijn werk 
uiteindelijk te publiceren als proefschrift. Het was een zeer leerzame werkomgeving met veel 
geweldige collega’s en inmiddels ook nieuwe vrienden. Dank aan alle collega’s voor het kleur 
geven aan het instituut en de fijne werksfeer. Barend, we waren het niet altijd met elkaar eens, 
maar dat hield me scherp en vergrootte mijn motivatie om mijn proefschrift af te ronden. Ik heb 
veel geleerd van onze discussies en ik ben blij dat ik ook kon bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van 
jouw managementvaardigheden. Ik waardeer je openheid en betrokkenheid. Clara, dank voor de 
geweldige coördinatie van het publicatieproces. Marije, Roos en Jos als mijn teamgenoten ben ik 
jullie dankbaar voor onze samenwerking, constructief en tegelijkertijd gezellig. Laurens, Elizabeth 
en Edwin, dank voor jullie samenwerking, adviezen en feedback op een aantal van mijn ideeën 
en conceptteksten. Marlies, Nanda en Sjerhiel, jullie namen mogen hier ook niet ontbreken, dank 
voor jullie hulp en gezelligheid. Oud-collega’s Maaike en Floortje, jullie collegialiteit en vriend-
schap hebben zeker ook bijgedragen tot dit proefschrift. Dank voor jullie ondersteuning, humor 
en relativeringsvermogen. 
De SciSA junioren verdienen een speciale plek in dit dankwoord: Bei, Keelie, Pieter, Roos, Stefan, 
Thomas en Tjerk, jullie maakten het Rathenau tot een bijzondere werkplek, waar hard werd 
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gewerkt en ook hard werd gelachen. Beide waren nodig om te komen tot dit proefschrift. En 
onze JuSci-meetings niet te vergeten: het delen van onze moments of happiness en moments of 
despair. De meesten van jullie hebben inmiddels een andere werkplek gevonden en ik wens jullie 
allen heel veel succes, geluk en plezier! Stefan and Thomas, my 207 roomies, you are two very 
special men who taught me so many valuable things. Not only about you and your colorful lives, 
about modern technology, music, food and how to win a discussion, but especially about myself. 
I am very thankful for your friendship and support, your sense of humor, incredible openness and 
even greater stubbornness. I will not easily forget our fruit breaks, gym sessions, dinner dates and 
city trips and I hope many more will follow!
Dank ook aan Christine Teelken, Dick de Gilder en Peter Groenewegen, collega’s van de Vrije 
Universiteit, vakgroep Organisatiewetenschappen, met wie ik vooral in de beginfase veel ideeën 
heb uitgewisseld en die me geholpen hebben bij het vormgeven van mijn onderzoek.
Mijn lieve familie, schoonfamilie en vrienden wil ik bedanken voor hun steun en gewenste 
afleiding door de jaren heen. Jullie hebben mij met beide benen op de grond weten te houden 
en me geholpen werk af en toe helemaal te vergeten. Uitleggen wat ik nu precies deed in Den 
Haag, werkte daarnaast ook erg relativerend. Mijn ouders wil ik graag bedanken voor wie ze zijn 
en wat ze mij hebben meegegeven. Hoe meer ik mij ertegen verzet, des te meer herken ik mezelf 
in jullie. Maar één ding is zeker, zonder jullie ongelooflijke koppigheid was dit proefschrift er niet 
geweest. Een persoon in het bijzonder wil ik hier nog benoemen en dat is oma Van Dijk. Waar ik 
het in mijn vrije tijd vaak heerlijk vond om even niet over mijn werk te praten, vroeg jij juist altijd 
naar mijn werk. En dan niet een algemene vraag zoals ‘hoe is het op je werk’, maar je wilde 
precies weten wat ik nu deed, hoe, waarom, met wie en vooral wanneer ik klaar zou zijn voor de 
verdediging. Zo trots als je altijd was, zo graag had ik het je gegund tijdens mijn promotie 
vooraan te kunnen stralen. Je had het vervoer en reisgezelschap al geregeld, helaas piepte je er 
net te vroeg tussenuit. Oma, dit proefschrift is voor jou.  
Roel, jij gaf me de ruimte om volledig op te kunnen gaan in mijn werk en je gaf me op de juiste 
momenten een relativerende schop onder mijn kont om weer te beseffen dat er belangrijkere 
dingen zijn, zoals onze prachtige zonen Mees en Simon, jij en ik. Ik ben je ontzettend dankbaar 
voor je vertrouwen, geduld, toewijding, humor en liefde. Lief, je bent mijn alles.   

The Rathenau Institute promotes the formation of political and public opinion on science and 
technology. To this end, the Institute studies the organization and development of science 
systems, publishes about social impact of new technologies, and organizes debates on issues 
and dilemmas in science and technology.
Who was Rathenau?
The Rathenau Instituut is named after Professor G.W. Rathenau (1911-1989), who was 
successively professor of experimental physics at the University of Amsterdam, director of the 
Philips Physics Laboratory in Eindhoven, and a member of the Scientiﬁ c Advisory Council on 
Government Policy. He achieved national fame as chairman of the commission formed in 1978 
to investigate the societal implications of micro-electronics. One of the commission’s 
recommendations was that there should be ongoing and systematic monitoring of the societal 
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Netherlands Organization for Technology Assessment (NOTA) in 1986. On 2 June 1994, this 
organization was renamed ‘the Rathenau Instituut’.
Dissertation
Pleun van Arensbergen
Talent Proof 
Selection Processes in Research 
Funding and Careers
TA
L
E
N
T
 P
R
O
O
F
: S
E
L
E
C
T
IO
N
 P
R
O
C
E
S
S
E
S
 IN
 R
E
S
E
A
R
C
H
 F
U
N
D
IN
G
 A
N
D
 C
A
R
E
E
R
S
           
           P
L
E
U
N
 V
A
N
 A
R
E
N
S
B
E
R
G
E
N
The quality of higher education and research is strongly connected to the quality of the people 
working in the academic sector. For excellent science, excellent scientists are needed. The pool 
of competent scholars with academic career ambitions has been growing for the past decades. 
As public funding of universities has not matched this rise of (potential) staff, academics have 
become more dependent on competitive external project funding and individual funding. 
Publishing and grant proposal writing are two activities of major importance for especially early 
career researcher who aim to advance in academia. Funding organizations therefore play a crucial 
role in the development of academic careers, next to universities that increasingly focus on 
attracting and retaining academic top talent. The research questions of this study, ‘What is 
academic talent and how is it selected?’ aim to create a better understanding of the process of 
talent selection within academia, especially in the context of grant allocation. 
Key results of this study address the criteria used in talent assessment and more speciﬁ cally the 
weight assigned to publications; the social and competitive nature of grant allocation processes; 
the role of gender in talent selection and gender differences in academic performance; and 
factors supporting or impeding academic careers.
This study feeds current debates on scientiﬁ c quality and the growing competition for funding 
and academic positions with empirical arguments. It reﬂ ects on the existing mechanisms of talent 
selection and ends with a discussion on the implications for higher education and science policy 
to uphold and stimulate academic talent.
